Essays in health economics and public policy by Cannonier, Colin Darren
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
2011
Essays in health economics and public policy
Colin Darren Cannonier
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, colin.cannonier@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations
Part of the Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contactgradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cannonier, Colin Darren, "Essays in health economics and public policy" (2011). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 2226.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/2226
ESSAYS IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the  
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College  
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
in 
 
The Department of Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Colin D. Cannonier 
B.S., University of the West Indies, Jamaica, 1999 
M.A., Williams College, U.S.A., 2004 
M.S., Louisiana State University, U.S.A., 2008 
August 2011  
 
 ii
This thesis is dedicated to my mother Dulcina Cannonier.
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
This is a great opportunity to express my respect, gratitude and appreciation to my 
advisor Dr. Naci Mocan.  Professor is always right!!!  The detailed level of interest you showed 
in my work, academic development and the substantial financial and time inputs are beyond 
comparison.  In particular, Dr. Mocan has provided valuable insights and has encouraged me to 
develop the skills to carry out independent research.  It is a privilege to have worked under your 
guidance and the lessons learnt and experiences gained have equipped me to perform in my 
future academic pursuits.  Importantly, I am grateful for the important lessons you and Madeline 
Mocan taught me as a human being. 
Special thanks to my other committee members, namely, Dr. Robert Newman, Dr. Kaj 
Gittings and Dr. Bulent Unel, from whom I received tremendous support, advice and 
encouragement during this process of my dissertation.  Thanks to Dr. Carter Hill for providing 
valuable comments and suggestions on aspects of the econometric model, especially in the early 
parts of the research.  There were a few persons in the academic profession, especially Lucie 
Schmidt and David Paton, who responded favorably in contributing numerous helpful comments 
and suggestions.   
During the past several months, I had the opportunity to present parts of this research at 
various colleges, universities and conferences. I am grateful to participants in seminars at 
Louisiana State University, Whitworth University, Indiana University – South Bend, St. Olaf 
College, Belmont University, University of Massachusetts – Lowell and the Southern Economic 
Association meetings.   
I would like to acknowledge all the wonderful people with whom I came in contact along 
this journey.  These include my childhood mates, sports colleagues, former co-workers, current 
 iv
and former office mates, classmates and teachers.  Douglas Gollin has given me steady 
encouragement, especially during my transition into the doctoral program.  I am thankful for the 
valuable financial support received from various institutions that made pursuing my academic 
studies possible: St. Kitts-Nevis Social Security Board, Joint Japan/World Bank Scholarship, the 
Huel Perkins Diversity Fellowship and the Economics Department at Louisiana State University.   
To my wife Nicole, I offer my deepest gratitude for providing support and 
encouragement throughout this challenging, yet worthwhile process.    
My greatest debt is to my mother, Dulcina Cannonier, for the unwavering love and 
support.  This dissertation is dedicated to you and my siblings Delass, Janelle and Zamoya.   
 v
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... ii 
 
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................ iii 
 
List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. viii 
 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ x 
 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... xi 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
 
Chapter 2. State Abstinence Education Programs and Teen Birth Rates in the U.S. ............ 4 
2.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 4 
2.2. Background ...................................................................................................................... 6 
2.2.1. Teen Birth Rates in the United States .................................................................. 6 
2.2.2. Title V State Abstinence Education (SAE) Program ........................................... 8 
2.2.3. Analytical Framework and Related Literature ..................................................... 9 
2.3. Data ................................................................................................................................ 13 
2.3.1. Birth Rates and State Abstinence Education (SAE) Funding ............................ 14 
2.3.2. Other Controls .................................................................................................... 15 
2.4. Empirical Strategy ......................................................................................................... 21 
2.5. Results ............................................................................................................................ 24 
2.5.1. The Impact of State Abstinence Education on Births to Minors ....................... 24 
2.5.2. Difference-in-Differences .................................................................................. 25 
2.5.3. Impact of the State Abstinence Education Program on Race-Specific 
Birth Rates ..........................................................................................................31 
2.6. Sensitivity Analysis ....................................................................................................... 32 
2.6.1. Multi-way Clustering ......................................................................................... 32 
2.6.2. Including Lags of the State Abstinence Education Funding Variable ............... 33 
2.6.3. Lagged Dependent Variable .............................................................................. 34 
2.6.4. Sample Size Modification .................................................................................. 35 
2.6.5. Changes in the Control Group ........................................................................... 36 
2.6.6. Multiple Control Groups .................................................................................... 37 
2.6.7. Other Robustness Checks .................................................................................. 38 
2.7. Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 40 
2.7.1. Caveats ............................................................................................................... 40 
2.7.2. Estimated Cost-Benefit Analysis ....................................................................... 42 
2.8. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 43 
 
Chapter 3. Does the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) Increase Fertility 
Behavior? ..................................................................................................................45 
3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 45 
3.2. Background .................................................................................................................... 48 
 vi
3.2.1. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 ...................................... 48 
3.2.2. Implications of the Family and Medical Leave (FMLA)................................... 50 
3.3. Theoretical Perspective .................................................................................................. 51 
3.4. Previous Literature ......................................................................................................... 53 
3.4.1. Related Literature............................................................................................... 53 
3.4.2. Previous Research on the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) ................. 57 
3.5. Empirical Strategy ......................................................................................................... 58 
3.6. Data ................................................................................................................................ 60 
3.6.1. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort (NLSY79) ..................... 60 
3.6.2. Dependent Variables and Controls .................................................................... 61 
3.6.3. Measurement and Other Data Issues .................................................................. 62 
3.7. Empirical Results ........................................................................................................... 66 
3.7.1. Descriptive Statistics .......................................................................................... 66 
3.7.2. Discrete-Time Hazard Estimates: Probability of Having a First Birth .............. 67 
3.7.3. Discrete-Time Hazard Estimates: Probability of Having a Second Birth.......... 70 
3.7.4. Some Calculations ............................................................................................. 71 
3.7.5. Sensitivity Analysis ........................................................................................... 77 
3.7.6. Parametric Estimation Using Log-normal Regressions ..................................... 80 
3.8. Discussion and Conclusion ............................................................................................ 83 
 
Chapter 4. Empowering Women: The Impact of Education on Preferences – 
Evidence from a Policy Experiment in Sierra Leone ............................................87 
4.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 87 
4.2. Education in Sierra Leone and the Free Primary Education (FPE) Policy .................... 91 
4.2.1. Some Background on Education in Sierra Leone Prior to the FPE ................... 91 
4.2.2. An Overview of the Free Primary Education (FPE) Policy ............................... 95 
4.3. Data ................................................................................................................................ 96 
4.3.1. Sierra Leone Demographic and Health Survey (SLDHS) ................................. 96 
4.3.2. Other Data .......................................................................................................... 99 
4.4. Empirical Strategy ....................................................................................................... 100 
4.4.1. Treatment (FPE Cohort) Effect on Schooling ................................................. 100 
4.4.2. Interactions between Treatment (FPE Cohort) Effect and Education Funding 
(FPE Inputs) on Schooling ............................................................................... 102 
4.4.3. Schooling on Preferences: Instrumental Variables (IV) Strategy .................... 106 
4.5. Results .......................................................................................................................... 107 
4.5.1. Impact of Treatment (FPE Cohort) on Schooling ............................................ 107 
4.5.2. Impact of Treatment and Education Funding on Schooling ............................ 110 
4.5.3. Further Support for the Identification Strategy ................................................ 112 
4.5.4. Some Robustness Checks ................................................................................ 113 
4.5.5. Impact of Schooling on Preferences: OLS Estimates ...................................... 114 
4.5.6. Impact of Schooling on Preferences: Instrumental Variables (IV) 
Estimates ...........................................................................................................117 
4.6. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 121 
 
Chapter 5. Summary and Conclusions ................................................................................... 124 
 
 vii
References .................................................................................................................................. 128 
 
Appendix 
A Supplementary Tables for Chapter 2 ....................................................................... 138 
 
B Supplementary Tables for Chapter 3 ....................................................................... 145 
 
C Supplementary Tables for Chapter 4 ....................................................................... 148 
 
D Supplementary Material for Chapter 2 ................................................................... 152 
 
E Supplementary Material for Chapter 3 ................................................................... 154 
 
F Supplementary Material for Chapter 4 ................................................................... 159 
 
Vita ............................................................................................................................................. 161 
 
 
  
 viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1:  Summary Statistics: Difference-in-Differences Analysis for the period 1991-
2005...........................................................................................................................16 
 
Table 2.2:  Impact of State Abstinence Education Funding on Birth rate ................................. 28 
 
Table 2.3:  Differences in Mean (change in) Birth Rates between Age Groups ........................ 29 
 
Table 2.4:  Impact of State Abstinence Education (SAE) on Birth Rates: Models using 
various Population Groups to Deflate the SAE Funding (Control Group: 
Birth rates for females 25-29 years)..........................................................................30 
 
Table 2.5:  Impact of State Abstinence Education (SAE) on Race-Specific Birth Rates: 
Models using various Population Groups to Deflate the SAE Funding 
(Control Group: Birth rates for females 25-29 years) ...............................................39 
 
Table 3.1:  Impact of Fertility Desire on choosing a Maternity Leave Job: OLS 
Regressions ...............................................................................................................64 
 
Table 3.2:  Summary Statistics for Women in the NLSY79 sample: Means (standard 
deviations) .................................................................................................................68 
 
Table 3.3:  Estimates from Logit Regression: Likelihood of a First Birth (Marginal 
Effects)  .................................................................................................................... 72 
 
Table 3.4:  Estimates from Logit Regression: Likelihood of a First Birth by Sector, 
Race and Ethnicity and Education Level (Marginal effects) ....................................73 
 
Table 3.5:  Estimates from Logit Regression: Likelihood of a Second Birth (Marginal 
Effects)  .................................................................................................................... 74 
 
Table 3.6:  Estimates from Logit Regression: Likelihood of a Second Birth by Sector, 
Race and Ethnicity and Education Level (Marginal effects) ....................................75 
 
Table 3.7:  Estimates from Logit Regression: Sensitivity Analysis on the likelihood of a 
Birth (Marginal Effects) ............................................................................................78 
 
Table 3.8:  Estimates from Log-normal Regression: Time-to-birth in years ..............................85 
 
Table 4.1:  Summary Statistics: 2008 SLDHS Sample (Individual Level Data) ..................... 103 
 
Table 4.2:  Summary Statistics: Variables Used in the Analysis (District-level Data)............ 105 
 
Table 4.3:  The Impact of Treatment on Schooling - OLS Regressions .................................. 109 
 
 ix
Table 4.4:  The Impact of Treatment and Exposure on Schooling - OLS Regressions ........... 111 
 
Table 4.5:  The Impact of Schooling on Preferences – OLS Regressions ............................... 119 
 
Table 4.6:  The Impact of Schooling on Preferences – Instrumental Variables 
Regression .............................................................................................................. 120 
 
Table A.1:  Variable Definitions and Sources .......................................................................... 139 
 
Table A.2:  Difference-in-Differences: Outcomes of Change in Birth Rates: Control 
Group: Birth rates for females 25-29 years.............................................................141 
 
Table A.3:  Difference-in-Differences: Outcomes of Change in Birth Rates: Control 
Group: Birth rates for females 25-29 years (Sample size modification) ................142 
 
Table A.4:  Difference-in-Differences: Outcomes of Change in Birth Rates (Changes in 
the Control Group) ..................................................................................................143 
 
Table A.5:  Difference-in-Differences: Outcomes of Change in Birth Rates (Multiple 
Control Groups) ......................................................................................................143 
 
Table A.6:  Difference-in-Differences: Outcomes of Change in Birth Rates (Allowing 
covariates to affect age groups differently) ............................................................144 
 
Table B.1:  Description of Variables ........................................................................................ 146 
 
Table B.2:  Some Calculations ................................................................................................. 147 
 
Table B.3:  Predicted response time (years) before getting a birth (Eligible Women)............. 147 
 
Table C.1:  The Impact of Treatment and Exposure on Schooling - OLS Regressions 
(Different Control Group: Individuals born 1986-1989 or 12-15 years in 
2001) .......................................................................................................................149 
 
Table C.2:  The Impact of Treatment and Exposure on Schooling – OLS Regressions 
(Robustness Check) ................................................................................................150 
 
Table C.3:  The Impact of Schooling on Preferences – Instrumental Variables 
Regressions (Different Control Group: Individuals born 1986-1989 or 12-15 
years in 2001) ..........................................................................................................151 
 
 
 
  
 x
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1:  Trends in U.S. Birth Rates ....................................................................................... 24 
 
Figure 3.1:  Log-normal Survival Plots of not giving a first birth .............................................. 86 
 
Figure 3.2:  Log-normal Survival Plots of not giving a second birth .......................................... 86 
 
Figure 4.1:  Sierra Leone divided by districts in 2004 ................................................................ 93 
 
Figure 4.2:  Distribution of Primary School Damage Index in 2004 .......................................... 94 
 
 
 
  
  
 xi
ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation consists of three essays analyzing the role of public policy in affecting 
such outcomes as fertility, educational attainment and women’s preferences towards fertility and 
sexual activity.   
First, I investigate how a government educational policy affected the fertility behavior of 
teenagers in the United States.  Specifically, Title V State Abstinence Education (SAE) program 
appropriates funding to states for the purpose of educating minors on abstinence before marriage.  
Using state level data to analyze the impact of abstinence education on the birth rates for teens; I 
find that for an average state, increasing spending by $50,000 per year on state abstinence 
education can help avoid approximately four births to teenagers.    
Next, I examine the fertility impact of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).  The 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) which was implemented in August 1993, is a federal 
reform requiring firms of a certain size in all states to grant job-protected leave to any employee 
satisfying certain eligibility criteria.  One of the provisions of the FMLA is to allow women to 
stay at home for a maximum period of 12 weeks to give care to the new born.  Using data from 
the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) this study analyzes 
whether the FMLA has influenced birth outcomes in the U.S. over the period 1989 to 2006.  I 
find that eligible women increase the probability of giving a first and second birth by about 6 and 
4.2 percentage points, respectively.  Compared to other women, eligible women are giving birth 
to the first child 11 months earlier and about 6 months earlier for the second child.   
In the final part of this research, I estimate the impact of schooling on preferences among 
women.  I first analyze the effect of a government policy that provides free primary education on 
completed schooling.  From this investigation, I find that increased schooling changes a 
 xii
woman’s preference for the demand for children, delays the start of first sexual encounter and 
increases the use of modern contraceptives.  Increased education has also empowered women. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation consists of three essays analyzing the role of public policy in affecting 
such outcomes as fertility, educational attainment and women’s preferences towards fertility and 
sexual activity.  It has its concentration in the fields of Health Economics, Economic 
Demography and Public Policy which also form the bulk of my research.  The organization of 
the dissertation is as follows.  The first part, comprising two-thirds of the essays, discusses my 
work on the role of policy in influencing fertility while the second part focuses on the impact of 
education on health-related outcomes and preferences.  I also discuss my future research. 
 In the first chapter titled “State Abstinence Education and Teen Birth Rates in the U.S.”, I 
investigate how a government educational policy affected the fertility behavior of teenagers in 
the United States.  Specifically, Title V, section 510 of the Social Security Act, passed in 1996 
and implemented in 1998, appropriates funding to states for the purpose of educating minors on 
the benefits of abstinence before marriage.  Despite considerable research on the impact of 
abstinence education on teen fertility outcomes, high quality population-level studies on state 
abstinence education using panel data are absent.  This chapter uses state-level data over the 
period 1991 to 2005 to analyze the impact of abstinence education on the birth rates for teens 15-
17 years by evaluating the Title V, section 510 State Abstinence Education (SAE) program.  I 
find that for an average state, increasing spending by $50,000 per year on SAE can help avoid 
approximately four births to teenagers, resulting in net savings of $15,652 to the public for each 
birth avoided.    
The second essay “Does the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) increase Fertility 
Behavior?” is similar in spirit to the previous chapter in that it examines the fertility impact of 
another universal policy undertaken in the United States around the same time period.   The 
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Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) which was implemented in August 1993, is a federal 
reform requiring firms of a certain size in all states to grant job-protected leave to any employee 
satisfying the eligibility criteria.  One of the provisions of the FMLA is to allow women to stay 
at home for a maximum period of 12 weeks to give care to the new born.  While it remains an 
important policy question, the effect of this legislation on the fertility response of eligible women 
has received no attention by researchers.  Using data from the 1979 cohort of the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) this study analyzes whether the FMLA has influenced 
birth outcomes in the U.S. over the period 1989 to 2006.  Specifically, I evaluate the effect of the 
FMLA by comparing the changes in the birth hazard profiles of women who became eligible for 
FMLA benefits such as maternity leave, to the changes in the control group who were not 
eligible for such leave.  Using a discrete-time hazard model, results from the difference-in-
differences estimation indicate that eligible women increase the probability of giving a first and 
second birth by about 6 and 4.2 percentage points, respectively.  Compared to other women, 
eligible women are giving birth to the first child 11 months earlier and about 6 months earlier for 
the second child. I also find that if the criteria for eligibility were relaxed, the fertility impact of 
the policy could almost double, possibly through its effects on a broader spectrum of the labor 
force.                
The study of the benefits of education has occupied a considerable part of the economics 
literature, but a large and disproportionate amount of interest has been dedicated to the private 
returns to education.  Recently, economists have examined the role of education in influencing 
other outcomes such as health (Chou, Liu, Grossman and Joyce 2010; Currie and Moretti 2003; 
Grossman 1972a, 1972b; Lleras-Muney 2005; Kenkel 1991).  In the third essay, the role of 
government is once again revisited, but this time within the context of how public policy 
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influences preferences through education.  In the chapter titled “Empowering Women: The 
Impact of Education on Preferences – Evidence from a Policy Experiment in Sierra Leone”, I 
estimate the impact of schooling on preferences among women.  I first analyze the effect of a 
government policy that provides free primary education on completed schooling.  Variation in 
individuals’ exposure to the policy (identified by year of birth) and the amount of education 
funding led to an increase of 0.85 years of completed schooling for the affected female cohort.  
By combining birth year and free primary education input to instrument for schooling, I find that 
schooling changes a woman’s preference for the demand for children, delays the start of first 
sexual encounter and increases the use of modern contraceptives.  Specifically, an additional 
year of schooling reduces desired fertility by 0.37 children while it increases the delay in sexual 
debut by 0.24 years.  The results also indicate that increased education has empowered women 
by influencing their opinions regarding the rights of women to decide under what conditions they 
have sexual relations with their husbands.   
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CHAPTER 2.  STATE ABSTINENCE EDUCATION PROGRAMS AND TEEN BIRTH RATES IN THE U.S. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Although teen fertility rates are on the decline in the United States, the U.S. still has one 
of the highest rates of teen pregnancy, ranking first amongst the industrialized nations 
(Guttmacher, 2002; Sen, 2003; Barnett and Hurst, 2003).  The cost of childbearing is estimated 
to have been approximately $9.1 billion in 2006 (Hoffman, 2006), affecting a number of 
institutions ranging from the health care system, child welfare, and public sector health care to 
the state and federal prisons systems.  It is estimated that the average child born to a female 
under the age of 19 receives assistance from the public sector amounting to $1,430 every year.1  
The aim of this chapter is to use state-level panel data from the U.S. to examine the impact on 
teen births in relation to a federal government-sponsored State Abstinence Education (SAE) 
program that promotes the importance and consequences of abstaining from premarital sex. 
Several studies have used state-level data to estimate pregnancy, births or abortions as a 
function of a set of determinants such as abstinence, abortion laws or some forms of sex 
education.  For instance, the results of Levine (2003) provide strong support for an impact of 
parental-consent abortion laws on teen pregnancy rates, but no impact on births.  Kearney and 
Levine (2009) find a decline in births when cheaper family planning services are made available 
to higher-income women.  However, Paton (2002) finds no evidence that greater access to family 
planning services helps in reducing underage births or abortions.      
                                                 
1 Monetary values are in 2004 dollars.  For the period 1991-2004, it was estimated that taxpayers contributed $161 
billion to support teen childbearing. Further, Hoffman (2006) states that the reduction in teen birth rates during the 
same period has resulted in an estimated savings of $6.8 billion in 2004.  Private expenditures or savings are not 
included in these estimates.  
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Many previous studies investigating the effects of various public policy interventions 
have relied on randomized-control trials (RCTs).2  Randomized experiments have a superior 
advantage in terms of their internal validity, which other methods such as difference-in-
differences do not readily provide.  If successful random assignment to control and treatment 
groups are undertaken, RCTs can provide accurate and useful information on observable 
differences that are attributable to intervention and not to confounding influences.  However, 
controlled experiments lack external validity.  These experiments tend to focus on a specific 
population with particular characteristics in a controlled environment and for this reason, the 
results cannot be readily generalized to other settings.  Furthermore, a challenge for controlled 
designs is the potential for the control group, especially in the case of teens, to change its 
behavior in rather unexpected ways (Kirby et al., 1994) or for the treatment group to refuse 
program intervention.  Although a large number of RCTs have been conducted to analyze the 
impact of abstinence education, population-level studies that use state-level panel data are 
absent.  Despite the preponderance of individual-level studies, because of the shortcomings 
identified above, there is the possibility for the results of these studies to be overestimated and 
the external validity could be brought into question.  This state-level analysis is designed to 
address the lack of external validity and to complement the work done in previous studies.      
Using state-level panel data, I present evidence that SAE programs supported by the 
Federal Title V, Section 510 grants have led to a statistically significant decline in teen birth 
rates.  I use difference-in-differences analysis where teens 15-17 years are the group targeted for 
                                                 
2 An RCT is a trial involving two randomly selected groups: one is the experimental group, which receives the 
intervention that is being tested, and the other is the comparison or control group, which receives a different 
treatment.  The different treatment may in fact be a placebo (fake or inertial treatment).  Neither of the groups knows 
whether it is receiving the “real” treatment or the “control” one.  For an example, see the meta-analysis by DiCenso 
et al. (2002).  
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the program, while 25-29 year-olds are used as the control group.  The findings are robust to 
various model specifications, as well as to various control groups. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows:  Section 2.2 presents background 
information on recent trends in teen birth rates in the U.S., institutional details on the Title V 
SAE program, analytical framework and a literature review of studies related to this research.  In 
Section 2.3, I describe the data used in the analysis, while Section 2.4 describes the empirical 
strategy.  The results of my findings are provided in Section 2.5, which is followed by sensitivity 
analyses in Section 2.6.  Section 2.7 addresses some caveats to the research, as well as discusses 
some policy issues.  Section 2.8 concludes.     
 
2.2. Background 
2.2.1. Teen Birth Rates in the United States 
The U.S. has one of the highest teen birth rates in the developed world and there is 
reasonable consensus that the present rates are a source of concern from a social and economic 
standpoint.  In 2005, there were approximately 415,000 teen births to women age 15-19, or 
roughly 41 out of every 1,000 females in this age range give birth.  Teen birth rates in the U.S. 
continue to witness a decline, albeit at a slower pace, for more than a decade.  To put into 
perspective, since their peak in 1991, teen birth rates have declined by 34 percent with the impact 
being largest amongst 15-17 year olds (Martin et. al., 2007).  An increasing number of studies 
have concluded that abstinence and improved contraceptive practices are influential in causing 
much of the decline (Santelli et al., 2007).   
 There is substantial variation in teen birth rates across different strata: race, ethnicity 
and state of residence.  In 2005, the birth rate among non-Hispanic Black teens was 60.9 per 
1,000 which was more than twice the rate of 25.9 per 1,000 among non-Hispanic Whites.  For 
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Hispanic teens, this rate was 81.7 per 1,000.  Among states, birth rates to teens were lowest in 
New Hampshire with 17.9 births per 1,000 girls age 15-19 while the highest rate of 63.4 per 
1,000 was recorded in the District of Columbia (Martin et al., 2007).   
 For more than a decade, federal and state policies on sex education have been skewed 
in favor of abstinence education which teaches the harmful physiological and psychological 
effects of premarital sex.  While both forms of sex education – abstinence and contraception - are 
encouraged and allowed, none of the states require that contraception use be stressed.  Sex 
education with a contraceptive focus is taught within the context of the riskiness in relying on 
failure-prone mechanisms.  Currently, there is no federal government-funded program for 
comprehensive sex education while funding for abstinence-centered programs have been 
channeled through three main streams: the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA) in 1981, Section 
510 of the Social Security Act (Title V) in 1996 and the Community-Based Abstinence 
Education (CBAE) in 2000.  Greater emphasis has been placed on funding the Title V program.  
  There are several reasons why this has been the case.  Total funding under the AFLA 
has been small compared to SAE funding which has tended to be at least four times as large.  
Further, less than half of the funding under the AFLA has been allocated for the prevention of 
teen pregnancy.  The AFLA program is still ongoing.  Under the CBAE arrangement, funding for 
abstinence education has been performed solely at the community level without any state 
approval.  That is, grants awarded under the CBAE went directly to community-based 
organizations from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).  In the case of 
the SAE program, all funding for abstinence education require state approval. Over time, both 
8 
 
the AFLA and the CBAE have undergone legislative changes because of a perceived lack of 
focus or the restrictive nature of the programs.3  
 
2.2.2. Title V State Abstinence Education (SAE) Program 
Since 1998, in accordance with Section 510, Title V of the Social Security Act passed in 
1996; the Federal government is mandated to make funds available to all states for the specific 
purpose of teaching and educating children to refrain from premarital sex through a State 
Abstinence Education (SAE) program.4  The aim of the program is to educate and promote the 
idea that abstinence is the preferred way of preventing pre-marital teen pregnancy and births.  
The motivation for Title V arose out of the concern for the high rates of teen pregnancy prior to 
the 1990s and the substantial social costs to the public sector.   
In 1998, the law required that the Federal government appropriates $250 million for 
states over five years ending in 2002.  A criterion for receiving these funds includes a state 
contribution of three dollars for every four dollars of program-associated federal grants it 
receives.  Thus, if states are to use all of the annual federal appropriation of $50 million in any 
one year, then the total grants available for the SAE program are estimated to be $87.5 million.5  
In 2002, the $50 million per year Federal Title V SAE program was extended for another five 
years until 2007.  Since then, the U.S. Congress has made a request for further appropriations. 
                                                 
3 See Advocates for Youth website the ACF website 
http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/index.php/publications/429.html?task=view  (Accessed December 14, 2010). 
 
4 Since June 2004, the SAE program has been managed and administered by the Administration for Children and 
Families (ACF) as well as Family and Youth Services Bureau (FYSB).  Previously, this was the responsibility of the 
Health Resources and Services Administration’s (HRSA) Maternal and Child Health Bureau (MCHB). See the ACF 
website http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/fysb/content/abstinence/factsheet.htm (Accessed March 3, 2009). 
 
5 Monies are distributed between states according to the following process: Grants are awarded to states based on a 
statutory formula which is partly determined by the proportion of low-income children in a state to the total number 
of low-income children in all states according to the latest census data. The state is required to match 75 percent of 
Title V funds.  See the ACF website http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/fysb/content/abstinence/factsheet.htm 
(Accessed March 3, 2009). 
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The target groups are children within the age range of 12-17 years.  The Federal 
government provides funding in the form of grants to states; and there is “great diversity in how 
Section 510 abstinence funds are distributed” (Mathematica Policy Research, 2009).  In any 
given year, the annual $50 million appropriation is divided into 80-90 awards, each with a value 
between $250,000 and $650,000.  In the majority of the cases, states implement the SAE grants 
through local organizations, which may include churches and other non-profit organizations.6 All 
users of the federal government funds must be guided by the “A-H definition”.7 
 
2.2.3. Analytical Framework and Related Literature 
Education has long been considered an important factor in determining fertility and the 
behaviors that affect fertility outcomes.  Three main channels have emphasized the causal effect 
of education.  In the first, education increases an individual’s permanent income through 
improved employment outcomes.  As a result, the opportunity cost of raising children (in terms 
of potential foregone earnings) rises and so the optimal fertility choices result in fewer but higher 
                                                 
6 Massachusetts is the only state that utilizes all of its funding in one block.  
  
7 This is not the first for abstinence-only education.  Such programs have been ongoing for a few decades as far back 
as 1981 during the Ronald Regan administration (see Economist article “Just Say No” at www.economist.com, 
accessed February 12, 2009).  However, the programs today are unique in their stated requirements and goals.  
The “A-H” definitions require that each grant must: 
A. Have as its exclusive purpose teaching the social, psychological, and health gains to be realized by 
abstaining from sexual activity,  
B. Teach abstinence from sexual activity outside marriage as the expected standard for all school-age children,  
C. Teach that abstinence from sexual activity is the only certain way to avoid out-of-wedlock pregnancy, 
sexually transmitted diseases, and other associated health problems,  
D. Teach that a mutually faithful, monogamous relationship in the context of marriage is the expected standard 
of sexual activity,  
E. Teach that sexual activity outside the context of marriage is likely to have harmful psychological and 
physical effects,  
F. Teach that bearing children out-of-wedlock is likely to have harmful consequences for the child, the child’s 
parents, and society,  
G. Teach young people how to reject sexual advances and how alcohol and drug use increases vulnerability to 
sexual advances, and 
H. Teach the importance of attaining self-sufficiency before engaging in sexual activity. 
10 
 
quality children (Becker, 1965; Becker et al., 1990).  The second channel posits that higher 
educated females seek higher educated males (assortative behavior), causing permanent income 
to rise further with implications for fertility choices (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002).  The third 
– allocative mechanism - suggests that education improves an individual’s knowledge, thus 
increasing the ability to efficiently process this information in making optimal fertility choices 
(Grossman, 1972a).   
 The effect of education on fertility choices may be analyzed in the spirit of Grossman’s 
(1972a, 2005) efficiency allocation framework, whereby higher educated individuals have access 
to more information to make the optimal fertility choices.  Simultaneously, with this information, 
they also know the resultant harmful effects of choosing a sub-optimal path such as early 
childbearing.  The problems of two-way causality and the possibility of third-variables 
influencing outcomes are also discussed in detail in Grossman (2005).  These issues, as they 
pertain to this work, are addressed later in the chapter.  These ideas can be summarized as  
Y=f(C, X)              (2.1) 
where Y measures some fertility outcome and C represents choices influencing fertility 
outcomes.  For example, C may stand for whether a teenager decides to abstain or practice 
contraceptive use, both of which are choice variables affecting fertility.  The vector X denotes all 
other factors that can affect the outcome.   
 As argued above, it is also true that schooling can influence the choices made as it 
relates to fertility.  If schooling does not influence the exogenous factors in the vector X, choice 
outcomes may be analyzed as follows: 
C=g(S, X)               (2.2) 
11 
 
where S is a schooling variable which also includes sex education.  Substituting Equation (2.2) 
into Equation (2.1) yields 
Y=h(S, X)                (2.3) 
This is the reduced-form equation which is estimated in the chapter.   
 Following the general lack of consensus in explaining the unprecedented rise in 
pregnancies in the 1970s and 80s (Akerlof et al., 1996; Willis, 1999) and the subsequent decline 
in the 1990s, more attention has been paid to the impact of changes in teen fertility behavior as a 
result of increased sex education.  Building on previous theories, economists such as Oettinger 
(1999) have incorporated rational choice models to explain how information affects individual 
behavior through a change in utility.       
A number of policy approaches have been used to address the problems of early 
pregnancy and childbearing.  There are three broad policy initiatives: those that increase access 
to contraceptives; those that alter the financial costs and incentives to childbearing; and those 
that highlight information through targeted interventions within schools and communities.8  The 
latter consists of three categories: sex education with a focus on abstinence, sex education with a 
focus on contraceptive use, and a multi-component youth development program. 9   The 
investigation undertaken in this chapter addresses the last policy issue. 
A number of studies, albeit with mixed results, have examined the relationship between 
abstinence education and pregnancy, and birth outcomes (Frost and Forrest, 1995; Doniger et al., 
                                                 
8 An example of altering the incentives to childbearing is the Family Cap welfare reform policy in the mid-1990s, 
which ended the practice of providing families on welfare with cash benefits upon the birth of a new child (Kearney, 
2008). 
 
9 While this paper focuses on the first category, the youth development program – a relatively expensive initiative - 
incorporates a more holistic approach to addressing the issue of teen childbearing.  See Kearney (2008) for a 
discussion of this issue.   
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2001; DiCenso et al., 2002).  One major criticism of these studies is the over-representation of a 
particular group of participants.  That is, the tendency has been to choose a disproportionate 
number of African-Americans and Hispanics, which represent the lower economic groups in 
society.  Other wide-ranging studies that are void of this critique have also found mixed results 
in the outcomes of abstinence education on sexual behavior and fertility (Kirby et al., 1994; 
Cabezón et al., 2005; Borawski et al., 2005). 
Closer to this chapter have been several studies analyzing the impact of Title V SAE 
programs; but none has been conducted using extensive state-level panel data analysis.  Those 
studies that have utilized panel data have been limited to very short time-series components with 
the individual being the unit of analysis.  The results have been mixed with some noting the 
ineffectiveness of the Title V SAE program (Barnett and Hurst, 2003; Devaney et al., 2008) 
while others (Denny et al., 1999; Carter-Jessop et al., 2000; Lieberman et al., 2000) have found 
that the programs have resulted in a decline in sexual activity.  Card (1999, p. 279) has argued 
that the effects of SAE programs are still inconclusive, noting that abstinence education 
programs have been “a partial contributor to the country’s focus on the problem of teen 
pregnancy, a focus that has led to the…decline in the teen birth rate.” 
Recently, one notable study examining the impact of Title V, Section 510 programs over 
a multi-year period is the April 2007 evaluation report by Mathematica Policy Research.  The 
evaluation is a study of four abstinence programs.10  The report has found that “none of the 
individual programs had statistically significant impacts on the rate of sexual abstinence…” 
(Mathematica Policy Research, 2007, p. 30).  Despite carrying out a “gold standard” randomized 
trial design (Kearney, 2008), this study is not without concerns, some of which have been 
                                                 
10The programs are My Choice, My Future in Virginia; ReCapturing the Vision in Florida; Families United to 
Prevent Teen Pregnancy in Wisconsin; and Teens in Control in Mississippi. 
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highlighted in the Mathematica report.  First, the results of the evaluation cannot be generalized 
for all teens, since the “findings provide no information on the effects the programs might have if 
they were implemented for high school youth...” (Mathematica Policy Research, 2007, p. 61). 11  
A second concern relates to the possible lack of statistical power of the evaluation tests given the 
small sizes (including control group), which range from 447 to 714 individuals.  This chapter 
uses a multi-year approach, but makes a different contribution relative to the Mathematica study, 
incorporating state-level panels in a difference-in-differences setting, controlling for observable 
and unobservable factors in further investigating the causal nature of the SAE program. 
 
2.3. Data 
The data consist of a panel of 49 U.S. states (including the District of Columbia) that 
receive funding for SAE as per Title V, section 510 of the Social Security Act.12  I exclude the 
state of California because it has never applied for any funding during these years.13   The 
observations are annual and span the period 1991-2005.14   
 
                                                 
11Within the Mathematica report, the RCT programs being analyzed were aimed at children who attended 
elementary and middle schools. 
   
12 All states, with the exception of California, have received SAE funding from the Federal government since the 
implementation of the program in 1998.  However, in 1997 a few states had been engaged in teaching abstinence 
using funding received from a Title XX grant under the Ronald Reagan Administration, also known as Adolescent 
Family Life Act (AFLA) enacted in 1981. These “modest” abstinence programs were supported by a Federal reform 
initiative called the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 (Maureen Duran, “Re: Effects of 
Funding,” email message to author, May 2008). 
 
13 Later, I include California in the analysis but the results remain largely unaffected.   
 
14 The period 1991-2005 is chosen since, in difference-in-differences estimation, we are examining the effect of the 
treatment, SAE (which began in 1998) by comparing the treatment group (birth rates for 15-17 year olds) after 
treatment, both to the treatment group before treatment and to a control group (birth rates for 25-29 year olds).  
Therefore it is necessary to have information before the treatment has started.  The choice of period coverage is also 
based on data availability and also for the fact that teen birth rates began to fall in the early 1990s.  As I show later, 
using different sample periods (sub-samples) still produces results, which are consistent with the main findings. 
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2.3.1. Birth Rates and State Abstinence Education (SAE) Funding 
The birth rates for females 15-17 and 25-29 years are obtained from the Center for 
Disease Control (CDC), which publishes annual data on the number of births by state, age group 
and race. 15  Females who give birth during the ages 25-29 are considered to be the control group, 
while those giving birth during minor years act as the treatment group.  Birth rates are expressed 
as births per 1,000 female age-specific population.   I also analyze birth rates by race and 
ethnicity.        
The data on Title V, section 510 SAE funding for each state and year come from the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services Administration for Children and Families (ACF).  
The Title V program has been in existence since 1998 and each subsequent year the Federal 
government has appropriated $50 million for the SAE program.  The distribution of funds to 
each state is based on a formula that takes into account the proportion of low-income children in 
a state to the total number of low-income children in all states.  Each state is then required to 
provide 75 percent of this amount in matching funds.  The SAE data include the matching 
amount.  Since the data are reported in current dollars, the dollar amounts are expressed in real 
terms using the consumer price index, which is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis.16  To obtain the per capita SAE funding in real terms I then divide each state’s SAE 
funds expressed in real terms by its population.  In other specifications, I use other categories of 
population to deflate real SAE funds (example: population of 15-19 and 10-19 year-olds).  
                                                 
15 See website http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/vitalstats.htm (Accessed February 15, 2009). 
 
16 The base year for the consumer price index series from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis is 1982-1984.  
In this analysis, I use 2005 as the base year.  See website http://www.minneapolisfed.org/ (Accessed February 23, 
2009).  
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During the period under investigation, all states with the exception of California have requested 
Title V SAE funding.17   
Table 2.1 displays summary statistics for the birth rates and SAE per capita funding 
variables that I use in this analysis.  The definition of each variable is given in the first column.  
Columns 2-4 show the descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation and number of 
observations) for all state and year combinations in the sample.  The table also provides variable 
definitions and descriptive statistics for other controls used in the model.   
 
2.3.2. Other Controls 
In the regressions, I include social, economic, demographic as well as medical and health 
policy variables to control for other factors that affect teen birth rates.  State and year fixed-
effects are also included in all model specifications.  All data sources are listed in Table A.1.  
Teen birth rates are likely to be affected by the rape rate.  A number of studies, such as Donovan 
(1996), consider the effects of statutory rape on adolescent pregnancy, where some findings 
reveal at least 50 percent of children born to minors have an adult male as the father.   The rape 
rate is calculated as the number of rapes per 100,000 of the population and is obtained from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports (UCRs).  The robbery rate is also 
obtained from the FBI UCRs and it measures the number of robberies per 100,000 population.  I 
control for another related variable, imprisonment rate, which measures the number of 
incarcerations per 100,000 population.  These variables are proxies for difficult-to-observe state 
characteristics that may be correlated with teen births.  The data source is the same as the 
previous two variables.   
                                                 
17 This is important because this situation is like an exogenous event since all states accept SAE funding.  If for 
some reason, some states decide not to take the SAE funding while others access it, then this creates an endogenous 
event. 
16 
 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Difference-in-Differences Analysis for the period 1991-2005 
Variables Variable Definition Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Birth rates (All) Births per 1000 female population 15-17 and 25-29 years  71.59 45.608 1470 
Birth rates (All Blacks) Births per 1000 Black female population 15-17 and 25-
29 years 
77.59 33.05 1470 
Birth rates (All 
Hispanics) 
Births per 1000 Hispanic female population 15-17 and 
25-29 years 
83.00 43.62 1468 
Birth rates (All Whites) Births per 1000 White female population 15-17 and 25-
29 years 
68.92 48.90 1470 
Birth rates (All)     
Age 15-17 Births per 1000 population of all females 15-17 years 28.293 11.736 735 
Age 25-29 Births per 1000 population of all females 25-29 years 114.888 16.460 735 
Birth rates (Black)     
Age 15-17 Births per 1000 population of Black females 15-17 years 53.002 24.013 735 
Age 25-29 Births per 1000 population of Black females 25-219 
years 
102.179 19.968 735 
Birth rates (Hispanic)     
Age 15-17 Births per 1000 population of Hispanic females 15-17 
years 
54.608 21.205 735 
Age 25-29 Births per 1000 population of Hispanic females 25-219 
years 
111.469 41.721 733 
Birth rates (White)     
Age 15-17 Births per 1000 population of White females 15-17 years 22.492 8.954 735 
Age 25-29 Births per 1000 population of White females 25-29 years 115.351 19.192 735 
Notes: Refer to the Appendix for a complete description of all variables and sources of the data.  
1
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Economic conditions may affect adolescent birth rates.  Therefore, I include the poverty 
rate, which is the percentage of the population below the poverty level.  The data come from a 
variety of sources including the Census Bureau and the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES).  I also control for the proportion of the state’s population that is Black and the 
proportion of the state’s population consisting of Hispanics.  Both sets of variables come from 
the Population Division of the U.S. Census Bureau.  High school graduation rate is also included, 
as some studies show a strong association between teen child bearing and high school 
completion (Hofferth et al., 2001).  The variable high school graduation rate is constructed as the 
percentage of students graduating from high school.18  I also control for the rate of urbanization 
of the state.19       
Finally, I consider two health policy variables, which are indicator variables to represent 
whether or not a particular type of abortion restriction has been in place in a state in a given year.  
The first is Medicaid funding restriction, which prohibits the use of public resources to perform 
therapeutic abortions.  This variable equals one for states where Medicaid pays for abortions and 
zero otherwise.  The second restriction is a parental consent/notification or informed law, which 
requires a minor to notify, obtain consent from a parent or be given professional advice from 
medical personnel before proceeding with an abortion.  The variable takes the value of one if 
such a state has a parental consent/notification or informed law in place in that year, otherwise 
the variable assumes a zero value.  The information in constructing these variables comes from 
various issues of the Guttmacher Report on Public Policy, other reports from the Guttmacher 
                                                 
18 Swanson (2004) provides an extensive account on how this variable is derived. 
 
19 I thank Naci Mocan for providing the data. 
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Institute and from various publication issues of the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights 
Action League (NARAL).20  
 
2.4. Empirical Strategy 
The empirical strategy is to estimate the impact of Title V SAE on the fertility rates of 
12-17 year olds.  The first procedure is to estimate a regression model in which the birth rate for 
teens 15-17 years old is explained by abstinence education through Title V SAE funding.21  
Equation (2.4) depicts this model: 
 Birthrateit= α0 + α1SAEit + α2Xit +λi +γt + ηit + eit  (2.4) 
where i is an index for state and t indexes years.  The dependent variable is the birth rate for 15-
17 year-olds, SAEit is the real per capita funding for SAE programs, which occur after the 
introduction of Title V.  The vector X includes other variables (which I described earlier) that 
may be determinants of birth rates, such as demographic characteristics in the state, socio-
economic conditions in the state, as well as medical and health policy variables of the state.  I 
also control for state fixed-effects (λi), year fixed-effects (γt) and state-specific linear trends (ηit).  
The random error term is eit.   
In the specification above, a significant relationship between SAE funding and birth rates 
of 15-17 year-olds could be due to correlation between SAE funding and birth rates in general, 
leading to a spurious relationship.  Therefore, I use the specification in Equation (2.4) to obtain 
                                                 
20  NARAL produces the publication “Who Decides? A State-by-State Report on the Status of Women’s 
Reproductive Rights” that provides information on state laws and other legislative information that are related to 
reproductive rights. 
 
21 I use 15-17 year-olds as the treatment instead of 12-17 year-olds because data on the latter age group are not 
readily available over the length of the period under consideration.  Further, the available births data for the 
excluded 12-14 year-olds account for a relatively small proportion of births for 12-17 year-olds. 
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counterfactual estimates of the impact of SAE funding on birth rates of older women, 
specifically 18-19 and 25-29 year-olds.  The estimates should provide some measure of any 
benefits of the SAE program to older women.  Since SAE is explicitly geared towards school-
aged teens, then I do not anticipate any statistically significant results from this experiment.   
  As a second procedure, I employ a difference-in-differences method with the variables 
in first-differences exploiting the variation in the birth rates across states and time.22   Difference-
in-differences estimation allows the comparison of teen birth rates before and after the 
introduction of Title V SAE between 15-17 year-olds and 25-29 year-olds.  Specifically, I 
estimate the effect of SAE funding on birth rates using first-differences depicted in Equation 
(2.5):   
∆Birthrateait= β0 + β1∆SAEit + β2Youngit + β3(Youngit * ∆SAEit ) + β4∆Xit +λi +γt + eit   (2.5) 
where the dependent variable is the change in birth rates from one period to the next for age 
group a where a stands for females 15-17 years old (the treatment group) or those in the control 
group who are older.  On the right-hand side of the equation, ∆SAEit is the change in real per 
capita funding for SAE programs, which occur after the introduction of Title V; Youngit is a 
binary variable that equals one for birth rates for teens 15-17 years old and equals zero 
otherwise.23  The coefficient on the interaction term, (Youngit * ∆SAEit ) captures the association 
between differences in changes in birth rates specific to the treatment group (females 15-17 years 
old) relative to the control group in all states in the years after the SAE program was 
                                                 
22 In addition, first-differencing eliminates different trends in age-specific birth rates that may exist.  
  
23 The SAE amount comprises the Title V, section 510 allocations from the federal government plus the 75 percent 
matching contribution of each state. 
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implemented (relative to the period prior to the Title V Section 510 law). 24   This is the 
difference-in-differences estimator of the effects of the change in SAE funding on changes in 
birth rates.  The vector X is the same as the specification in Equation (2.4).  Although state fixed-
effects drop out by differencing, I include state dummies and keep the year dummies.  The 
random error term is ite .  The identifying assumption is that any relative shift in the birth rate for 
teens 15-17 years is due to the implementation of the Title V SAE program. 
In this analysis, a preferred control group might be females 25-29 years old.  The reason for 
this selected group is non-trivial.  The selection of this particular age group of females ensures 
there is no contamination of either group with the other during the period of SAE funding, which 
spans the period 1998-2005 in the sample. In this instance, females 25-29 years old in 2005 will 
have been in the 18-22 years range in 1998, which marks the start of the SAE program.  At the 
same time, females 15-17 years and who have started the SAE program in 1998 will never 
become part of the control group even into the year 2005 where they will be 22-24 years old.  
Notwithstanding, consideration is given to the significant physiological differences between 
these two groups and so I use a younger control group of 18-19 year-olds in a restricted sample.  
I investigate this in the section on sensitivity analysis.   
Figure 2.1 shows trends in birth rates for minors and older females 25-29 years for all states 
before and after the introduction of the SAE program.  Birth rates for females 15-17 (25-29) 
years are declining (increasing) even before the Title V SAE program was implemented.  This is 
important since time trends must be held constant to accurately estimate any effect of the 
program.  These different age-specific trends in birth rates occur before the implementation of 
the Title V program and are not directly related to the SAE program.  The presence of these 
                                                 
24 The impact of SAE funding on birth rates of the older group (control) is β1, the impact on the 15-17 year-olds is 
(β1+ β3).  Thus, the differential impact is represented by β3, which is the coefficient of interest. 
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trends poses potential identification problems; and to eliminate the different trends that may exist, 
I perform the analysis in first-differences.  
       
Figure 2.1: Trends in U.S. Birth Rates        
 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. The Impact of State Abstinence Education on Births to Minors 
Using the model in Equation (2.4), I estimate the relationship between Title V SAE 
funding and birth rates for females 15-17 years old.  The results are reported in Table 2.2 where 
the main coefficient of interest is that related to the SAE funding variable.  There is indication 
that SAE through Title V funding is associated with a decline in birth rates for females 15-17 
years.  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.2 present the results where the dependent variable is birth 
rates for 15-17 year-olds.  Both specifications are similar except that column (2) includes a linear 
state-specific trend.  In both specifications, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant.   
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These results may be due to correlation between funding and birth rates in general.  If 
there is correlation between funding and birth rates for older women, then this can have 
implications in any effort to establish some possible causal relationship between abstinence 
education and birth rates for minors.  I address this by performing a counterfactual analysis by 
running regressions similar to the specifications in the first two columns of Table 2.2, except that 
the dependent variable is birth rates for females 18-19 years (columns 3 and 4) and birth rates for 
females 25-29 years (columns 5 and 6).  In all four specifications, abstinence education through 
Title V funding has no significant impact on birth rates for older women.    
The above results provide a basis from which further analysis can be undertaken to 
investigate the impact of the program on teen birth rates using difference-in-differences 
analysis.25 
 
2.5.2. Difference-in-Differences 
Table 2.3, columns (1)-(2), shows the birth rates for females 15-17 years and 25-29 years, 
before and after the implementation of the SAE program in 1998.  Prior to the introduction of the 
SAE program, the birth rate (births per 1,000 age-specific female population) for 15-17 year-olds 
was 33.6, compared to 113.3 for older females.   After the introduction of the SAE program, the 
birth rates for 15-17 year-olds fell to 23.7, compared to an increase to 116.3 for 25-29 year-olds.   
Column (3) shows the difference in these two differences.  The implied impact of Title V, 
                                                 
25 Although not statistically significant, the coefficient estimate on the SAE Funding term for 25-29 year-olds 
appears quite large.  This can influence the difference-in-differences estimation strategy when this older group of 
women is used as the control group.  Upon closer examination, although the coefficient is large in absolute value, 
the change in birth rates compared to the baseline scenario is smaller than the changes which occur for 18-19 year-
olds.  For example, the coefficient of 2.122 (column 5, Table 2.2) implies an increase of less than a two percent 
change in birth rates for women 25-29 years.  On the other hand, for the 18-19 year-olds with mean birth rate of 
about 28, the coefficient of 1.453 (column 2, Table 2.2) implies a more than 5 percent change.  In addition, the 
results are statistically significant and of the expected sign for teenagers while for the older groups they are not 
significant.   
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section 510 SAE program on birth rates for younger females is a decline of 12.9 births per 1,000 
age-specific females.  In columns (4)-(6), I show the same results in first-differences terms, 
which suggest that the implied effect of changes in the SAE funding on changes in birth rates for 
15-17 year-olds compared to older females is 2.1.  With no control variables, these are the results 
from a difference-in-differences model in its simplest form.  As explained earlier (see Figure 2.1), 
there were trending patterns in birth rates before the introduction of any Title V SAE program.  
This highlights the need to control for the differential trends across state and time in an 
econometric model.   
Table 2.4 reports the difference-in-differences estimates from a regression model of the 
form of Equation (2.5), where the dependent variable is the change in birth rate.  All variables 
are in first-differences.  Taking first-differences allows for the elimination of trends.  This is 
potentially important as the treatment and control group, with each containing births to women 
of different ages, may have differential trends over time.26   In all specifications of the model, I 
cluster standard errors at the state level.27  Although not reported, all results include the full set 
of controls, state fixed-effects and year fixed-effects.  In column (1), which I consider as the base 
specification, the real SAE funding variable is deflated by the total population to obtain the per 
capita term.  The Title V SAE program leads to a decrease in the birth rates for 15-17 year-olds; 
and this effect is statistically significant.  Given the potential for birth rates to be influenced by 
                                                 
26 There is also a statistical advantage to using the first-differenced model.  If the errors in the first-differences model 
are serially uncorrelated, then it can be “shown that the first-difference estimator is most efficient…” (Wooldridge, 
2002, p. 281).  I test for serial correlation in the first-differences model by regressing the residual errors (obtained 
from a regression of Equation 5) on the lagged values.  If there is a statistically significant coefficient on the lagged 
residual term this will indicate the presence of serial correlation.  The coefficient of the lagged residual was -0.026 
with a p-value of 0.337 and t-statistic of -0.96, suggesting there is no evidence of serial correlation. 
 
27 Angrist and Pischke (2008) also suggest that “reliable inference using a standard cluster adjustment” is achieved if 
the number of clusters is reasonably large (not less than 42).  The authors further explain that “as far as serial 
correlation goes, most of the evidence suggests that when you are lucky enough to do research on US states…you 
are on reasonably safe ground...” (pp. 175-176). The idea is that if there are too few clusters, serial correlation will 
tend to be underestimated.  This analysis contains 49 clusters. 
27 
 
non-linear effects, I expand the specification in column 1 to include a complete set of 
interactions: state*year, state*age and age*year effects.  The results are shown in column 2.  In 
this specification, the coefficient on the interaction term ∆SAE Funding*Young, increases in 
magnitude and remains negative and significant.  
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.4, I extend the analysis of the impact of the SAE funding 
on birth rates by investigating different specifications of the real SAE funding variable deflated 
by different population subgroups.  Whereas in columns 1 and 2 real SAE funding is deflated by 
total population to obtain real SAE funding per capita; in columns 3 and 4, I instead deflate the 
real SAE funding variable by the population of 15-19 year olds; while in columns 5 and 6, real 
SAE funding variable is deflated by the population of 10-19 year olds.  Apart from using the 
various different population sub-groups as deflators, the column 1 and 2 are respectively 
identical to those in columns 3 and 4 and columns 5 and 6.  Even with the change in specification 
of the real SAE funding variable, the results of the differential impact of SAE funding on birth 
rates for teens 15-17 years remain negative and statistically significant.  
 To put into context, consider the result in column 1 of Table 2.4 which is the preferred 
specification.  If the change in real SAE funding goes up by one cent per capita, this will 
generate a reduction in the birth rate for 15-17 year-olds by 0.04 births per 1,000 age-specific 
population. In other words, a one cent per capita increase in SAE funding is equivalent to an 
injection of $50,000 for an average state per year.  This increased spending could result in an 
average state avoiding approximately 4 teen births per year (see Appendix D for a comparison 
with another study on abstinence education).28   The results are similar across the specifications.  
                                                 
28 Increasing spending by one cent per capita means that for an average state with a population of five million, total 
spending will increase by $0.01 x 5,000,000 = $50,000.  Given the average state population of 15-17 year-olds is 
100,842; the decline in the number of births for an average state equals 4.03.  That is, 100,842*(0.04/1000) = 4.03.  
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Table 2.2: Impact of State Abstinence Education Funding on Birth rate  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent Variable: Birth rates for: 
 15-17 year-olds 18-19 year-olds 25-29 year-olds 
SAE Funding -9.340*** -1.453* 0.200 0.200 2.122 -2.881 
 (2.254) (0.773) (3.617) (3.617) (3.990) (2.929) 
Rape 0.062 0.020 0.103* 0.103* -0.052 -0.096 
 (0.042) (0.025) (0.053) (0.053) (0.057) (0.081) 
Robbery 0.031*** -0.000 0.027** 0.027** 0.026*** 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) 
Poverty -0.042 0.028 0.109 0.109 -0.528*** -0.287*** 
 (0.105) (0.071) (0.172) (0.172) (0.146) (0.104) 
High school graduation  -0.039 0.005 0.033 0.033 0.062 0.021 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.065) (0.065) (0.052) (0.047) 
Unemployment rate -0.311 -0.099 -0.446 -0.446 1.840*** 0.649* 
 (0.235) (0.177) (0.455) (0.455) (0.617) (0.368) 
Prison (incarceration) 0.004 0.002 0.015 0.015 0.011* 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
Notification Law 0.769 0.828*** 0.416 0.416 1.640* -1.088 
 (0.495) (0.220) (0.708) (0.708) (0.973) (0.759) 
Abortion Medicaid  0.506 -0.492 -0.144 -0.144 -2.417* -0.049 
 (0.933) (0.510) (0.723) (0.723) (1.382) (1.099) 
Hispanic -8.091 -143.635*** 162.806* 162.806* 63.006* -132.392* 
 (15.683) (30.175) (91.560) (91.560) (33.255) (66.684) 
Black 100.548* -99.919 559.519*** 559.519*** 35.743 -6.252 
 (56.331) (63.445) (116.282) (116.282) (53.642) (121.661) 
Urbanization 2.076 -47.410* -72.488 -72.488 -57.201 -100.694** 
 (25.032) (28.054) (51.008) (51.008) (51.848) (38.822) 
Constant 16.878 2815.129*** -9.164 -9.164 117.905*** -983.631*** 
 (11.083) (107.280) (43.652) (43.652) (23.158) (318.943) 
State fixed-effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Linear state trends? No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 735 735 441 441 735 735 
R-square  0.97 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.94 0.97 
Notes: Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust and adjusted for clustering at the state level.   Statistical levels of 
significance are as follows:  * means p<0.1, ** means p<0.05, *** means p<0.01.     
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Table 2.3: Differences in Mean (change in) Birth Rates between Age Groups 
  Birth rates  Change in birth rates  
 Before 1998 1998 and after Difference Before 1998 1998 and after Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
15-17 year-olds 33.571 
(0.670) 
23.675 
(0.446) 
-9.896*** 
(0.788) 
-1.140 
(0.134) 
-1.129 
(0.062) 
0.011 
(0.137) 
       
25-29 year-olds 113.287 
(0.828) 
116.288 
(0.873) 
3.001** 
(1.213) 
-1.170 
(0.170) 
0.935 
(0.141) 
2.105*** 
(0.220) 
       
Difference -79.716 
(1.066) 
-92.613 
(0.980) 
-12.897*** 
(0.053) 
0.030 
(0.217) 
-2.064 
(0.155) 
-2.094*** 
(0.010) 
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses is reported below the mean.  Statistical levels of significance are as follows:  
 * means p<0.1, ** means p<0.05, *** means p<0.01.   
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Table 2.4: Impact of State Abstinence Education (SAE) on Birth Rates: Models 
using various Population Groups to Deflate the SAE Funding (Control Group: Birth 
rates for females 25-29 years) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent Variable: ∆Birth rates 
∆SAE Funding *Young -4.349*** -4.916*** -0.311*** -0.348*** -0.590*** -0.656*** 
 (1.238) (1.348) (0.107) (0.120) (0.207) (0.233) 
∆Rape 0.036 0.043 0.035 0.042 0.035 0.042 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) 
∆Robbery -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
∆Poverty -0.009 0.008 -0.009 0.008 -0.009 0.008 
 (0.048) (0.057) (0.048) (0.056) (0.048) (0.056) 
∆High school graduation  -0.016 -0.023 -0.018 -0.024 -0.017 -0.024 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) 
∆Unemployment rate -0.175 -0.240 -0.175 -0.240 -0.175 -0.240 
 (0.188) (0.188) (0.186) (0.187) (0.186) (0.187) 
∆Prison (incarceration) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
∆Notification Law 0.343 0.414 0.341 0.413 0.341 0.413 
 (0.276) (0.270) (0.274) (0.269) (0.274) (0.269) 
∆Abortion Medicaid  -0.524 -0.625* -0.539 -0.636* -0.538 -0.635* 
 (0.377) (0.342) (0.386) (0.347) (0.385) (0.347) 
∆Hispanic 6.710 25.752 5.423 24.807 5.715 25.037 
 (17.891) (23.609) (17.829) (23.450) (17.788) (23.421) 
∆Black -55.976 -1.314 -56.066 -1.549 -56.116 -1.640 
 (40.110) (27.055) (40.104) (27.105) (40.161) (27.136) 
∆Urbanization -36.304** -21.659* -37.126** -22.286** -37.228** -22.356** 
 (13.771) (10.844) (13.939) (10.643) (14.187) (10.734) 
State fixed-effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional Covariates? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State*year interactions? No Yes No Yes No Yes 
State*age interactions? No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Age * year interactions? No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Denominator of ∆SAE 
per capita 
Total 
population 
Total 
population 
Population 
of 15-19 
Population 
of 15-19 
Population 
of 10-19 
Population 
of 10-19 
Mean of ∆SAE 0.018 0.018 0.258 0.258 0.131 0.131 
Observations 1372 1372 1372 1372 1372 1372 
R-square  0.21 0.29 0.21 0.29 0.21 0.29 
Notes: Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust and adjusted for clustering at the state level.   Statistical levels of 
significance are as follows:  * means p<0.1, ** means p<0.05, *** means p<0.01.  The variable SAE funding is in per capita 
terms and this is obtained by the real SAE dollar amount by the following denominators:  Total population (columns 1-2), 
population age 15-19 years (columns 3-4) and population age 10-19 years (columns 5-6).    
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2.5.3. Impact of the State Abstinence Education Program on Race-Specific Birth Rates  
Given the results of Bronars et al. (1994) and Abrevaya (2001) that link race with fertility, 
it may be informative to investigate the impact of the program on the birth rates for Blacks, 
Whites as well as Hispanics.  Table 2.5 shows the difference-in-differences analyses for Blacks 
(columns 1-3), Hispanics (columns 4-6) and Whites (columns 7-9).  The results in columns 1-3 
show no significant effects of SAE funding on birth rates for black teens 15-17 years, although 
the sign remains negative.  In the case of Hispanics, the coefficient of interest is positive but is 
not significant in any of the specifications.  In comparison, the results in columns 7-9 indicate 
that for Whites, there are significant effects of the Title V SAE program on birth rates for teens 
of the same age group.            
There might be underlying reasons related to this differential impact such as income, 
education, family circumstances and other socio-economic phenomena.  The fact that white 
births respond to the program as opposed to Black and Hispanic births, might also be reflective 
of the differential high school dropout rates between races.  In 2005, the high school dropout rate 
for Blacks and Hispanics was 0.66 and 0.87, respectively, while for Whites it was 0.23.29 Given 
that Whites remain in school for longer periods than Blacks or Hispanics, they are potentially 
exposed to treatment more fully.  Also, those who attain low education levels tend to come from 
poorer families with low income; and this often results in lack of resources to be aware of the 
various opportunities at their disposal and to utilize them to their full advantage.  Without this 
awareness, their ability to make the optimal decisions regarding pregnancy and childbearing may 
be compromised.  Although this type of analysis is beyond the scope of the chapter, some studies 
find only a modest impact of “socioeconomic disadvantage” on early childbearing (Kearney, 
                                                 
29 Source: US Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics Dropout Rates in the United States: 
2005.  Compendium Report.  http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007059.pdf (Accessed December 19, 2010). 
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2009). Also, it could be the case that SAE funding is more effective in reducing births for a 
population, namely whites, that has less teenage births.    
The above results provide support to the causal impact of the Title V SAE program.  That 
is, for an average state, increasing spending by $50,000 per year on SAE can help avoid 
approximately four births to teenagers.  This impact is concentrated among white teens.30  The 
estimates are stable across different model specifications.   
 
2.6. Sensitivity Analysis 
2.6.1. Multi-way Clustering 
In this first robustness check, I cluster the standard errors on two dimensions 
simultaneously (state and year) using multi-way clustering as proposed by Cameron, Gelbach 
and Miller (2006).  Due to the panel structure of the data, it is important to adequately treat error 
terms.  In the previous estimations, standard errors are clustered by state.  This captures the 
correlation between observations for the same state in different years.  One-dimensional 
clustering of this type assumes there is no correlation between observations on different states in 
the same year (i.e., there is no time effect).  If this assumption is false, then in some situations, 
this can lead to under-estimated standard errors and consequently biased estimates.  For example, 
country-wide shocks will induce correlations between states at a particular time and state-
specific shocks will induce correlations across time.  In addition, common shocks such as 
business cycles that can induce correlations between different states in different years.   
Table A.2 displays estimates of Equation (2.5) after clustering standard errors on both 
state and year.  The results in column 1 are comparable to those in column 1 of Table 2.4.  By 
                                                 
30This is an important policy issue.  While the program seems to have an effect on reducing teen childbearing, there 
is no evidence of a significant impact on Blacks (or Hispanics), who are more likely to be susceptible to early teen 
childbearing. 
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race and ethnicity, the results in columns 2, 3 and 4 can be respectively compared with those 
found in columns 1, 4 and 7 of Table 2.5.  In all instances, the magnitude and signs of the key 
parameter estimates are unaffected to this form of clustering while for Blacks the estimated 
coefficient becomes statistically significant.  The fact that the results remain robust to clustering 
on both state and time is not surprising.  This is because when “there are only a few clusters in 
one dimension, clustering by the more frequent cluster yields results that are almost identical to 
clustering by both firm[state] and time” (Petersen, 2009). In this chapter, there are 49 states and 
15 years of data. 
 
2.6.2. Including Lags of the State Abstinence Education Funding Variable 
In Panel 2 of Table A.2, I allow the SAE program to influence birth rates in a year after 
funding is received.  This is done for a couple of reasons:  First, SAE may have a lagged impact 
on birth rates; and second, in the event that a pregnancy occurs right after the SAE, an 
approximate 9-month gestation period is required before birth rates can be affected.   In this 
specification, if there is a delayed effect on childbearing caused by SAE, then the coefficient on 
the lagged interaction term should be negative and statistically significant.  The table shows 
results of three specifications using the same control group (females 25-29 years) as before: 
column (1) analyzes the full sample looking at the impact of the program on birth rates for all 
females regardless of race and ethnicity while columns 2 to 4 consider the effect on birth rates 
for Blacks, Hispanics and Whites, respectively.  In all cases, the real SAE funding variable is 
deflated by total population to obtain the per capita term.  In this particular specification, I add 
one lag plus a contemporaneous term.  In large part, the results are consistent with those reported 
earlier. The impact is statistically significant for total births and those for Whites.  Meanwhile, 
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only the contemporaneous term is significant for Blacks. In the case of Hispanics, the program 
has been associated with a significant increase in birth rates.  It must be noted however, that 
Hispanics include all persons of Hispanic origin of any race. 
 
2.6.3. Lagged Dependent Variable 
I also estimate models with the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable.  Such a model is 
a robust representation of infinite (Koyck) distributed lagged models, which may more 
accurately capture the dynamic effect of the SAE program.  Models with lagged dependent 
variables provide estimates that are efficient if the model with the lagged dependent variable 
does not suffer from serial correlation in the residuals.  I find no evidence of serial correlation at 
the 10 percent level of significance.  Panel 3 of Table A.2 presents the results of the model with 
the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. 31   As in previous robust tests, I only report the 
main coefficient of interest.  Once again, the impact of the SAE program on birth rates for 
minors is remarkably stable and precisely estimated for both the sample of all births and for 
White and Hispanic births but not for Blacks.  Using the results of the lagged dependent variable 
model specification in column (1), the long-run differential impact of changes in SAE on 
changes in birth rates is -4.3.32,33  
                                                 
31I instrument for the lagged dependent variable using 2SLS with the following variables as external instruments: 
current, lagged and forward values of the birth rates in levels.  The null hypothesis that the system is exactly 
identified is rejected (over-identification test).  Also, the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity cannot not be 
rejected at the conventional levels of significance (endogeneity test). 
 
32This is obtained using the Koyck Transformation which considers an infinite distributed lag model of the form: 
Yt= β0 + β1Xt + λβ1Xt-1 + λ
2β1Xt-2 + … + εt where Y is some dependent variable, X is the independent variable of 
interest and the residuals decay at a geometric rate such that βk = β1 λ
k-1 for k=1,2,… and 0< λ<1.  Multiplying the 
distributed lagged model by λ, lagging one period and subtracting this from the original lagged distributed model 
gives Yt= β0(1-λ)+ β1Xt + λYt-1 + νt, where νt = εt - λεt-1.  With a model in first-differences, this can be written as 
∆Yt= β1∆Xt + λ∆Yt-1 + ut, where ut=∆ νt.  In general, these models assume εt~IID(0,σ
2) from ut=ρut-1+ et and that |λ|, 
| ρ|<1.  While the Koyck transformation generally suffers from serial correlation, my model in first-differences does 
not encounter this problem. 
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2.6.4. Sample Size Modification 
In this robustness checks performed in Table A.3, I repeat the analysis using the preferred 
specification as presented in column (1) of Table 2.5, but this time using different sample periods.  
Specifically, I exclude the first two years (1996 and 1997) immediately preceding 1998 when the 
SAE program funding began (Panel 1).  I also exclude the year 2002, which seems to be an 
anomaly in birth rate data trends during the period 1991-2005.34 In another sensitivity analysis, I 
included California in the sample (Panel 2) while in another I excluded those states with the 
highest and lowest per capita SAE funding (Panel 3).  Finally, I narrow the sample size 
sufficiently small enough to exploit the impact of the program during those periods around which 
the most significant changes in SAE funding occurred (Panel 4).  That is, the major jump in SAE 
funding took place in 1998 in all states.  Therefore, this sensitivity analysis estimates the model 
using data around the narrow window from 1995 to 2000. 
As can be seen in the results of Table A.3 (Panel 1), despite the sample period changes, 
the coefficient estimate is significant and the sign remains negative as before.  This is true for all 
races/ethnicity combined (column 1), as well as for Whites separately (column 4).  In Panel 2 of 
Table A.3, I include the state of California, which has never accepted Title V SAE funding.  As 
the results show clearly, whether California is taken into account, the impact on birth rates 
remains largely unchanged.  The results in Panel 3 exclude the states with the largest and 
                                                                                                                                                             
33Using the specification from Table A.2, Panel 3 (column1), the differential long-run impact (i.e. β ) of the 
change in the SAE funding on the change in birth rates of minors can be calculated using the following results:  
λ= -0.011 and β1 = -4.315.  Therefore,β   4.315  .  4.3, where β1, which is the same as β3 in the 
model, is the coefficient on the interaction term ∆SAE*Young.  Note, the long-run impact is the same as the short-
run or instantaneous effect as shown in column 1 of Table 4.   
 
34In 2002, birth rates show a remarkable dip in comparison to previous years; and this episode is more striking for 
some state-specific age groups relative to others.  I conjecture that this phenomenon may be related to some major 
event occurring in a previous period (for example: the recession of 2001 and/or the impact of 9/11 terrorist 
activities). 
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smallest per capita SAE funding over the period of this study. These states are Mississippi and 
New Hampshire, respectively.  The results are also robust to this specification.  Finally, the last 
panel (Panel 4) of the table shows the point estimates for the reduced sample comprising the 
years 1995 to 2000.  Although the estimates are smaller in magnitude than those reported in the 
previous sample modifications, in general the inferences are qualitatively similar.     
 
2.6.5. Changes in the Control Group 
I consider the possibility that different control groups may result in a different impact of 
the SAE program on birth rates for teens 15-17 years relative to an older group of females.  Two 
other comparison groups are considered and the results are shown in Table A.4.  In columns 1-4, 
the control group is females 18-19 years old over the restricted period 1991 to 1999.  The 
restricted time-period is used because females who are 18-19 years in 2000 and beyond will have 
been subjected to SAE in 1998.  Hence, they will not really be a control group after 1999.  In 
columns 5-8, I use an older control group, namely birth rates for females 30-34 years over the 
period 1991-2005.  While the SAE program should not affect the birth rates for this older control 
group, it is useful to check for any possible spurious impact.35  
Beginning with the younger control group of 18-19 year-olds in columns 1-4, the SAE 
funding has resulted in a decline in birth rates for 15-17 year olds in both the full sample and the 
specification for white females only.  As in most of the previous analysis, the impact of the 
program on the birth rates for Black or Hispanic females is not statistically significant.  The 
results I obtain using this younger control group are consistent with the findings obtained earlier 
in the base analysis using the control group of 25-29 year-olds.  One criterion that is used in 
                                                 
35I also consider females 20-24 years old as a control group.  These results are not reported. 
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selecting a comparison group is for both treatment and control groups to be similar. Indeed, the 
control group of 18-19 year-olds is very similar to minors.   In columns 5-8 where the control 
group is 30-34 year-olds, I obtain relatively weaker results of the impact of SAE funding on birth 
rates. 
 
2.6.6. Multiple Control Groups 
I re-estimate the baseline model shown in Equation (2.5), using multiple control groups 
instead of a single comparison group.  In these analyses, the use of multiple comparison groups 
can help to strengthen the robustness of the previous results of the investigation.36  In this robust 
check, I use two comparison groups together: females 18-19 and 25-29 years old.  The treatment 
group remains those female minors 15-17 years old.  To avoid the possibility that the treatment 
group of 15-17 year-olds can become part of the control group, the estimation period is 1991-
1999.  The results are shown in columns 1-4 of  Table A.5.  Indeed, the impact of the SAE 
funding on the birth rates for minors consistently produces a negative coefficient estimate, which 
is statistically significant for two of the three specifications.  To utilize the full sample period, 
another set of multiple controls is required; and so I replace females 18-19 years with those 30-
34 years to form another multiple control group of females 25-34 years old.  Columns 5-8 of 
Table A.5 provide the results, which are very similar to those of columns 1-4.  The sign of the 
coefficient is as expected, as is the significance of the estimate.  In this case, the SAE program 
has a significant impact on the birth rates for minors across both races included in the 
specification. 
  
                                                 
36According to Meyer (1995, p. 157), “the more comparison groups the better.” 
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2.6.7. Other Robustness Checks 
I consider that each of the controls used in the model may have a different impact on 
birth rates for 15-17 year-olds and the older control group.  For example, unemployment may 
reduce (or increase) births for the control group but may have a different effect on minors.  To 
control for this, I include the interaction between each control variable and the age group 
(unemployment * young, robbery * young and so on).  The results, which are largely unchanged 
with the additional covariates and different control groups, are shown in Table A.6.  
I perform additional robustness checks to demonstrate the reliability of the results.  First, 
I consider the possibility that certain states may be responsible for driving some of the observed 
impact.  For instance, states with high pre-adoption birth rates may apply for more funding and 
so the aggregate state-level effects could be driven by a few states.  In separate regressions, I 
address this possibility by a) dropping the top five states in terms of birth rates; b) removing the 
first five states with the lowest birth rates; and c) combining both (a) and (b).37   Second, I also 
weighted the regressions by relevant populations such as total population, population of 
teenagers and so on.  The results from these two approaches were comparable and qualitatively 
similar to the main findings.  Using different comparison groups did not affect the results as 
before.  These results are not shown, but are available upon request.  
 
 
  
                                                 
37The states with the highest teen (15-17 year olds) birth rates and rankings in 2005 were Texas (1), New Mexico (2), 
Mississippi (3), Arkansas (4) and Arizona (5).  The five states with the lowest teen birth rates in 2005 were New 
Hampshire (50), Vermont (49), Massachusetts (48), Connecticut (47) and New Jersey (46). 
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2.7. Discussion 
2.7.1. Caveats 
The findings above suggest a causal effect of joint federal government and state-based 
abstinence-centered education on teen birth rates.  That is, the SAE program appears to have 
resulted in some gains in reducing underage births to mothers.        
However, a number of issues remain.  The first relates to the choice of using births rather 
than pregnancies, especially since a preponderance of the research focuses on the latter.  
Although pregnancies are important to analyze, reliable annual state and age-specific measures 
are not readily available for an extended period of time.  Furthermore, fertility is an important 
outcome to analyze because of its implications for long-term well-being of young mothers and 
their off springs.   
A second criticism is that more-refined estimates can be obtained if the analysis is done 
at a less aggregated geographical level such as counties and cities.  While age-specific birth rates 
can be disaggregated to lower levels of analysis, county or city-level SAE funding data are not 
readily available.   Any attempt to estimate the effect of state-level SAE data on county-level 
fertility rates will result in one of the more serious forms of measurement error leading to biased 
coefficient estimates. 38    
Third, the model might be missing important variables such as measures of family 
planning (expenditure or clinics) and abortion notification laws.  With respect to the latter, it can 
be expected or assumed that states that accept SAE grants are also more likely to introduce 
abortion notification legislation.  Thus, the SAE variable might be picking up some of the 
                                                 
38 In such a scenario, the measurement error will be on the right-hand side, specifically with the SAE funding 
variable.  Greene (2003, section 5.61) emphasizes that such errors are cause for concern especially within a multiple 
regression framework.  Measurement errors of this type not only bias the coefficient of interest, but also the other 
coefficients whose direction of bias is unknown.  
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notification effect.  While this may be the case, initial evidence suggests that the “new parental 
consent or notification laws probably had at most a very small effect” (Henshaw, 1997, p. 121).  
I include a notification law dummy variable, as well as an indicator of whether or not states 
provide Medicaid assistance for abortion.  The effects of the coefficients appear rather small.  
Also, it is not clear that acceptance of SAE grants is highly correlated with abortion notification 
since, as was mentioned earlier, all states excluding California have taken part in the Title V 
SAE funding program from its inception.  With respect to not accounting for family planning 
expenditures, measures of family planning tend to be associated with funding for 
“comprehensive” sex education (CRE).  Despite the absence of a proxy CRE variable, this effect 
is likely to be adequately controlled for by the presence of state fixed-effects and year fixed-
effects.39        
There might be other factors influencing the impact of the SAE program.  For example, 
variation in SAE funding across states is due in part to child poverty.  This is important because 
it raises the possibility that child poverty, which influences the level of SAE funding, may also 
be driving fertility patterns in these states and thus making SAE funding endogenous.  However, 
in this study, cross-state variation is not a confounding factor since I am really comparing the 
effect of the SAE program within each state and not across states.  Although child poverty is in 
some way associated with SAE funding it must be pointed out that SAE funding is not based 
solely on poverty within each state, but on the ratio of poor children in a state relative to the total 
                                                 
39 The tendency is for every state to access similar and constant funding levels for CRE.  Thus, there is likely to be 
less variation in CREs across states. 
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number of low-income children in all states.   Based on this formula the ratio for each state is 
more likely to move very gradually overtime.40,41   
 
2.7.2. Estimated Cost-Benefit Analysis 
What is the potential impact of abstinence education spending on births avoided?  One 
way to evaluate the effectiveness of the SAE program is to compare the spending costs for each 
avoided birth with the associated savings that will arise as result.  According to Hoffman (2006), 
average public sector spending on a child born to a female 17 years and younger was $4,080 per 
annum (note this figure is higher than the annual cost of $1,430 for all teenagers mentioned 
earlier).  Given that the average length of time in which a teenage mother receives public 
assistance is 6.9 years (Hoffman, 2006), this implies that the estimated public savings for each 
avoided birth is $4,080 x 6.9 = $28,152 (or $112,608 for every four births avoided).     
 I can then use the results provided in this chapter to provide a rough estimate of the 
annual cost associated with each birth avoided due to abstinence education.  Recall, the analysis 
showed that on average a state can avoid four births by increasing abstinence education spending 
by $50,000.  Comparing these two estimates, it implies a state that spends $50,000 on abstinence 
education will avoid four births and as a result saves approximately $112,608.  This is a net 
                                                 
40 In fact, in the U.S. the poverty rate for children under the age of 18 had moved from 21.8 percent in 1991 to only 
17.6 percent in 2005.  This represents a decline in child poverty rates over the period.  However, variations in the 
amount of SAE funding accessed by states were related to administrative changes in the operation of the SAE 
program and not due to any state demographics.  See Children’s Defense Fund website 
http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-publications/data/state-data-repository/census/census-2007-
child-poverty-data.pdf (Accessed January 21, 2010).     
 
41 In spite of this, endogeneity of SAE funding cannot be completely discounted.  To provide strong support to the 
identification strategy using difference-in-differences models, I undertake a number of robustness checks in the 
section on “Sensitivity Analysis”.  I also consider the use of instrumental variables to identify the effect of 
abstinence funding using the citizen and government ideology scores by Berry et al. (1998) as instruments.  These 
variables are not expected to be correlated with birth outcomes but correlated with SAE funding. The results (not 
shown) of the instrumental variable strategy were not significant as the first stage results were rather weak.           
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savings of $112,608 - $50,000 = $62,808 for every four avoided births or $15,652 for each birth 
avoided.    
 
2.8. Conclusion 
In an era of heightened awareness of the high teen birth rates in the U.S., an intense 
debate has centered on the effectiveness of various policy approaches to reducing early 
childbearing.  One view among researchers is that policies promoting abstinence and improved 
contraceptive practices can be influential in curtailing teen births.   
I present evidence supporting the influence of a federal government-sponsored state 
abstinence education (SAE) program.  Specifically, I estimate the impact of SAE funding from 
the federal government Title V, Section 510 appropriations on the birth rates for teens 15-17 
years in the U.S. over the period 1991-2005.  The results suggest that Title V SAE has led to a 
decline in birth rates for the targeted group of female minors.  Using difference-in-differences 
methodology, I find for an average state, increasing spending by $50,000 per year on SAE can 
help avoid approximately four births to teenagers, resulting in net savings of $15,652 to the 
public for each birth avoided.  Given that each teenage birth is associated with an annual social 
cost of $1,430, this particular education program seems to be cost-effective at the current margin.  
The overall findings appear to be robust to a wide range of specifications.   
I further find that the SAE program has a consistently significant impact among Whites 
but not Blacks. This apparent heterogeneous influence of SAE on the birth outcomes of Blacks 
and Whites opens an avenue for future research.  For example, it may be that Blacks (and 
Hispanics) - because of their lower socio-economic outcomes and other circumstances which 
influence years of schooling - have less exposure to this form of education than White teens.  To 
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investigate this hypothesis, one might have to rely on more disaggregated information at the 
individual level.42  
  
                                                 
42 For the purposes of this study, the paper can benefit from two important extensions.  First, is an analysis that 
includes data on abortions for a more informed discussion on the impact on pregnancies.  A number of studies such 
as Levine (2000, 2003) have investigated this issue.  Second, with the relevant data available, an investigation that 
looks at the specific counties and cities that have received appropriations of Title V SAE funding will provide 
greater insight and precision in determining the impact of the program. 
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CHAPTER 3.  DOES THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (FMLA) INCREASE FERTILITY 
BEHAVIOR? 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Since the 1990s, family-friendly policies such as maternity leave have increased 
throughout the United States.  Universal maternity leave has become an important topic of 
discussion regarding its contribution to various aspects of work and family life, in particular, the 
effect on decisions related to childbearing.  
For most countries, especially those in Europe such as Austria and Sweden, pronatalist 
policies - those designed to encourage fertility behavior - are quite common where parental leave 
is sufficiently generous allowing mothers to have two or possibly three separate gestations within 
the same leave period.  In addition, these countries have provisions ensuring that employees are 
compensated while on leave. This is in sharp contrast to the United States (U.S.) where leave 
policies only became universal through the passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) in 1993.1  Compared to other countries, the FMLA provides a shorter leave period 
amounting to 12 weeks unpaid leave.  Most European and OECD countries offer an average of 
36 weeks.2  Further, new mothers in Europe get on average 14 to 16 weeks of paid maternity 
leave (Kamerman and Gatenio, 2002).  Prior to the FMLA, only 12 states in the U.S. (plus the 
District of Columbia) possessed laws requiring job-protected maternity leave but with wide 
variation (from 4 to 18 weeks) in the length of time allowed.3   An advantage of the FMLA over 
                                                 
1 Although it is a federal policy, knowledge of the FMLA is still not as widespread since only 58.2 percent of 
employees at covered worksites have any knowledge of FMLA (Department of Labor, 2007). 
 
2 The United Nations watchdog on labor issues, the International Labor Organization (ILO) prescribes a minimum of 
14 weeks maternity leave along with some cash benefit (International Labor Organization, 2000).    
 
3  The states are California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin and Vermont. Information obtained from Waldfogel 
(1999).  
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the state-specific leave laws is that it is universal and so better able to influence childbearing 
preferences at the national level.    
Outside of the U.S., incentive-driven policies have been shown to have an impact on 
fertility rates.  Generous pronatalist policies such as the 1998 Quebec government “Baby Bonus” 
program in Canada have generated an increase in family size.  In this program, mothers were 
rewarded as much as $500, $3,000 and $8,000 (Canadian dollars) for having a first, second and 
third birth, respectively (Milligan, 2002).4   Other countries such as Austria, France, Germany, 
Italy, Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom at various times have instituted welfare and 
social policies associated with cash incentives in an attempt to encourage fertility rates with 
some degree of success (Gauthier, 2007).  In line with this research are those studies that 
examine the impact on family fertility of work-related policies such as maternity leave. Nearly 
all of the studies use micro-level data, producing mixed results: some showing that work-related 
incentives have a positive impact in raising fertility (Hyatt and Milne, 1991; Buttner and Lutz, 
1990; Hoem, 1993; and Lalive and Zweimüller, 2009) while others have found no evidence of a 
policy impact (Gauthier and Hatzius, 1997 and Hoem et al., 2001).    
At the other end of the spectrum are anti-natalist policies, those designed to restrict a 
certain type of fertility.  These policies tend to be implemented in places where fertility rates are 
far above the replacement level and population growth is considered to be excessive.  For 
instance, China’s one-child family policy which began in the late 1970s is designed with the 
objective of curbing the rapid population growth as a means to aid development.  Although both 
                                                 
4 During this period, the official exchange rate was US $1 to CAN $1.5.  In terms of United States currency, these 
amounts approximated to US$333, US$2,000 and US$5,333, respectively.  This is based on the exchange rate of US 
$1 to CAN $1.5 that existed at the time.   See World Development Indicators at 
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2 (accessed October 9, 2010).  
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pronatalist and anti-natalist policies have an underlying economic objective, the latter has 
attracted numerous criticisms for being gender discriminatory among other things.        
Despite the evidence of some positive impact of family leave polices on family formation, 
within the U.S., the fertility effect of maternity leave under the auspices of the FMLA has been 
ignored within the empirical literature.5  This neglect is perplexing.  A parallel debate regarding 
the merits of the FMLA is ongoing.  For conservative opponents, the FMLA is merely a 
symbolic gesture catering to certain interest groups.  They point to the lack of any firm evidence 
to suggest that such legislation can make a positive and significant impact on fertility rates.  
They also argue that women who  otherwise (in the absence of the FMLA) will have quit their 
jobs to spend more time taking care of the newborn are now spending less time with their young 
infants because of this legislation.  Proponents of the FMLA argue that this policy allows women 
to spend more time at home with the young without adversely affecting employment in general 
(Klerman and Leibowitz, 1998).  Supporters of the FMLA further argue that not only is the 
FMLA a good thing but it must be improved since the U.S. lags behind most developed countries 
that have introduced and implemented maternity leave legislation on a more generous scale.6   
In this chapter, I estimate the impact of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) on 
fertility outcomes.  Specifically, I examine whether eligible women under the FMLA criteria are 
more likely to have a first and second birth compared to other women.  I find evidence that 
implementation of the FMLA is associated with an increase in fertility outcomes among eligible 
                                                 
5 Averett and Whittington (2001) investigate the impact of maternity leave on influencing births during the period 
1985 to 1992, which was a period before the FMLA was introduced.     
  
6 The U.S. and Australia are perhaps the only two industrialized nations with unpaid maternity leave legislation, but 
Australia is set to implement its first compulsory paid parental leave scheme in January 2011 when eligible parents 
will be paid at minimum wage for 18 weeks while on leave (See the Australian Government Department of Families, 
Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs website at  
http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/families/progserv/paid_parental/Pages/default.aspx.  Information accessed May 9, 
2010)  
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women.  Using panel data from the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY79) for the period 1989 to 2006, I find that the introduction of the FMLA has significantly 
increased the probability of eligible women having a first and second child.  The results are 
robust to a variety of specifications.  I also find that the impact of the legislation is evident 
amongst eligible whites and those with college-level experiences.  These results are corroborated 
with the findings that eligible women are giving birth faster as a result of the policy.     
I organize the rest of the chapter as follows: Section 3.2 provides background information 
on the FMLA.  Section 3.3 provides a theoretical perspective to help motivate the study.  Section 
3.4 outlines the previous empirical literature.  Section 3.5 presents the empirical strategy while 
Section 3.6 presents the data.  The results are presented in Section 3.7.  Section 3.8 discusses and 
concludes. 
 
3.2. Background 
3.2.1. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 
On February 5, 1993, President Bill Clinton signed his first piece of legislation by 
enacting the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, a federal law guaranteeing job-
protected maternity leave along with other provisions.  Prior to the FMLA, job-protected 
maternity leave – the right to take time off from work to give birth, care for the newborn and 
resume employment at the pre-birth job – was largely possible through the goodwill of 
employers and/or through state mandates.7 In large part, employer and state policies towards 
                                                 
7 Less than 25 percent of the contiguous states of the U.S. had any state legislation establishing job-protected 
maternity leave.  There were 12 states plus the District of Columbia with similar maternity leave legislation prior to 
the enactment of the FMLA.  These are: California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin and Vermont (Waldfogel, 1999).  
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maternity leave were aimed at providing greater flexibility for women in the workplace and to 
strike some balance between work and parental duties.     
Implemented on August 5, 1993, the FMLA provided benefits only to eligible employees.  
Under the FMLA, an eligible employee is one who:  
(1) has been employed by a covered employer;8   
(2) has worked for the employer for at least 12 months;  
(3) has worked at least 1,250 hours over the previous 12 months; and  
(4) is employed at a worksite in the United States or in any territory or possession of 
the United States where 50 or more employees are employed by the employer 
within 75 miles of that worksite.  
Eligible employees are entitled to take up to 12 weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave each year 
for any of the following reasons: (a) to give birth and care for the newborn; (b) to adopt a child 
or to carry out foster care; and (c) to care for self, a spouse, a child or parent with a serious health 
condition.9  The FMLA applies to all public agencies including those of the state, local and 
federal governments as well as schools.  Employees in the private sector are also covered.   
 
  
                                                 
8 According to the U.S. Department of Labor, a covered employer is “any person engaged in commerce or in any 
industry or activity affecting commerce, who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 
20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding year. Employers covered by FMLA also include any 
person acting, directly or indirectly, in the interest of a covered employer to any of the employees of the employer, 
any successor in interest of a covered employer, and any public agency.  Public agencies are covered employers 
without regard to the number of employees employed. Public as well as private elementary and secondary schools 
are also covered employers without regard to the number of employees employed.”  Source: 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/allcfr/ESA/Title_29/Part_825/29CFR825.104.htm (Accessed August 11, 2010). 
 
9 Under the FMLA, if two spouses are employed by the same employer, then the combined leave allowed is 12 
weeks. 
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3.2.2. Implications of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 
While the FMLA represents a marked improvement in legislative leave policies in the 
U.S., in many instances the resulting benefits are considered small in comparison to those of 
other industrialized nations.   There are some notable differences in the FMLA and leave policies 
in other developed countries.  The FMLA is broader in scope compared to its industrialized 
counterparts whose leave laws focus mainly on parental leave.  Almost all industrialized 
countries provide some form of paid leave to employees while the U.S. does not.  Also, 
eligibility for leave does not depend on company size in other industrialized countries.  As a 
result, the FMLA only affects a relatively small proportion of companies.10  
Although the FMLA has led to the standardization of maternity leave policies throughout 
the country, critics of the FMLA point to its symbolic nature since much of the present benefits 
were already instituted in workplaces in some states prior to 1993.  Further, some argue that the 
FMLA is too restrictive since it is limited to companies with at least 50 employees and therefore 
a significant proportion of the labor force cannot benefit from this policy.   
However, the FMLA as a policy may offer some insights into family-friendly policies in 
the U.S.  There are a number of potential implications arising from such a policy.  First, the 
FMLA can help to address the balance between women’s work and family life.  Second, it can 
help to address the length of delay in childbearing among career oriented women.  Finally, there 
are also implications for the retention of women in the labor force given that educated women 
may opt out of paid employment after having children.   
 
  
                                                 
10 Despite a small number of companies, the FMLA still manages to cover around half of the working population.  
The Department of Labor (2007) using data for 2005, reports that 76.1 million of the 141.7 million workers in the 
U.S. were eligible for FMLA benefits. 
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3.3. Theoretical Perspective 
Two main approaches have been used to explain the relationship between economic 
factors and fertility: changes in relative income and the opportunity cost of time (Becker, 1960; 
Easterlin, 1975).   
In Becker’s (1960) model, children are treated as consumption goods, in that they provide 
utility to parents but they also represent a cost.  An increase in income can have two effects: one 
that causes the consumption of the good to increase (income effect) and the other occurs where 
the relative increase in income causes the opportunity cost of consuming the good to increase 
thereby reducing consumption (price effect).  The model appeals to a quantity-quality 
substitution process that determines the demand for children.  For instance, rising costs of 
education will increase the fixed costs of raising children so that parents will find it relatively 
more costly to have an additional child (child quantity) than say to provide more schooling (child 
quality).  In this case, an increase in income will cause a substitution away from quantity in favor 
of quality.  
A negative relationship between income and fertility may occur if “time spent on 
consumption” is incorporated within the household production function.  Not only is there a cost 
to obtaining the good (having a child), but there is also a cost – opportunity cost – in terms of 
parental time in consuming that good (for example, time away from work to raise kids).  Because 
children are considered to be relatively more “time intensive” than other goods, the opportunity 
cost of raising children is proportionately higher than that of consuming other goods.  
Consequently, as incomes increase, the relative costs of raising children in terms of other goods 
increase, and so the demand for children (fertility) declines.    
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An alternative model of fertility subscribes to the notion that tastes or preference levels 
evolve over succeeding generations and they matter in determining fertility.  Easterlin (1975) 
describes the concept of relative income as earnings relative to material aspirations.  As an 
individual’s standard of living rises, so does his/her material aspirations.  In order to keep 
relative income constant, individuals will make adjustments to increase earnings such as working 
more.  An increase in female labor force participation will likely lead to a postponement of child-
bearing, while some women will also choose to have fewer children over their lifetime.   
These income-fertility nexuses described in the theoretical literature can be observed in 
the data where women in higher income countries are showing a tendency to defer having 
children.   This process of child postponement gets more acute because the more time women 
spend investing in human capital and integrating into labor market activities, their chances of 
conception progressively decreases due to physiological as well as other factors such as 
miscarriages which increase with age.  The FMLA represents one policy option in addressing the 
falling or low fertility rates.  By allowing women the right to return to a former job after 
maternity leave, the FMLA reduces some of the costs associated with children without 
necessarily affecting the labor market outcomes of women.  Under the FMLA, women can avoid 
costs such as the following: costs related to a loss of employment or being forced to exit the 
labor force because of employment restrictions related to giving birth and returning to work, and 
costs of having to find a new job.  By lowering opportunity costs of rearing children, the FMLA 
effectively increases the demand for children.  Whether the FMLA increases the fertility 
behavior of women is an empirical question. 
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3.4. Previous Literature 
3.4.1. Related Literature 
Over the past decade, empirical findings have improved our knowledge about the effects 
of maternity leave as well as other family policies.  I review the previous literature on family 
leave policies and legislation from several perspectives: (i) studies investigating the influence of 
parental leave on job continuity, labor supply and employment outcomes, (ii) studies that look at 
the impact of leave policies on leave-taking, (iii) research that examines the role of family leave 
legislation on child health outcomes and (iv) studies on the relationship between family leave 
initiatives and fertility outcomes. Greater attention is paid to the latter since this is of greater 
relevance to my analysis of the impact of a specific policy, the FMLA. 
There is a growing literature providing evidence on the impact of maternity leave policies 
on the labor market outcomes of women, more so in the U.S. but also in other parts of the world 
such as Europe.  An important aspect of maternity leave policies is the improvement in job 
continuity among new mothers post-birth.  If maternity leave statutes improve job-continuity for 
new mothers (Baker and Milligan, 2008a), then on-the-job training for this group of women will 
increase and help to reduce some of the wage gaps that exist between mothers and non-mothers 
(Waldfogel, 1998; Klerman and Leibowitz, 1999).  In the absence of maternity leave initiatives a 
woman, once she becomes pregnant and gives birth, may lack the incentive to immediately 
return to her old job or there is an increased likelihood that she will quit her current job to care 
for the newborn.  With respect to the impact of the FMLA on job-continuity, Baum (2003) finds 
a relatively small effect of this federal policy, primarily because prior leave policies were already 
in place in some firms.     
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Some studies such as Baker and Milligan (2008b) have concurred that parental leave 
policies are associated with increases in female labor supply.  On the other hand, the results of 
others have been less conclusive in the U.S. than in other countries with maternity leave policies 
offering more generous provisions.  Waldfogel’s (1999) is one of the few U.S. studies with 
definitive results finding that a higher proportion of women with very young children (less than 
one year) have been employed since the FMLA.  Although maternity leave policies in other 
countries provide more generous benefits than in the U.S., only a few studies have done a direct 
examination of the labor supply effect of these policies (see Winegarden and Bracy, 1995; Ruhm, 
1998; Baker and Milligan, 2008a).  Studies such as Waldfogel (1999), investigating the impact 
on wages find that the impact of leave policies on wages is even less clear.  
On the aspect of the role of parental leave on leave-taking, there has been limited 
research.  The more recent research in this area (example: Waldfogel, 1999; Klerman and 
Leibowitz, 1998) finds an increase in the amount of leave taken as a result of these leave policies.     
There is a strand of literature that assesses the role of parental leave policies on the health 
outcomes of new mothers and their children.  Several cross-country analyses have found that 
maternity leave policies are associated with a significant improvement in child health outcomes 
(Winegarden and Bracy, 1995; Ruhm, 2000; Tanaka, 2005).  Using the U.S. data, Berger et al. 
(2005) find that women taking less than the maximum allowable leave period under the FMLA 
have children with worse health outcomes, attributable in part to the lower levels of 
breastfeeding and immunizations. 
There are only a few studies that investigate the consequences of parental leave laws on 
fertility outcomes. Hyatt and Milne (1991), using time-series Canadian data from 1948-1986, 
examine the potential impact of some government programs on fertility behavior.  They find that 
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under the Unemployment Insurance (UI) maternity benefits program, a one percent increase in 
the real value of this benefit was associated with an increase in fertility rate in the range 0.09 to 
0.26 percent.   Buttner and Lutz (1990) using data for Democratic Republic of Germany (East 
Germany) for the period 1964 through 1987, investigated the impact of a 1976 pronatalist social 
policy on age-specific fertility rates.  The introduction of this policy resulted in substantial 
increases in parental leave from 18 weeks to 26 weeks (or 52 weeks in the case of mothers with 
at least two children).  The authors find a strong, positive, causal effect on fertility rates up to 
five years after the policy. This impact appears to be greater for women with second and higher-
order births.     
Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) present data from 22 OECD countries over the period 1970 
to 1990 showing that neither of the two maternity leave policy variables – duration of maternity 
leave nor maternity pay – has a statistically significant impact on fertility rates.  To the authors’ 
surprise, they find no positive effect of maternity pay on fertility rates.  In a multivariate 
difference-in-differences analysis, they attribute this to the lack of variation in maternity 
payment over the study period.  Hoem (1993) documents the role of a Swedish policy reform in 
influencing the speed of childbearing amongst women.  Initially, the law required parents to 
retain their parental leave benefits up to two years following the birth of a child, but a policy 
change in 1986 led to a six-month extension of these benefits.  With the possibility that women 
can have two or possibly three children consecutively before returning to work, the author finds 
that the incentives under this policy increased women’s preferences for children relative to a 
career in the workplace.    
To date and to my knowledge, only one published multivariate study has analyzed the 
impact of maternity leave on fertility outcomes in the U.S. None has examined the impact of the 
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FMLA.  The study, which was done by Averett and Whittington (2001) examines whether 
employer-provided maternity leave affects fertility decisions of women.  Specifically, they 
investigated the impact of maternity leave on the probability of observing a birth using a 
discrete-time hazard model.  They find an increase in the likelihood of a woman giving birth as a 
result of maternity leave.  This result is even stronger if the woman has had a child in the past.            
There are other studies investigating the impact of government-mandated parental 
benefits on fertility using data from other countries.   Hoem et al. (2001) find that, by extending 
the parental leave in 1990 in Austria, the change in policy slowed the declining rate of third 
births.  More recently, Lalive and Zweimüller (2009) study the effects of changes in parental 
leave provisions on fertility as well as return-to-work behavior from a 1990 Austrian policy 
reform.  The new policy allows women to obtain longer paid maternity leave from the child’s 
first birthday to the second.  Using treated and control groups in a regression discontinuity 
framework, the authors find that mothers are 15 percent more likely to get an additional child, an 
episode which coincides with more time off from work. 
A related literature also examines the implications of financial incentives for fertility 
outcomes.  Incentives in the form of subsidies from these pronatalist polices tend to have large 
positive impacts on fertility (Milligan, 2005).  In general, the impacts of welfare reform 
programs aimed at either encouraging or prohibiting fertility behavior in the U.S. have been 
mixed.  Some of the factors influencing the results relate to the sensitivity of the findings to 
model specification as well as difficulty in measuring the size of the impact which may be very 
small relative to the effects of other factors (Moffit, 1997; Blank, 2002).   
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3.4.2. Previous Research on the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 
Previous empirical research provides evidence that the introduction of the FMLA has led 
to more coverage for eligible recipients who have increased the amount of leave taken (Ross, 
1998; Waldfogel, 1999; Han and Waldfogel 2003; Han et al., 2007).  At the same time, it 
appears that the FMLA has not caused any significant changes in employment or wages.  Berger 
and Waldfogel (2004) showed that FMLA-eligible women were more likely to access parental 
leave and then return to work after giving birth - a finding that may be attributable to the FMLA.   
Numerous studies have explored the role of the FMLA on various outcomes of interests 
such as wages, employment and child health outcomes.  To my knowledge, none of the studies 
have examined the fertility impact of the FMLA.11  If the introduction of the FMLA has created 
an incentive for more women to access leave (including maternity leave) then the FMLA may 
have impacted fertility behavior.   
This study expands on previous literature by investigating the causal effects of a 
universal policy (federal government legislation) on fertility behavior of women since the 
introduction of the FMLA.  Using the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY79) data, I identify the fertility behavior of women who, according to the criteria as set 
out in the FMLA, are eligible for maternity leave.  This research contributes to the existing 
literature in several distinct ways. 
This is the first analysis to study the fertility effects of a federal government-mandated 
parental leave policy in the U.S.   The study that comes closest is that of Averett and Whittington 
(2001) who investigate the fertility effects of employer-based maternity leave in the U.S., but 
this was prior to the implementation of the FMLA.  One limitation of their study is that only a 
                                                 
11 Averett and Whittington (2001) have looked at the impact of maternity leave on fertility, but their investigation 
was conducted prior to the introduction of the FMLA. 
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few states had laws providing job-protected maternity leave prior to the FMLA.  Therefore, the 
present study makes it possible to undertake a more general investigation of the universal impact 
of a federal law.  Consequently, the evidence that this chapter provides on the impact of 
maternity leave-related policies on fertility outcomes may have broader policy implications.   
Second, I am able to exploit the variation in exposure to FMLA benefits.  There is also variation 
in covered employers within states because not all firms are covered under FMLA.  Further, two 
individuals in the same covered firm may differ in eligibility status if one of them does not meet 
the criteria explained in Section 3.2.  This allows for the use of a difference-in-differences (DID) 
strategy.   
Third, I use a dataset which allows for the tracking of the behavior of a group of 
individuals over time and whose age group makes them most likely to be the first to be affected 
by this policy.  Waldfogel (1999) recognizes the NLSY data as being a potentially good source 
of information in investigating the FMLA’s impact on leave coverage.12  The data sample, which 
spans the period 1989 to 2006, provides important information over a sufficiently long time 
frame allowing for an assessment of the FMLA.  Ruhm (1997) expresses a similar sentiment by 
informing that over time, usage of the FMLA will likely increase.   
 
3.5. Empirical Strategy 
Since identification comes from an exogenous policy rule (eligibility criteria) based on 
length of current employment and company size, it is necessary to identify the policy impact by 
comparing the likelihood of a birth outcome between individuals eligible for FMLA benefits and 
                                                 
12 At the time of her research, the span of the data was too short to carry out any meaningful investigation. 
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those who are ineligible. 13  To do this, I employ a difference-in-differences estimator exploiting 
the variation in exposure to FMLA benefits by identifying changes in fertility behavior between 
two groups.  One group receives treatment and another group does not.  The natural control 
group will comprise women who were not eligible for FMLA, while the treatment group 
comprises women who satisfied the criteria for FMLA benefits and so became eligible. 
To evaluate the impact of the policy, I compare the changes in risk or probability of 
giving birth in the treatment and control group using the following discrete-time hazard model: 
 logit (hit)= α(t) + β1FMLAt + β2Eligibleit + β3 (FMLAt *Eligibleit) + β4Xit  (3.1) 
where hit is the hazard rate for individual i during interval t.  The hazard rate is the probability 
that an event occurs at a certain time to a particular individual given that the individual is at risk 
to the event at that time.  If the event is a first birth, then the hazard rate is the probability of a 
woman giving a first birth within the sample period among those women who are yet to have a 
first birth.     
The right-hand side of the equation consists of an indicator variable, FMLAt which 
equals one for the years 1993 to 2006 and zero otherwise, Eligibleit is a dichotomous variable 
which equals one for a woman that satisfies all the eligibility criteria for each year as defined in 
Section 3.2 and FMLAt *Eligibleit is the interaction term.  The vector X contains a set of 
covariates which may be fixed or time-varying and controls for age, race and ethnicity, marital 
status, education, family income, whether the woman has an urban residence, job tenure and the 
number of children the woman has had previously.  The βs represent the corresponding 
parameters to be estimated.  Standard errors are clustered at the person level. 
                                                 
13 Ineligible women are those who do not satisfy all the eligibility criteria and who have worked some positive 
number of hours in each of the years during the sample period 1989-2006.  Therefore, women who never worked in 
any year during the sample period are excluded. 
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The term α(t) is a function of t and completes the baseline logit-hazard model as shown in 
Equation (3.1).  In the case of discrete-time hazard models, the form of this function is usually 
determined by the researcher after inspection of data plots of the hazard function.  A hazard plot 
with an approximately linear pattern might have a function of the form α(t)= α1+α2t which 
comprises a constant and a time trend. This functional form may also include a quadratic term, t2.  
In many cases, a plot of the hazard function may not be linear and so the function α(t) will have 
to take a more flexible form.  The most flexible form of the function is when t is treated as a 
categorical variable for every time interval, except one (Allison, 1984).  In this case, the function 
will take the form α(t) = α1D1+ α2D2 + α3D3 +…+ αkDk or alternatively, this function can include 
an intercept term and k-1 time dummy variables.    
Interpretation of the coefficients is as follows:  β1 estimates the impact of the FMLA on 
the “risk” of giving a birth among ineligible women, β2 estimates the impact on birth for women 
who would have been eligible before the FMLA and β3 is the coefficient of the interaction term 
and represents the DID estimate.  I am primarily interested in the coefficient β3, which captures 
the policy impact.  It measures the differences in the changes of the hazard estimates of the 
policy between the treatment and comparison groups.  In other words, it shows whether FMLA-
eligible women’s response to a birth is different from that of ineligible women. 
 
3.6. Data 
3.6.1. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort (NLSY79)  
The main dataset for the analysis of fertility outcomes is based on micro data from the 
1989 to 2006 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort (NLSY79).  
Since 1979, interviews have been conducted on 12,686 U.S.-born young men and women who 
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were 14 to 22 years old in 1979 and the respondents have been followed and interviewed 
annually up until 1994 and biennially from 1996.  The NLSY79 is a large nationally-
representative survey designed to provide comprehensive information on labor market activities 
and demographic information.  There is an oversampling of Blacks, Hispanics, and economically 
disadvantaged non-Black/non-Hispanic individuals in the NLSY79. However, the NLSY79 
provides customized sampling weights to adjust for this oversampling.     
This panel structure of the NLSY79 data offers several advantages over cross-sectional 
data.  For example, the longitudinal nature of the data allows one to follow the same individuals.  
This is important for this chapter in analyzing how women changed fertility behavior over time.   
The sample period is from 1989 to 2006.  During this period, it is possible to observe 
how fertility behavior changed over the years in response to the FMLA policy. By the design of 
the sample, the youngest person is 24 years old in 1989, the beginning of the analysis period.  
This means that the youngest person in the sample was 28 years old when the FMLA was 
implemented.  Although the sample may not be representative of fertility in the U.S. during the 
sample period, almost 65% of the women over the age of 25 had given birth to at least one child 
during the same time frame (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009, Table 89).  Further, the provisions of the 
FMLA and its strict eligibility criteria for maternity leave (for example, being at work in the past 
12 months with the same employee) are likely to impact a certain set of women, the greater 
proportion of whom are likely to be found in the sample.   
 
3.6.2. Dependent Variables and Controls  
The dependent variable is a binary indicator that equals one if the woman gave a birth 
during the sample period 1989 to 2006 and zero otherwise.  Specifically, there are two outcome 
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variables, one for whether the person has a first birth and the other is whether the individual has 
a second birth.  For each outcome, I control for a number of characteristics that are likely to 
affect fertility behavior such as the age, race and ethnicity, education, marital status, cognitive 
ability in the form of the age-adjusted Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), family income, 
the number of children a woman had in the past and tastes for children such as women’s views 
on gender roles in the household.  I also include work history information such as job tenure.  
Year dummies are also included to allow for differential characteristics over time.  Table B.1 
provides the definition of each of the variables used and the units of measurement. 
I organized the data in a person-year format.  The person-year format means that the 
same woman appears in the sample each year until she either gives birth in a particular year or if 
she never gives birth throughout the sample period.  This data restructuring will typically result 
in the number of person-years being greater than the actual number of women in the sample.  See 
Appendix E for a description of this process.   
 
3.6.3. Measurement and Other Data Issues  
There may be drawbacks in interpreting the relationship between the FMLA impact and 
fertility outcomes.  Other influences might bias the results.  For example, there is the potential 
for sorting to occur before the policy, whereby women who desire to have children will choose 
those jobs that provide maternity leave benefits.  Specifically, women with strong fertility desires 
may be prone to take up jobs that offer maternity leave irrespective of the FMLA, while those 
women with no desire for children may choose firms not covered under FMLA.  In this case, the 
impact of FMLA on fertility is not clearly identified because it is fertility desires that may be 
driving women to access leave, as opposed to the availability of leave under the FMLA that is 
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influencing childbearing preferences.  Although the study by Averett and Whittington (2001) did 
not investigate the impact of the FMLA, the authors found no evidence that women who prefer 
having children were self-selecting into employment providing maternity leave.14  Selection of 
this type is unlikely because under the FMLA, there is an implicit waiting period since all 
FMLA-maternity leave beneficiaries ought to have worked at least one year with the same 
employer and must have accumulated at least 1,250 hours during the past year (see Section 3.2). 
To test the above empirically, Table 3.1 provides results of some regressions where the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if an individual is employed at a job that 
offers job-protected maternity leave and zero otherwise.15  Each specification (columns 1 to 2) 
includes covariates controlling for various demographic and other characteristics of the person 
such as age, race and ethnicity and education.  The bottom of the table lists all the controls used.  
I also include state and year fixed-effects.   
In column (1), the variable of interest is the “desired number of children” which was 
asked of each respondent in the 1979 wave of the NLSY79.  If women with strong fertility 
desires are sorting into jobs offering maternity leave then the coefficient on this variable should 
be positive and significant.  It turns out that the coefficient is negative and not statistically 
significant; suggesting that desired fertility does not appear to have any impact on the probability 
                                                 
14 The authors estimated the effect of the “desired number of children” on the probability of being in a maternity 
leave job.  They found that the coefficient on “desired number of children” was negative and insignificant.  A 
statistically insignificant result indicates little/no evidence of selection bias caused by women sorting into firms 
offering maternity leave because they want to have children.  
 
15  Each wave of the NLSY79 asks respondents whether they are employed at a job that offers job-protected 
maternity leave.  Job-protected maternity leave guarantees an individual the right to return to work after being 
granted leave from the same employer conditional upon the employee spending no more than the maximum 
allowable leave. As mentioned earlier, varying degrees of job-protected maternity leave existed in states before the 
FMLA was implemented.    
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of a woman choosing such a job.16  In another specification (column 2), the variable “desired 
number of children” is interacted with a dummy variable “Eligible” which equals to one for a 
woman who would have become eligible for the FMLA and zero otherwise.  The coefficient on 
this interaction is positive but is not statistically significant.  This is evidence against the 
possibility that women who might have been eligible for FMLA were already choosing maternity 
leave jobs in anticipation of the policy. In summary, these results offer evidence to dispel the 
notion that a widespread number of women with strong fertility desires were sorting into jobs 
offering maternity leave.17   
 
Table 3.1: Impact of Fertility Desire on choosing a Maternity Leave Job: OLS 
Regressions 
Variables (1) (2) 
 Dependent variable: Employer 
provides job-protected maternity leave 
Desired number of children -0.0025 -0.0039 
 (0.0028) (0.0033) 
Eligible*Desired number of children  0.0053 
  (0.0040) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
State dummies Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes 
Woman-year observations 40,775 40,775 
Log-likelihood  0.15 0.25 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual are reported in parentheses.  In addition, all regressions 
control for age, education, marital status, AFQT scores in percentile, race, ethnicity, union status, whether the 
individual resides in an urban area, family income, number of children ever head, tastes for children as 
measured by women and job tenure.   
  
                                                 
16 As shown in column 1 of Table 3.1, the coefficient of -0.002 is almost identical to the result obtained by Averett 
and Whittington (2001).   
    
17 There is also a selection bias whereby women who desire children may choose to not work.  In which case, the 
probability of giving a birth increases for these ineligible women.  By including women who are not working, I am 
actually underestimating the impact of the policy.   Also, women in larger firms with longer tenure and more hours 
may be more committed to career and may be less likely to have children or more likely to delay.  This would bias 
against finding fertility effects of FMLA on eligible women.  
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There may also be causality issues where the take-up of maternity leave is itself 
endogenous.  That is, the decision of working women to proceed on maternity leave may be due 
to child-friendly employment benefits unrelated to FMLA and offered in covered institutions.  If 
eligible women decide to have children because of these benefits irrespective of the FMLA, then 
the impact of the FMLA on fertility outcomes of eligible women is likely to be biased.  This 
potential problem is likely to be minimal because childcare in the U.S. is widely available and is 
not limited to FMLA-covered institutions.    
 Other issues surround the use of the NLSY79 data.  Because the NLSY79 has only one 
cohort, one potential issue is that for the women in the sample, the FMLA occurs in the middle 
of their peak fertility years.  For example, for the FMLA to have an effect on the timing of a 
woman’s first birth, she must not have had a first birth before the age of 28.  The characteristics 
of these women may result in selection bias on the fertility impact of the FMLA.  This bias is 
likely to be downwards because for physiological reasons older, childless women tend to have a 
lower probability of having a first birth.  It is also possible for an upward bias to occur to the 
extent that women who are more educated and/or career-oriented may further delay having a first 
birth, thus making the probability of a first birth more likely at a later age.   
There is possible measurement error in deriving the “Eligible” variable.  One of the 
criteria for eligibility for FMLA is that the individual must be employed in a covered institution 
(see Section 3.2). According to the definition, covered employers comprise all public institutions 
(including schools) irrespective of the number of employees, private institutions with at least 50 
employees, and private elementary and secondary schools irrespective of the number of 
employees.  Even though all public schools are covered employers, only some private schools 
are.  Information on the type of private school employer (whether elementary or secondary) is 
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not provided in the NLSY79 and so it is possible that some private school firms are incorrectly 
included in the covered category.  This discrepancy is likely to be small since the total number of 
private schools constitutes less than one percent of all firms in the US.18   
In some firms, women receive additional benefits in the form of compensation while on 
maternity leave.  Therefore it may be possible to find two women working in separate firms both 
of whom are eligible for FMLA but one of them can access paid leave while the other does not.  
There is no information in the NLSY79 that allows the researcher to differentiate between these 
two women.  If both women decide to have children and proceed on maternity leave, but one did 
so because of the compensation irrespective of the FMLA, then the impact of FMLA eligibility 
on the probability of giving birth will be biased.  Since only a small fraction of workers enjoy 
paid family leave benefits this bias is likely to be small.19    
 
3.7. Empirical Results 
3.7.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics of the NLSY79 sample of women used in the 
chapter.  The first column shows the statistics for all women during the observation period 1989 
to 2006.  Columns 2 and 3 provide statistics for women who would have been eligible for FMLA 
benefits before and after the policy was introduced, respectively.  Meanwhile, columns 4 and 5 
give statistics for ineligible women.  These ineligible women are those who have worked some 
                                                 
18 In 2007, there were 33,740 private schools in the US.  See the U.S. Department of Education National Center for 
Education Statistics, Private School Universe Survey 2007-2008 available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_058.asp (accessed October 2, 2010).  In 2002, the total number 
of firms as reported by the Census Bureau was 22,974,655.  See the U.S. Census Bureau: State and Country Quick 
Facts available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (accessed October 2, 2010).  
   
19 For example, in 2007, only 8% of private sector workers could access paid family leave benefits.  See U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in Private 
Industry in the United States at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebsm0006.pdf  (accessed September 21,  2010)  
67 
 
positive number of hours in each of the years of the sample period.  If sample selection exists, 
one way of detecting this is if the demographic characteristics of the two groups of women differ 
substantively.  More than half of the women are married and this fraction is similar across all 
categories of women before and after the policy.  Across two groups, the women are similar in 
age and on average they have acquired about 13 years of schooling.  There is a higher proportion 
of Black eligible women compared to the proportion of Black ineligible women.  The opposite is 
true for women of Hispanic origin.   
 
3.7.2. Discrete-Time Hazard Estimates: Probability of Having a First Birth  
In this section, I use a discrete-time hazard model to present formal estimates of Equation 
(3.1) to test whether the introduction of the FMLA resulted in a differential impact on the 
likelihood of eligible women giving birth relative to other women.  Table 3 presents estimates of 
the impact on the probability of a first birth.  Columns 1 and 2 present the marginal effects based 
on the logit model shown in Equation (3.1) with time dummies included in all specifications.  
The key variable of interest is the interaction term FMLA*Eligible which indicates whether the 
birth response among FMLA-eligible women differs to that of ineligible women.  The variable 
Eligible equals one if the individual satisfies the main criteria to be eligible for FMLA benefits 
and equal zero otherwise (see Section 3.2 for the list of criteria), while FMLA equals one for all 
years (1993-2006) since the start of the policy and zero otherwise.     
The specifications in columns 1 and 2 differ by only the additional controls included in 
the latter.  In both specifications, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  These results indicate that the introduction of the 
FMLA has led to a 3.7 percentage point and 6 percentage point increase in the probability that an 
eligible woman will give a first birth.     
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Women in the NLSY79 sample: Means (standard 
deviations)  
Variables All women Eligible women Working Ineligible women 
 
1989-2006 
Before 
(1989-1992) 
After  
(1993-2006) 
Before 
(1989-1992) 
After  
(1993-2006) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dummy Explanatory Variables     
Eligible 0.444 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Married 0.554 0.507*** 0.534 0.570 0.583 
Black 0.287 0.317*** 0.355 0.229 0.253 
Hispanic 0.180 0.159*** 0.180 0.177 0.193 
Union 0.117 0.172*** 0.211 0.045 0.057 
Urban 0.766 0.817*** 0.751 0.782 0.746 
Gender role1 0.144 0.118*** 0.121 0.156 0.169 
Gender role2 0.842 0.862*** 0.855 0.832 0.828 
Gender role3 0.258 0.225*** 0.238 0.266 0.286 
      
Continuous explanatory variables     
Age 34.744 
(5.834) 
29.529*** 
(2.495) 
37.953 
(4.918) 
29.419 
(2.507) 
37.824 
(4.905) 
Education 13.338 
(2.356) 
13.598*** 
(2.247) 
13.741 
(2.380) 
12.887 
(2.273) 
13.162 
(2.365) 
Family Income 50.060 
(72.589) 
45.963** 
(87.66) 
54.771 
(49.627) 
42.782 
(93.071) 
52.498 
(65.860) 
Parity 1.898 
(1.330) 
1.630*** 
(1.229) 
1.802 
(1.266) 
1.962 
(1.347) 
2.060 
(1.390) 
AFQT score 43.087 
(27.920) 
45.837*** 
(27.822) 
43.627 
(27.881) 
42.430 
(27.890) 
41.766 
(27.918) 
Job tenure 245.132 
(258.188) 
228.013*** 
(182.891) 
374.417 
(305.738) 
119.572 
(144.003) 
222.336 
(251.470) 
     
Other variables     
High school dropout 0.087 0.063*** 0.053 0.133 0.099 
High school graduate 0.415 0.390*** 0.381 0.447 0.436 
Some college 0.275 0.281*** 0.297 0.250 0.270 
College graduate 0.223 0.266*** 0.270 0.171 0.195 
Government sector 0.171 0.268*** 0.311 0.064 0.076 
Private sector 0.654 0.727*** 0.554 0.760 0.640 
MLS states 0.282 0.276*** 0.263 0.298 0.289 
Employees 2279.151 
(13,222.750) 
6056.807*** 
(22004.320) 
1984.748 
(10548.880) 
2534.387 
(15129.530) 
651.741 
(6702.972) 
Hours work 1799.651 
(789.281) 
2098.985*** 
(404.634) 
2171.072 
(504.041) 
1414.506 
(821.257) 
1591.103 
(904.100) 
Desired number of children 2.507 
(1.494) 
2.477** 
(1.432) 
2.458 
(1.411) 
2.525 
(1.528) 
2.550 
(1.565) 
Maternity leave 0.641 0.854*** 0.879 0.434 0.473 
Covered 0.580 1.000 1.000 0.247 0.244 
N 42,353 6,582 12,224 9,059 14,488 
Notes: Eligible women are those who satisfy all the criteria to be eligible for FMLA benefits.  See Section 3.2 for these 
eligibility criteria. Ineligible women are those who do not satisfy all the eligibility criteria and who have worked some positive 
number of hours in each of the years during the sample period 1989-2006.  Therefore, women who never worked in any year 
during the sample period are excluded. Statistical levels of significance, based on the difference between means of eligible and 
ineligible women before FMLA, are as follows: ** indicates p<0.05, *** indicates p<0.01.    
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The coefficients on a number of independent variables in the model show the expected 
sign in Table 3.3 (column 2).  The likelihood of a first birth increases with age.  Although the 
education variable is not significant, the measure of cognitive ability (AFQT scores) is negative 
and significant.  Being married increases the probability of giving a first birth while race, 
ethnicity, union status and place of residence do not have any significant impact.   
As a whole, the objectives of the FMLA reflect a commitment towards improving 
employees’ needs to balance work and family responsibilities, thus promoting family integrity 
without comprising productivity in the workplace.  Prior to the FMLA, it is likely that 
individuals’ desire and ability to access leave would have been influenced by the institutional 
policies of the organization to which they belong.  Given the universal nature of the FMLA, it is 
particularly interesting to investigate what effect the FMLA and its eligibility criteria had on first 
birth among specific sub-groups of the sample.  I explore this in Table 3.4, Panels 1 to 3, where 
the results are shown separately by institutional sector, race and ethnicity, and education level.  
The estimates are based on a model that includes control variables as well as year fixed-effects.       
Panel 1 separates the results according to whether the individuals were employed in the 
government sector or other sectors.  The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant in other sectors (column 3).  On the other hand, in the government sector 
the likelihood of eligible women giving a first birth is not statistically significantly different to 
other women.  This result in part might be explained by the fact that all public institutions are 
covered employers regardless of the number of employees, therefore making it far easier for an 
otherwise ineligible woman to become eligible.20       
                                                 
20 See Section 3.2 for a definition of a covered employer and how this relates to a woman being eligible for FMLA 
benefits. I also present models where the sample is disaggregated according to firm size.  For firms with less than 50 
employees, the coefficient of interest was not significantly different from zero.  This result is not surprising because 
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Panel 2 divides the sample by race and ethnicity: Blacks, Hispanics and Whites as shown 
in columns 2 to 4, respectively.  From these grouping, the only significant result is obtained 
within the White category, suggesting that among whites, eligible women increase their 
probability of giving a first birth by about 5.8 percentage points which is similar to the result 
obtained in the full sample.  In terms of education level (Panel 3), eligible women among those 
with at least some college experience increase the probability of giving a first birth by 5.2 
percentage points.  In the case of Panel 2, one plausible explanation for this outcome is that to 
the extent that whites are more likely to be married and have high income-earning husbands, it 
makes it more feasible for them to take unpaid leave to have children under the FMLA.  
Similarly, the results in Panel 3 might be associated with the fact that white eligible women who 
are utilizing the leave benefits under FMLA the most also happen to be the more educated.21  
This result is also consistent with the findings that college-educated females were more like to 
take unpaid maternity leave while the FMLA policy appeared to have no significant impact on 
women who had never gone to college (Han, Ruhm and Waldfogel, 2007).  
 
3.7.3. Discrete-Time Hazard Estimates: Probability of Having a Second Birth  
Table 3.5 presents estimates of the impact on the probability of a second birth.  The 
results in this table come from the same model specifications as in Table 3.3.  The coefficient on 
the interaction term is positive and significant across both specifications as shown in columns 1 
and 2.  Using the results of column 2, the value of the coefficient indicates that eligible women 
                                                                                                                                                             
firms in this size category (with a few exceptions as noted in Section 2) by definition are not covered institutions, 
thus making the employees ineligible for FMLA benefits.  
 
21Therefore, the more educated are better able to utilize the leave benefits of the FMLA because of better knowledge 
about policy.  Recall, only 58.2 percent of employees at covered worksites had any knowledge of FMLA 
(Department of Labor, 2007). 
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increase their probability of giving a second birth by about 4.2 percentage points following the 
introduction of the FMLA.          
Independent variables that measure age, marital status and cognitive ability all have 
significant effects on the probability of giving a second birth.  Age and marital status are 
associated with increased probability while AFQT scores have a downward influence on the 
probability of a second birth.   
Similar to the first birth outcomes, I run the models with the probability of a second birth 
as the dependent variable with the results shown separately by the type of sector, race and 
ethnicity, and education.  The results are presented in Table 3.6 and the specifications are the 
same as those found in Table 3.4.  Specifically, Panels 1 to 3 of Table 3.6 correspond to the 
respective Panels 1 to 3 of Table 3.4.  In almost all of the cases, the results are qualitatively 
similar in terms of statistical significance whereby eligible women working in other sectors 
significantly increase the probability of giving a second birth (Panel 1, column 3).  On the other 
hand, white eligible women (Panel 2, column 4) and eligible women with at least some exposure 
to college education (Panel 3, column 3) have increased the probability of giving a second birth 
by 4.4 and 2.9 percentage points, respectively.   
 
3.7.4. Some Calculations  
Overall, the above results indicate a positive effect of FMLA on eligible women resulting 
in the increased probability of giving a first and second birth.  The magnitude of the effect is 
larger for a first birth.  Using the results in column 2 of Tables 3.3 and 3.5, I calculate the 
predicted probabilities of giving a first and second birth for eligible women.  These are shown in 
the top panel of Table B.2. The probability of an eligible woman giving a first birth before the    
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Table 3.3: Estimates from Logit Regression: Likelihood of a First Birth 
(Marginal Effects) 
Variables (1) (2) 
 Dependent variable: first birth 
Eligible -0.0130*** -0.0101*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0024) 
FMLA -0.1343*** -0.9938*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0023) 
FMLA*Eligible 0.0367** 0.0597** 
 (0.0171) (0.0285) 
Age  0.0168*** 
  (0.0040) 
Age squared  -0.0002*** 
  (0.0001) 
Education  -0.0002 
  (0.0004) 
Married  0.0335*** 
  (0.0030) 
AFQT percentile  -0.0001** 
  (0.0000) 
Black  0.0012 
  (0.0029) 
Hispanic  -0.0019 
  (0.0024) 
Union  0.0024 
  (0.0031) 
Urban  -0.0012 
  (0.0022) 
Family income  -0.0000 
  (0.0000) 
Parity  0.0191*** 
  (0.0017) 
Gender role1  -0.0014 
  (0.0028) 
Gender role2  -0.0031 
  (0.0027) 
Gender role3  0.0024 
  (0.0026) 
Job tenure  0.0000 
  (0.0000) 
Job tenure squared  -0.0080 
  (0.0171) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Woman-year observations 12,277 11,981 
Log-likelihood -2668.420 -2024.656 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual are reported in parentheses.  Statistical 
levels of significance are: * indicates p<0.1, ** indicates p<0.05, *** indicates p<0.01.    
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Table 3.4: Estimates from Logit Regression: Likelihood of a First Birth by Sector, Race 
and Ethnicity and Education Level (Marginal effects)         
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PANEL 1: Sector 
Full sample Government Other 
sectors 
 
FMLA*Eligible 0.0597** 0.0084 0.0605*  
 (0.0285) (0.0198) (0.0305)  
Woman-year observations 11,981 2236 9745  
Log-likelihood -2024.656 -353.711 -1663.319  
     
     
PANEL 2: Results by race and ethnicity    
 
Full sample Black Hispanic Others 
(Whites) 
FMLA*Eligible 0.0597** 0.0152 0.0118 0.0582* 
 (0.0285) (0.0141) (0.0168) (0.0312) 
Woman-year observations  11,981 2946 1732 7303 
Log-likelihood -2024.656 -368.175 -281.577 -1331.076 
     
     
PANEL 3: Results by level of education    
 
Full sample High school 
or less 
At least 
Some 
College 
 
FMLA*Eligible 0.0597** 0.0145 0.0520*  
 (0.0285) (0.0125) (0.0284)  
Woman-year observations 11,981 3960 8021  
Log-likelihood -2024.656 -616.706 -1391.836  
     
     
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual are reported in parentheses.  Statistical levels of 
significance are: * indicates p<0.1, ** indicates p<0.05.   
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Table 3.5: Estimates from Logit Regression: Likelihood of a Second Birth 
(Marginal effects) 
Variables (1) (2) 
 Dependent variable: Second birth 
Eligible -0.0128*** -0.0054*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0011) 
FMLA -0.1390*** -0.9937*** 
 (0.0389) (0.0033) 
FMLA*Eligible 0.0590*** 0.0418** 
 (0.0162) (0.0183) 
Age  0.0080*** 
  (0.0018) 
Age squared  -0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) 
Education  -0.0003 
  (0.0002) 
Married  0.0106*** 
  (0.0013) 
AFQT percentile  -0.0000* 
  (0.0000) 
Black  0.0019 
  (0.0014) 
Hispanic  0.0008 
  (0.0012) 
Union  0.0002 
  (0.0014) 
Urban  -0.0010 
  (0.0010) 
Family income  -0.0000 
  (0.0000) 
Parity  0.0104*** 
  (0.0009) 
Gender role1  -0.0005 
  (0.0015) 
Gender role2  0.0002 
  (0.0013) 
Gender role3  0.0016 
  (0.0013) 
Job tenure  0.0000* 
  (0.0000) 
Job tenure squared  -0.0037 
  (0.0068) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Woman-year observations 21671 21059 
Log-likelihood -3281.282 -2409.276 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual are reported in parentheses.  Statistical 
levels of significance are: * indicates p<0.1, ** indicates p<0.05, *** indicates p<0.01.     
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Table 3.6: Estimates from Logit Regression: Likelihood of a Second Birth by Sector, 
Race and Ethnicity and Education Level (Marginal Effects) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PANEL 1: Sector 
Full sample Government Other 
Sectors 
 
FMLA*Eligible 0.0418** 0.0005 0.0487**  
 (0.0183) (0.0133) (0.0230)  
Woman-year observations  21059 3837 17222  
Log-likelihood -2409.276 -392.058 -2087.414  
     
     
PANEL 2: Results by race and ethnicity    
 
Full sample Blacks Hispanics Others 
(Whites) 
FMLA*Eligible 0.0418** 0.0324 0.0040 0.0444* 
 (0.0183) (0.0281) (0.0117) (0.0253) 
N (in person-years) 21059 5645 3242 12172 
Log-likelihood -2409.276 -553.178 -465.181 -1431.350 
     
     
PANEL 3: Results by level of education    
 
Full sample High school 
or less 
At least 
Some 
College 
 
FMLA*Eligible 0.0418** 0.0445 0.0287*  
 (0.0183) (0.0313) (0.0177)  
Woman-year observations 21059 8410 12649  
Log-likelihood -2409.276 -1067.191 -1391.289  
     
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual are reported in parentheses.  Statistical levels of 
significance are: * indicates p<0.1, ** indicates p<0.05.   
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FMLA was introduced is 25.96 percent.  After the FMLA, the probability of giving a first birth 
rises by 5.97 percentage points to 31.87 percent.  Similarly, for a second birth, the probability 
rises by 4.18 percentage points from 28 percent to 32.18 percent.  By taking a simple average, 
the probability of giving a first or second birth rose by an average of 5.08 percentage points to 
32.03 percent after the FMLA.  This represents an increase of approximately 19 percent.   
While there are currently no known studies examining the fertility impact of the FMLA 
on eligible women, the results can be compared with a U.S.-based study that investigates the 
impact of having a maternity leave job on fertility.  In Panel B of Table B.2 I provide the implied 
probabilities using estimates from a study by Averett and Whittington (2001).  As mentioned 
earlier, the authors in this study examined the impact of being employed in a job offering 
maternity leave on the probability of giving birth to a child.  Their sample comprises all working 
women and covers the period 1985 to 1992.  The baseline probability of having a child for 
working women is found by dividing the number of births over the sample period by the number 
of women in the sample.  That is 1325/3590 equals 36.9 percent.  The marginal effect of the 
impact of having a maternity leave job on the probability of having the first child is 3.7 
percentage points while the marginal effect of having a higher order birth due to maternity leave 
is 2.8 percentage points.  Therefore, the average marginal effect is 3.25 percentage points which 
is the average of 3.7 and 2.8.  Using this information, the predicted probability of having any 
child after having a maternity leave job is approximately 40.15 percent (36.9+3.25=40.15).    
How do the implied calculations from the Averett and Whittington study compare?  On 
average, maternity leave increased the probability of working women having a child by 3.25 
percentage points or about 8.8 percent.  The calculations in the current study suggest that FMLA 
increased the probability of eligible women having a child by an average of 3.97 percentage 
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points or by about 19 percent.  The results of this chapter are closer to those of Lalive and 
Zweimüller (2005) who finds that women were 15 percent more likely to have an additional birth 
under a policy in Austria.    
 
3.7.5. Sensitivity Analysis  
Some states had maternity leave statutes (MLS) prior to the introduction of the FMLA.  It 
is possible individuals residing in states that already had some form of MLS are unlikely to be 
affected as much by the FMLA, since in some cases, the benefits  provided under the FMLA 
may have been less generous.  Also, in 2002 California introduced the Paid Family Leave Bill 
that provides disability compensation for employees unable to perform work duties due to the 
birth of a child along with other provisions.  In light of these circumstances, I estimate the main 
model shown in Equation (3.1) by excluding California.  In a separate regression, I exclude all 
states that had an MLS (California is included as well) prior to the FMLA.  The results are 
shown in Table 3.7 (columns 2 and 3, respectively).  Panels 1 and 2 present the results when the 
dependent variable is the probability of a first birth and second birth, respectively.  Even with 
these exclusions, there is still evidence of an increase in the probability of eligible women giving 
a first and second birth.  
Instead of removing these states that had some form of maternity leave statutes, I kept 
them, coding such states with a dummy variable and interacting with eligibility status.  This 
would give some variation in access to leave that did not turn on in 1993.  The results as shown 
in column 4 (both panels), are robust to this specification.  In column 5, I re-estimate the model 
with a placebo effect. Here, I assume that the policy started in some period other than the year it 
actually took place.  In panel 1, the policy is assumed to have taken place during the period   
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1990-1992 while in column 2, it is assumed that the FMLA started in 1990.  The estimates of the 
placebo effects can be compared with the estimates of the policy effect in column 1.  As one 
would expect, the placebo effects are not statistically significant, thus providing further support 
to the identification strategy. In column 6, I consider the possibility that there may be some pre-
existing differential trends in fertility between eligible and non-eligible women.  To control for 
this, I include a linear time trend and interacted it with the “Eligibility” dummy. Once again, the 
results are robust to this specification.1      
In the next set of robustness checks, I assume that the criteria for eligibility is based 
either on firm size, with hours worked allowed to vary (column 7) or eligibility is based solely on 
hours worked with the size of the firm allowed to vary (column 8).  Recall in Section 3.2, for the 
purposes of the FMLA, eligibility is based on both hours worked and size of firm in which the 
individual is employed.   Compared with the base estimates in column 1, the results in columns 7 
and 8 are larger in the majority of the cases.  Even more interestingly are those estimates in 
column 8.  The coefficient is almost twice as large as in the case of a first birth.  This is 
interesting because the results can have important policy implications.  One interpretation of this 
finding is as follows: if the eligibility criteria for receiving FMLA benefits were based only on 
the amount of hours an employee works (disregarding the size of the firm), then the fertility 
impact will be larger, almost doubling in the case of a first birth outcome.  Given that almost 90 
percent of the firms in the U.S. employ 20 or less individuals, it would appear that a change in 
policy that relaxes the eligibility criteria can have a profound fertility impact through its effect on 
a broader spectrum of the labor force.2  
                                                 
1I also ran the same regression, this time including a quadratic trend and interacting with eligibility status.  The 
results (not shown) are also robust to this specification.   
2Data source: http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/smallbus.html (accessed Jan 25, 2011).     
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One final piece of robustness check is that I use eligibility status in the first year as 
opposed to the current year.  That is, in the year an individual first becomes eligible for FMLA 
benefits, the assumption is that individual remains eligible through the remainder of the sample 
period.  The results are shown in column 9, panels 1 and 2.  Even with this static form of 
eligibility, the results remain significant and of the expected the sign.   
While it is not possible to guarantee that the FMLA was the sole cause of the relative 
increase in fertility behavior among eligible women, there is no evidence that some other factor(s) 
with a similarly universal impact and unrelated to the FMLA could have affected eligible women 
to the same degree as the previous findings indicate. 
 
3.7.6. Parametric Estimation Using Log-normal Regressions  
The results obtained above have been generated from a set of semi-parametric models.  
These models are more appropriate in cases where the distribution of the outcome is not exactly 
known.  However, there are some parametric (distribution-based) models prevalent in the social 
sciences and that are appropriate in this analysis.  One commonly–used model is the log-normal 
model associated with skewed outcomes and is also used to measure the response times of an 
individual to an event.3  The model measures the log of survival time.  Specifically, the log-
normal model assumes a log-normal distribution of the form: 
 log(ti)= β1FMLAt + β2Eligibleit + β3 (FMLAt *Eligibleit) + β4Xit + εit (3.2) 
                                                 
3 Inspection of the data reveals positive skewness in the outcomes used in this analysis.     
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where the dependent variable measures the log of survival time in years, t.  The remainder of the 
model is the same as in Equation (3.1).  The error term is assumed normal with zero mean and 
constant variance.4   
 The log-normal model is one of several duration/survival models known as accelerated 
failure time (AFT) models.5  In these models the researcher is interested in determining how long 
a case will last before a “failure” (in this case, giving a birth) occurs.  Related to this study, I am 
interested in determining the length of time a woman takes or “survives” before giving a birth.  
Although the log-normal model does not have a hazard-form interpretation, its AFT form of 
interpretation is related to hazard functions: in general an increase in the hazard of an event 
implies a decrease in the expected log survival time.  Because of the form of the log-normal 
model, interpretation of the coefficients is straightforward: a unit increase in the covariate leads 
to a β increase/decrease in the logged survival time.  Put another way: an increase in the 
covariate leads to a 100*β percent change in survival times.  Based on the previous findings 
which show that eligible women have a higher “hazard” of giving birth since FMLA, this implies 
that eligible women ought to have shorter survival times before giving a birth.  Therefore, the 
coefficient on the interaction term (FMLA*Eligible) in the log-normal regressions is expected to 
be negative. 
 Table 3.8 presents the results of the log-normal time-to-birth regressions for the two birth 
outcomes.  The specifications in columns 1 and 2 are similar to the models shown in columns 2 
of Tables 3.3 and 3.5, respectively.  The sign of the coefficient on the FMLA*Eligible 
interaction term in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.8 is opposite those of the discrete time hazard 
models in columns 2 of Tables 3.3 and 3.5, respectively.  Since eligible women after FMLA have 
                                                 
4 The dependent variable “t” is distributed log-normal.   
 
5 Other models of the AFT type include Exponential, Weibull and log-logistic.   
82 
 
a greater hazard of giving birth then it implies that these women will take less time on average to 
do so.  In both outcomes, the coefficients are statistically significant.  For an interpretation of the 
coefficient on the interaction term in Table 3.8: following the FMLA, eligible women are taking 
on average 37.8 percent less time before having a first birth (column 1) while taking 21.1 percent 
less time before having a second birth (column 2).    
 To put this into context, Table B.3 presents some calculations on the time taken for 
eligible women to give a first and second birth before and after the FMLA.  Column 1 gives the 
baseline average waiting time in years.  In the sample, eligible women took just over two years 
before giving a first or second birth. With the introduction of the FMLA, they have reduced this 
waiting time by 0.88 years or about 11 months for a first birth and by 0.5 years or six months for 
a second birth, resulting in a fall in the average waiting time before giving a birth of 0.69 years 
or approximately 8 months (column 2).  The predicted new waiting times are approximately 1.4 
years for giving a first birth and just under two years for a second birth (column 3).  On average, 
the waiting time has been reduced to 1.65 years or approximately 20 months.      
To illustrate how the probability of giving a birth changed over the years, Figures 3.1 and 
3.2 plot the fitted log-normal survival functions between FMLA-eligible women and ineligible 
women for the first and second birth outcomes.  The plotted predicted survival functions clearly 
indicate eligible women have lower probabilities of not having either a first or a second birth.  
The differences in the probabilities between the two groups of women get larger after about the 
fourth year which is when the FMLA began.     
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3.8. Discussion and Conclusion  
This chapter examines the impact on fertility outcomes of a policy - the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) - that allows women to proceed on job-protected maternity leave.  
Because the FMLA has clearly-defined eligibility criteria and empirical evidence suggests that it 
may have been associated with an increase in work leave taken, it is possible to identify the 
impact on fertility by comparing the outcome among eligible women (who are able to access 
FMLA leave) with the fertility outcomes of those who are not eligible for FMLA.   
I find that the implementation of the FMLA has resulted in eligible women increasing 
their probabilities of giving birth to a first and second child.  The magnitude of the effects 
appears larger for a first birth.  Specifically, among eligible women, the FMLA increased the 
probability of giving birth by 6 percentage points for a first birth and 4.2 percentage points for a 
second birth.  These changes are equivalent to respective increases in probabilities of 23.1 and 
14.9 percent from the baseline.  The results of the analysis also show that eligible women are 
giving birth to the first child 11 months earlier and about 6 months earlier for the second child.      
I also consider the impact of the policy across sectors, race and ethnicity, and education 
level.  These results indicate that the FMLA is more effective in non-government sectors.  There 
is no difference in the responsiveness to birth among Blacks and Hispanics.  Meanwhile, among 
Whites, eligible females have significantly higher probabilities of giving a first or second birth.  
Eligible women with at least some education experience at the college level are more likely to 
give a first or second birth after FMLA.       
These results are consistent with increased leave being taken by eligible recipients (Ross, 
1998; Waldfogel, 1999; Han and Waldfogel 2003; Han, Ruhm and Waldfogel 2007). The results 
are also consistent with the findings that college-educated females were more like to take unpaid 
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maternity leave while the policy appeared to have no significant impact on women who had 
never gone to college (Han, Ruhm and Waldfogel 2007).  In addition to the effectiveness of the 
policy in influencing child preferences, by allowing eligible women the right to return to their 
former jobs after giving birth, the FMLA has effectively improved the labor outcomes of new 
parents (Waldfogel, 1999).   Beyond these, the findings raise the possibility that the policy may 
have improved other outcomes not yet explored.  For instance, the long-term educational 
attainment and health outcomes of children born to FMLA-eligible women represent important 
areas for future research.6   
This research offers some insights into family friendly policies in the U.S.  There are a 
number of potential implications arising from such a policy.  First, the FMLA can help to address 
the balance between women’s work and family life.  Second, it can help to address the length of 
delay in childbearing among career oriented women.  Finally, there are also implications for the 
retention of women in the labor force given that educated women may opt out of paid 
employment after having children.    
There is evidence that the FMLA is under-utilized.  For instance, only 58.2 percent of 
employees at covered worksites had any knowledge of FMLA (Department of Labor, 2007).  In 
addition, I find that if the criteria for eligibility were relaxed, the fertility impact of the policy 
could almost double, most notably by impacting a wider spectrum of the labor force.  On these 
bases alone, the effect of the FMLA on fertility outcomes can increase overtime through greater 
public awareness and perhaps a revisiting of the policy.     
                                                 
6 Using the NLSY, specifically the NLSY79 Children and Young Adults, it is possible to link these eligible women 
directly to their children.  Since 1988, the NLSY has collected information on children born to the 1979 women 
cohort.  These children were age 10 and older. There is a variety of outcomes of interests such as schooling, health 
and fertility.  Berger et al. (2005) find that women taking less than the maximum allowable leave period under the 
FMLA have children with worse health outcomes, attributable in part to the lower levels of breastfeeding and 
immunizations.  These are short-term outcomes and so the impact on longer-term outcomes of interest is worth 
investigating.      
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Table 3.8: Estimates from Log-normal Regression: Time-to-birth in years 
Variables (1) (2) 
 Dependent variable: log of 
Time to birth in years 
 First birth Second birth 
Eligible  0.267*** 0.253*** 
 (0.062) (0.058) 
FMLA 0.901*** 0.773*** 
 (0.087) (0.073) 
FMLA*Eligible  -0.378*** -0.211** 
 (0.104) (0.091) 
Age -0.588*** -0.555*** 
 (0.090) (0.094) 
Age squared 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Education 0.014 0.022** 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
Married -0.679*** -0.526*** 
 (0.058) (0.052) 
AFQT percentile 0.002* 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Black -0.038 -0.081 
 (0.073) (0.064) 
Hispanic 0.056 0.017 
 (0.076) (0.065) 
Union -0.023 -0.003 
 (0.077) (0.074) 
Urban -0.011 0.003 
 (0.063) (0.054) 
Family income -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Parity -0.563*** -0.640*** 
 (0.028) (0.032) 
Gender role1 0.072 0.019 
 (0.080) (0.074) 
Gender role2 0.059 -0.072 
 (0.074) (0.066) 
Gender role3 -0.029 -0.009 
 (0.066) (0.059) 
Job tenure -0.000 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Job tenure squared 0.045 0.475 
 (0.481) (0.395) 
Woman-year observations 11981 21059 
Log-likelihood -1389.944 -1734.124 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual are reported in parentheses.  Statistical levels 
of significance are: * indicates p<0.1, ** indicates p<0.05, *** indicates p<0.01.    
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Figure 3.1: Log-normal Survival Plots of not giving a first birth 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Log-normal Survival Plots of not giving a second birth 
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CHAPTER 4.  EMPOWERING WOMEN: THE IMPACT OF EDUCATION ON PREFERENCES – 
EVIDENCE FROM A POLICY EXPERIMENT IN SIERRA LEONE 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The study of the benefits of education has occupied a considerable part of the economics 
literature, but a large and disproportionate amount of interest has been dedicated to the private 
returns to education.  Recently, economists have examined the role of education in influencing 
other outcomes such as health (Chou, Liu, Grossman and Joyce 2010; Currie and Moretti 2003; 
Grossman 1972a, 1972b; Lleras-Muney 2005).  Differential levels of schooling are linked with 
income inequality and lower levels of productivity which affect economic well-being and 
development (Chen, 2005; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992).  In the human capital literature, the 
benefits of education through wage increments raise income per capita.  Human capital 
investment through higher education influences household decisions on the number of children 
to produce (Becker 1991).  In developing countries, low levels of human capital investment 
combined with high fertility rates are associated with individuals possessing relatively fewer 
years of schooling. 
Another important correlate of education is time preference.  Education alters time 
preferences as people become more future-oriented and invest in human capital (Becker and 
Mulligan 1997).  The education-preference link helps to alter family structure and fertility 
patterns.  With more education and increased knowledge, women become more efficient in 
choosing the desired family size.  Consequently, other preferences such as the type of 
contraceptive to use and decision regarding sexual initiation are altered.  If education alters 
preferences, then schooling may impact both private returns and other outcomes.  In this case, 
private returns will underestimate the value of education without accounting for social returns.   
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Despite the evidence on the association between education and other outcomes, a causal 
link between the two is not well established in the empirical literature.  The key challenge in 
estimating the impact of education on preferences is that causality can run in the opposite 
direction.  Individuals who are more future-oriented are likely to invest more in human capital by 
obtaining more education. In which case, education is no longer exogenous.    
In this chapter, I address this endogeneity by using changes in an individual’s year of 
birth and exposure to differential amounts of education input to instrument for schooling.  These 
changes in year of birth and level of education investment were induced by a policy reform that 
provided free primary education to children in Sierra Leone.  Individuals that were of the 
primary school age (6 to 11 years) when the policy began in 2001 were treated with free and 
compulsory primary education.  In places where education is least accessible, public investments 
in education were higher.  The policy had a significant effect on education. There is no evidence 
that changes in education reflected past trends.  Further, increases in education investment under 
the policy raised education attainment among those who were of primary school age but had no 
effect on older individuals.  I also examined whether increases in schooling altered preferences 
among women.  They did.   
Prior to the Free Primary Education (FPE) policy, payment of tuition fees, teaching and 
learning materials as well as text book purchases were the responsibility of parents.  In addition, 
every primary school student was required to take the National Primary School Examination 
(NPSE) before enrolling in a secondary school.  Students (or their parents rather) were also 
responsible for the NPSE fee.  Under the FPE, the Government eliminated all such fees at the 
primary school level (UNESCO, 2003). 
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The FPE involved a large construction program rehabilitating damaged schools as well as 
building additional schools aimed at revitalizing the education system.  Implementation of the 
policy enabled Sierra Leone to witness an unprecedented increase in the number of primary 
schools and access to education.  With free and compulsory education, many disadvantaged 
groups such as females who had little or no opportunity for education in the past, were now in 
school.  Following the introduction of the FPE policy, primary school enrollments doubled 
between the years 2001 and 2004 (Statistics Sierra Leon, 2008). During the same period, the 
number of recognized primary schools rose by more than 20 percent from 3,467 to 4,298 with 
about 30 percent of these newly constructed.  In contrast, the total number of schools was just 
2,240 in 1989 (World Bank, 2007). 
Using cross-sectional data from the 2008 Sierra Leone Demographic and Health Survey 
(SLDHS), I link individual fertility and education data from the SLDHS with district-level data 
to reflect variation in the amount of investments in education since the introduction of the FPE 
policy.  In determining an individual’s exposure to the program, I consider the age of the 
individual when the policy began and the district of residence where higher educational inputs 
were devoted to those residing in areas with the least access to schooling.1  Educational inputs 
are measured as the amount of funding allocated for primary school education per 100 teachers.2   
I restrict the sample to only women.  Women who were of primary school age (6 to 11 years) 
were treated while older women were deemed to be in the control or untreated group.  After 
                                                 
1There is the potential for biased estimates if mass migration occurred during the period of the policy.  For instance, 
it may be the case that an individual’s current place of residence may not be the same place where schooling was 
received.  Ideally, I would like to know the respondent’s childhood place of residence but this information is not 
available in the SLDHS.  However, later in the paper, I address this potential problem by only considering those 
individuals who have never migrated or changed place of residence.  
 
2Funding per teacher is an indicator of quality of education.  More funding per teacher implies an increase in teacher 
resources available for education.  Anecdotal evidence indicates that the greater share of education investment was 
committed to improving the infrastructure.  This was in spite of the fact that there was a shortage of teachers.     
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controlling for year of birth and district fixed-effects, it is plausible to assume that the interaction 
of the treatment (those who were of primary school age during the FPE policy) and the level of 
educational input will be unrelated to preferences.  I therefore use this interaction term to 
instrument for years of schooling.   
Overall, the results suggest that the FPE policy was associated with increased schooling 
opportunities and the associated impact of education in altering preferences among women.  The 
policy increased schooling by 0.85 years.  More years of schooling altered the fertility desires of 
women by delaying the start of first sexual encounter and increasing the use of modern 
contraceptives.  The results also indicate that education has increased empowerment among 
women by influencing their opinions regarding the rights of women to decide under what 
conditions they have sexual relations with their husbands.     
I believe this analysis contributes to the literature in two distinct ways.  First, whereas 
most studies typically focus on a single link involving education and a particular outcome, this 
chapter provides the causal links from policy to education to preferences.  Only a handful of 
studies have investigated the impact of large education investment outlays on schooling, as well 
as the impact of education on fertility-related preferences.  Osili and Long (2008) and Breierova 
and Duflo (2004) show how variation in the timing and specific intensity of large school 
construction programs are used to measure the direct impact of education on fertility in Nigeria 
and Indonesia, respectively.  Their findings indicate that an additional year of schooling leads to 
a reduction in the average number of children born by as much as 5 percent among women under 
the age of 25.    Second, I use a recently-compiled dataset for a country on which no known 
recent research work has been conducted in this area.  
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 4.2 provides some 
background information on the educational system in Sierra Leone and the FPE policy.  Section 
4.3 describes the dataset used in the analysis.  Section 4.4 describes the empirical strategy.  In 
Section 4.5, I discuss the results of the impact of the policy on schooling and the associated 
impact on preferences.  Section 4.6 concludes.   
 
4.2. Education in Sierra Leone and the Free Primary Education (FPE) Policy 
4.2.1. Some Background on Education in Sierra Leone Prior to the FPE 
Prior to and just after its independence in 1961, Sierra Leone had an education system 
that was comparable to many countries including those of the industrialized world, and was 
appropriately dubbed the “Athens of West Africa”.  Nineteenth and early twentieth century 
Sierra Leonean society may have been characterized as having an education culture as the 
population sought greater empowerment post-colonial rule.  This educational thrust and the 
realization of the goals of education were partly influenced by the sustained economic growth 
occurring at the time.   From the mid-1970s, Sierra Leone began to experience difficult economic 
conditions and increased political instability.  Government’s apathy towards education 
contributed to a decline in the educational standards. In the midst of the economic turmoil, 
parents found it increasingly difficult to keep their children in school, oftentimes choosing which 
of their children to invest in (National Research Council, 1993).3  The period from 1970 to 1990 
witnessed a decline in the growth of school enrollment rates, particularly in primary schools, and 
the quality of education had declined.   
                                                 
3At the time, Sierra Leone was already one of the poorest regions in Africa.  The war and deteriorating economic 
conditions only served to exacerbate the situation.   
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In 1991, Sierra Leone was engaged in an eleven-year long civil war which ultimately led 
to the killing of at least 50,000 individuals (World Bank, 2007), the displacement of a couple 
million to neighboring countries while thousands were injured and/or maimed.4   One of the 
contributing factors to this violence was a reluctance and failure of government to provide 
educational opportunities, thus providing the impetus for a rebellion of the disenfranchised 
youths against the state. To put this into context: by the end of the war in 2002, 1,270 primary 
schools had been destroyed (International Monetary Fund, 2001), representing over 70 percent of 
the 1,795 schools estimated to have been in existence before the conflict.   As a result, more than 
half of the primary schools had disappeared and this led to almost 70 percent of school-age 
children being out of school (International Monetary Fund, 2001).   
Although the war began with an invasion of rebels from the Eastern region of the country, 
the violence eventually spread to all four regions (see Figure 4.1).  Consequently, there was 
substantial variation in regional damages to primary school infrastructure as shown in Figure 4.2.  
In the figure, a higher index corresponds to greater damage:  a damage index of 1 indicates a 
classroom is in usable condition, index 2 indicates that a classroom is in need of minor repairs, 
index 3 is for a classroom in need of rehabilitation and index 4 means a classroom requires 
reconstruction.  As illustrated, most of the damages occurred in the Eastern region where the war 
began, while the least damage appears to have been in the Western region where the capital is 
located and where the greatest resistance to the rebel forces occurred.  The Northern region 
comprises most of the country’s diamonds for which much of the war was being fought. 
In summary, a country that once gained notoriety for having one of the better education 
system in the colonial and post independence era, had now become one of the lesser-known on 
the African continent by the late 1990s.  A weakening education system brought on by 
                                                 
4The population in 1991 was 4.1 million. By the end of 2005, it had risen to 5.5 million.    
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Figure 4.1: Sierra Leone divided by districts in 2004 
Notes: The fourteen districts are as follows: Eastern region consists of Kailahun, Kenema and Kono; 
Western region consists of the Western Urban Area (comprising mainly the capital Free Town) and 
the Western Rural Area; Northern region consists of Bombali, Kambia, Koinadagu, Port Loko and 
Tonkolili and the Southern region comprises Bo, Bonthe, Moyamba and Pujehun.   
  
Source: Sierra Leone Demographic and Health Survey 2008 Report. 
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Primary School Damage Index in 2004 
 
Notes: In the figure, a higher index corresponds to greater damage:  a damage index of 1 indicates a 
classroom is in usable condition, index 2 indicates that a classroom is in need of minor repairs, index 3 is 
for a classroom in need of rehabilitation and index 4 means a classroom requires reconstruction.  As 
illustrated, most of the damages occurred in the Eastern region where the war began, while the least 
damage appears to have been in the Western region where the capital is located and where the greatest 
resistance to the rebel forces occurred.  The Northern region comprises most of the country’s diamonds for 
which much of the war was being fought.  See Figure 1 showing a map of the country. 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2007). 
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worsening economic conditions was further exacerbated by an eleven-year civil war and 
corruption.  With a return to civilian rule, a new political regime, committed to nation- building 
and the adoption of appropriate education policies served as the prelude to the free primary 
education (FPE) policy being introduced.   
 
4.2.2. An Overview of the Free Primary Education (FPE) Policy 
In 2001, Sierra Leone implemented a policy of providing free primary education (FPE) 
for all pupils in government-owned and government-assisted schools.5  Prior to the FPE policy, 
payment of tuition fees, teaching and learning materials as well as text book purchases were the 
responsibility of parents.  In addition, every primary school student was required to take the 
National Primary School Examination (NPSE) before enrolling in a secondary school.  Students 
(or their parents rather) were also responsible for the NPSE fee.  Under the FPE, the Government 
eliminated all such fees at the primary school level (UNESCO, 2003).   
Financed largely from domestic public funds, donor contributions from international 
financial institutions and foreign governments, the FPE was part of an overall universal primary 
education policy aimed at constructing and rehabilitating basic education facilities as well as 
providing greater access and increased educational opportunities to disadvantaged youths such as 
women.  The goal was to improve the quality of basic education (comprising six years of 
primary education and three years of secondary education), making it free and compulsory.  By 
far, this has been the largest education funding initiative to be undertaken since independence. 
The provision of free basic education, in particular primary education, became a policy priority 
for the government of Sierra Leone.  During the period 2001 to 2005, the government committed 
                                                 
5At least 95 percent of all recognized primary and secondary schools are either government-owned or government-
assisted (World Bank, 2007).   
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almost 20 percent its expenditures (equivalent to 4 percent of Gross Domestic Product) towards 
education.  Almost half of all education expenditure was devoted to primary education (UNDP, 
2007).  At the same time, the number of schools grew rapidly and by the end of 2005 there were 
at least 4,300 primary schools of which approximately 30 percent were newly constructed since 
2001.   To put this in perspective, in 1985 Sierra Leone had a grand total of 2,240 schools! 
The introduction of the FPE policy was associated with a pronounced change in primary 
school enrollments.  Primary school gross enrollment rates almost doubled from 89 percent to 
162 percent in 2004.6   This helped to narrow the gender gap to the point where girls accounted 
for 45 percent of the enrollment.  In 2004, Sierra Leone had the highest primary school 
enrollment rates amongst all Sub-Saharan countries (World Bank, 2007).  The stock of students 
between 2001 and 2004 doubled from 0.6 million to 1.3 million students.  Within this context, 
the FPE program has been influential in the rapid growth and progress in the education sector.   
 
4.3. Data 
4.3.1. Sierra Leone Demographic and Health Survey (SLDHS) 
For this investigation, I mainly use data from the 2008 Sierra Leone Demographic and 
Health Survey (SLDHS).  The SLDHS is part of a broader program of Demographic and Health 
Surveys conducted in other developing countries.  Interviews for the SLDHS were conducted 
from April to June 2008.  While funding for the survey came from a variety of international 
agencies, the collection, processing and dissemination of the data was undertaken by Statistics 
Sierra Leone in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and Sanitation, with technical support 
                                                 
6Primary school gross enrollment rate for any given year is the number of students enrolled in primary school 
expressed as a percentage of the population of primary-school-age children.  In Sierra Leone, the official primary 
school age ranges from 6 to 11 years.  It is possible for the primary school gross enrollment rate to be above 100 
percent.  This is because some of the enrolled may consist of older-aged children who have returned to school after 
the war, pre-primary school-aged kids attending primary school as well as repeaters.       
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provided by ORC Macro International.  The data are considered to be very good quality and the 
survey methods used to obtain information are similar to those utilized in the 2004 Population 
and Housing Census.  The SLDHS is a cross-sectional nationally representative household 
survey and is the first of this kind to be conducted in Sierra Leone.7  It contains a wealth of 
information for over 10,000 individuals consisting of 7,374 women and 3,280 men who were 
aged 15-49 and 15-59, respectively in 2008.  For this study, I limit the sample to females only.    
I use a variety of dependent variables measuring preferences towards fertility, sexual 
behavior, contraceptive use as well as measures of women’s empowerment.  As a proxy for 
fertility preference, I use a variable measuring the number of children desired by each female.  In 
general, a more appropriate variable will be the total number of children ever born.  While this 
information is available, it does not fully reflect the fertility outcomes of the FPE cohort 
consisting of 15 to 18 year olds who have not completed their fertility cycle.  As a measure of 
sexual behavior, I use a variable measuring “age at first sex” while contraceptive use is measured 
with a dichotomous variable equaling one if the individual uses a modern contraceptive method 
and zero otherwise.  The following indicators of women’s empowerment were also considered 
and used: whether a wife is justified in refusing to have sex when she is tired or not in the mood, 
whether the respondent has used any modern contraceptive, whether the respondent has ever 
been tested for the AIDS virus, whether a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her 
husband if she knows he has a sexually transmitted disease (STD), whether a wife is justified in 
asking that they use a condom if she knows her husband has an STD  and whether the respondent 
believes a husband is justified in hitting or beating his wife if she refuses to have sex with him.  
Appendix F provides the list of the questions as they were asked to the respondents. 
                                                 
7Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) have been conducted for more than 75 developing countries since 1985.  
In most of these countries, there are several waves of the survey. The DHS is not a panel but rather consists of 
repeated cross-sectional data and so it is not possible to follow the same household over time.         
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To test for the effect of education on preferences, I include a number of covariates to 
control for potential confounding factors impacting both the outcome variable and education.  
These controls consist of measures relating to individual demographic, social and economic 
characteristics.  Although its primary role is to collect information on fertility history and 
reproduction, the SLDHS contains valuable information allowing for an extensive set of 
covariates.  In addition to education which is measured as the total years of completed schooling, 
I also include the following explanatory variables: 
• Socio-demographic variables: age, marital status, ethnicity and religion 
• Welfare variables: whether or not the person is employed and a wealth index 
• Economic status: individuals that have durable consumer goods (television, radio 
and refrigerator) and urban residence 
In general, the SLDHS has many advantages such as an extensive set of questions 
seeking information on women’s preferences and opinions on women’s issues and rights.  
However, there are some limitations to using these data.  Longitudinal data are preferred and 
tend to be more reliable than one-shot retrospective surveys such as the SLDHS.  Although there 
are measures of wealth, the SLDHS lacks information on income.  The SLDHS data include no 
direct measure of region of birth, childhood place of residence or place of education.  Either one 
or a combination of these provides information in determining an individual’s level of exposure 
to the FPE program.  For instance, if an outcome is observed for an individual in a district which 
is different to the district of education because of migration, then this will lead to a bias in the 
program effect.  The extent of the bias will be influenced by the amount of migration and the 
type (rural-urban or within-district).  In recent years and with the end of the civil war, rural-urban 
migration has been on the decline.  About 50 percent of the individuals in the sample indicated 
ever having moved.  However, among this group of “movers”, there is evidence that most of this 
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migration consisted of two forms: movement between cities in the same urban sprawl and 
movements from cities and towns to the countryside.  Migration tends to be more common 
among the older groups compared to younger individuals who comprise the greater proportion of 
this investigation.  Because the SLDHS does not provide information on where an individual’s 
education began or ended, the extent or direction of the biasness of the effect of the program 
cannot be easily determined.  Later, I address this issue by using a sample of individuals who 
have never moved from their current place of residence.    
Table 4.1 (column 2) reports descriptive statistics for all women in the 2008 SLDHS.  On 
average, women desire to have approximately five children over their lifetime, they tend to have 
their first sexual encounter at the age of 14 and less than one-quarter of the sample uses some 
form of modern contraception.  Education levels are low in comparison to developed countries.  
The average years of completed schooling is less than three compared with an average of at least 
12 in developed countries such as the United States.  The women in the sample are less than 30 
years of age and their religious affiliation is mainly Islam or Christianity.  There are two main 
ethnic groups: the Temne and Mende.   
 
4.3.2. Other Data 
In addition to the SLDHS, I use other sources of data to carry out this investigation.  In 
particular, district-level data were obtained and matched to the individual-level SLDHS data.  
The district-level information include the number of schools constructed, funds allocated to 
primary education and school enrollment data which are related to the FPE program.  Descriptive 
statistics of the district-level data are displayed in Table 4.2.   
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4.4. Empirical Strategy 
In order to investigate the impact of schooling on preferences, one must show that more 
schooling changes preferences.  This is important because causality can occur in the opposite 
direction whereby individuals who are more future-oriented are more likely to increase their 
years of schooling.  In order to address this issue, I need at least one exogenous variable which 
influences education and is unrelated to preferences at the time.  In this chapter, two such factors 
are considered.  The first is year of birth or age.  Specifically, only individuals who were 
between 6 and 11 years (those who were born between 1990 and 1993) received free primary 
education.  The second is the intensity of free primary education.  More educational inputs are 
provided in districts where access to basic education is lower.      
 
4.4.1. Treatment (FPE Cohort) Effect on Schooling  
In Sierra Leone, primary school education on average lasts a total of six years, from age 6 
to 11.  At the start of the FPE in 2001, all women born during the period 1990 and 1993 were 
between the ages 8 and 11 years and so would have been exposed to the program in 2001.  These 
people represent the treated group or the free primary education cohort (FPE cohort).  Those who 
were 11 years or older were not treated.   
For greater comparability between the two groups, I restrict the sample to women who 
were 8-21 years old when the FPE was introduced in 2001.  The main sample therefore will 
consist of the following two groups: The first group consists of those individuals those who are 
15 to 18 years old but were 8 to 11 years old when the FPE was introduced and received free 
primary education.  This is the FPE cohort and they were born during the years 1990 to 1993.  
The second group comprises those who are 22 to 28 years but were 16 to 21 year old when the 
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FPE was implemented.  This is the control group and these women were born during the period 
1980 to 1985.  This group should not have received free primary education. Summary statistics 
for these two groups of women are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.1.  The differences in 
the means between the treated group and the control group are shown in column 5.  In most of 
the cases, these differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  Of particular 
interest are the years of completed schooling between the treated group and the control group.  
The former group has achieved more than 2 years of schooling compared to the control group.     
Note that the main sample excludes women aged 12 to 15 when the program was 
introduced.  The reason for this is non-trivial.   Persons in this group should have completed 
primary school and not have benefitted from the program.  In reality, this may not have been the 
case.  As mentioned earlier, the high primary school gross enrollment rates were partly due to a 
high proportion of late entrants to primary school as well as grade repetitions.  That is, many 
children attend primary school at an age which is above the official age for that particular grade.8  
Therefore, it is possible that some children benefitted from the program when it fact they should 
not have.  If this is the case, then the control group is not free of contamination.  This gives rise 
to biased estimates. 9   To ensure that the chosen control group had minimal or no exposure to the 
program since its introduction, an appropriate set of individuals will be those who were 16 to 21 
in 2001 (these were born 1980 to 1985).10    
                                                 
8In 2004, more than half the children enrolled in the first grade of primary school (where the official age is six years) 
were above the age of six.  This was true for the other grade levels of primary school (World Bank, 2007). 
  
9In any event, including this group of women in the estimation will only underestimate the impact of the policy, if in 
fact there was widespread over-age enrollment at the primary school level.      
            
10The reason for using this specific group of individuals as the control group is non-trivial.  The majority of over-age 
children attending primary school tend to be no more than three to four years above the legal primary school-age 
range of 6-11.  Therefore, someone who is in grade 6 of primary school and is over-aged can be expected to be at 
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The education of those who were treated (FPE cohort) and those who were not can be 
compared using an equation of the form: 
 Sijk= α0 + α1FPE Cohortk+α2Xijk + εijk (4.1) 
where Sijk stands for years of schooling of individual i who resides in district j and 
belongs to cohort k, “FPE Cohort” equals one for an individual born during the period 1990 and 
1993 and equals zero otherwise (this denotes those females age 8 to11 when the FPE program 
was introduced in 2001), Xijk is a vector of measured covariates including demographic, socio-
economic and cultural variables that are expected to influence education.  The coefficient α1 is 
the parameter of interest and it measures the treatment effect on schooling.  One would expect 
this coefficient to be positive since the “treated” are provided with more opportunities for 
schooling because education is free and compulsory.  The model also has a constant term, α0 and 
a random error term εijk.  Standard errors are robust and clustered at the district level and year of 
birth.  The regression also controls for district fixed-effects.   
 
4.4.2. Interactions between Treatment (FPE Cohort) Effect and Education Funding (FPE 
Inputs) on Schooling 
The second aspect of the identification exploits the fact that the FPE policy provided 
differential amounts of free primary education inputs according to the education requirements in 
each district.11  That is, more education inputs are provided in those areas where there is a greater 
                                                                                                                                                             
most 14 to 15 years old.  However, the number of people 14 to 15 years and attending primary school is considered 
to be very small.    
            
11Sierra Leone is divided into four main regions (East, West, North and South) comprising a total of 14 districts 
where one leader from each district has a seat in the country’s parliament.  The design of the SLDHS was done to 
take this district-level grouping into consideration.  Figure 1 shows the division of these districts according to 
regions.  
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics: Variables Used in the Analysis (District-level Data) 
Variables Observations=14 
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
 (1) (2) 
Imputed Primary Education funds allotted to districts (Le million) 1.001 (0.533) 
Share of local government development grants (FY 2006) (in percent) 7.15 (3.804) 
Female-male primary school enrollment ratio 0.813 (0.103) 
Number of primary schools per district in Fiscal year 2004 306.786 (132.089) 
Number of school teachers by district in 2004 1,379.714 (784.518) 
FPE input: Log of funding allocated for primary school education for every 100 teacher in 2004  1.294 (0.637) 
Proportion of FPE cohort women in each district 0.121  
Sources: UNDP (2007), Statistics Sierra Leone (2008), Statistics Sierra Leone (SLL) at http://www.statistics.sl/ (accessed August 
31, 2010) and Government of Sierra Leone Government Budget and Statement of Economic and Financial Policies for Financial 
Year 2003 address at http://www.statehouse-sl.org/gov-budget-2003.html (accessed August 31, 2010).  
 
need for basic education.  Therefore to estimate the full impact of the policy, the following 
equation applies:  
Sijk= φ0 + φ1FPE Cohortk + φ2FPE Inputsj +φ3(FPE Cohortk *FPE Inputsj) + φ4Xijk +εijk  (4.2) 
where the control variable “FPE Inputs” is the logarithm  of funding allocated for primary school 
education for every 100 teacher in 2004.  Data on the amount of funding allocated to primary 
school education was imputed using two sets of information: (1) aggregate primary education 
funding and (2) the share of local government development grants for each district.  I imputed 
the primary education funding to each district using the formula: Ej =E*sj, where Ej is the 
amount of primary education funds allocated to district j which is derived from the product of 
total allocation of funds for primary education (E) and the share of local government 
development grants for district j (sj).
1   
                                                 
1 Information on the district-level share of local government development grants and matching grants was for fiscal 
year 2006 (see UNDP, 2007, p.79), while total funding allotment for primary education came from the Government 
of Sierra Leone Budget and Statement of Economic and Financial Policies for the financial year 2003 (accessed at 
http://www.statehouse-sl.org/gov-budget-2003.html on August 31, 2010).       
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The coefficient on the interaction term is the independent variable of interest.  Those who 
are treated and resided in districts where the policy has the greatest impact should have higher 
levels of schooling.  Therefore, one expects φ3 to be positive.     
 
4.4.3. Schooling on Preferences: Instrumental Variables (IV) Strategy 
To estimate the effect of schooling on preferences, the following equation is specified: 
 Yijk= β0 + β1Sijk +β2Xijk +εijk  (4.3) 
where Yijk comprises the following preference variables: the desired number of children, age at 
first sexual intercourse along with the following dummy variables: whether a wife is justified in 
refusing to have sex when she is tired or not in the mood, whether the respondent has used any 
modern contraceptive, whether the respondent has ever been tested for the AIDS virus, whether a 
wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband if she knows he has a sexually 
transmitted disease (STD), whether a wife is justified in asking that they use a condom if she 
knows her husband has an STD  and whether the respondent thinks a husband is justified in 
hitting or beating his wife if she refuses to have sex with him.  The variable Sijk is the number of 
years of schooling and Xijk is the vector of individual characteristics.   
It is easy to run Equation (4.3) in a regression using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
obtain an estimate of β1, the parameter of interest.  However, β1 can only be interpreted as having 
a causal effect if E(Xijk, εijk)=0 and E(Sijk, εijk)=0. If schooling and the error term are correlated 
(i.e. E(Sijk, εijk)≠0), then β1 cannot be interpreted as the causal effect of education on preferences.  
In this case, education is deemed to be endogenous.  Endogeneity of education may arise from 
omitted variables that influence both schooling and preferences in a preference equation.    It 
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may also be the case that education is a proxy for unobservable personal traits such as ability and 
motivation and family characteristics which are part of the error term in a preference equation.  
In these situations, the OLS estimate is biased. 
To address this endogeneity bias and establish a causal link between education and 
preferences, I use instrumental variable (IV) estimation.  For a variable to serve as a valid 
instrument it must be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable (schooling) and also 
be exogenous.  The first feature implies that the instrument must directly influence the level of 
schooling while exogeneity suggests that the instrument’s impact on preferences only occurs via 
the education channel.  A key assumption of this chapter is that any non-stochastic changes in 
preferences and education among cohorts are due to variation in the impact of the FPE across 
districts.  Put differently, in the absence of FPE, there would be no systematic variation in 
schooling and preferences from one district to another.  Further, it is also assumed that FPE is 
not directly related to preferences and its effect on preferences is through the education variable.  
If these conditions are satisfied, then the FPE program can be used to construct instruments for 
schooling.    
By invoking the assumption that exposure to FPE (based on program intensity within 
districts and year of birth) is correlated with schooling but have no direct effect on preferences, I 
can then use the interaction of year-of-birth and FPE inputs as an instrument for schooling.   
 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Impact of Treatment (FPE Cohort) on Schooling  
Table 4.3 displays the estimation of Equation (4.1) which compares years of schooling 
for the treatment or FPE cohort (those born between 1990 and 1993 or who were 8 to 11 years in 
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2001) versus the untreated group of women who were born between 1980 and 1985 (ages 16 to 
21 when the FPE policy started in 2001).  The table shows two specifications of the regression: 
the specification in column 1 does not included district fixed-effects while column 2 does. 
District fixed-effects control for unobserved heterogeneity between districts that do not change 
over time.  There may be substantial variation in district-level schooling attributable to 
unobserved district characteristics such as the quality of teaching, differences in economic 
development and other social factors.  This is important because in many cases, districts that 
were impacted the most by the program also tended to be the lesser developed areas.   
The regressions in both columns have controls for age, employment status, an index of 
wealth, marital status, religion and ethnicity binary variables as well as dummies for whether the 
household has a radio, refrigerator or TV.  Also, to help isolate the impact of the program on 
education I control for the ratio of female-male primary school enrollment.  The specifications 
also include an interaction of this ratio and the FPE cohort dummy. Regressions are also 
weighted by female population and number of teachers.  Standard errors are clustered at the 
district and birth year level.  
The first row of Table 4.3 displays the primary variable of interest.  Recall that “FPE 
Cohort” is defined as those women who were 8 to 11 years when the program was implemented 
in 2001.  The coefficient on FPE Cohort in this table is positive and statistically significant 
across both specifications.  These results provide evidence that the impact of the treatment 
increased years of education.   
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Table 4.3: The Impact of Treatment on Schooling - OLS Regressions 
Variables (1) (2) 
 Dependent variable:  
Years of schooling 
FPE Cohort  3.927*** 3.734*** 
 (1.254) (1.197) 
Age  0.962** 0.979*** 
 (0.380) (0.350) 
Age squared -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
Employed -0.936*** -0.931*** 
 (0.223) (0.229) 
Wealth 0.372*** 0.365*** 
 (0.071) (0.069) 
Married -2.484*** -2.556*** 
 (0.268) (0.263) 
Radio 0.225 0.211 
 (0.239) (0.241) 
Fridge 1.128** 1.137** 
 (0.507) (0.511) 
TV 1.485*** 1.474*** 
 (0.268) (0.273) 
Christian 1.933*** 2.002*** 
 (0.470) (0.474) 
Islam 0.549 0.655 
 (0.468) (0.441) 
Temne -0.178 -0.347 
 (0.289) (0.341) 
Mende 0.219 0.344 
 (0.222) (0.236) 
Urban 1.010*** 1.174*** 
 (0.234) (0.235) 
District fixed-effects No Yes 
Observations 2667 2667 
R-square 0.43 0.43 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the year*district level.  Statistical levels of 
significance are: * indicates p<0.1, ** indicates p<0.05, *** indicates p<0.01.  The sample 
comprises the FPE cohort (those born during the period 1990 to 1993) and those females born during 
the period 1980 to 1985.  The model also includes a variable for female-male primary school 
enrollment ratio in 2004 in the district.  This variable is also interacted with “FPE Cohort” which 
equals one for individuals born 1990-1993 and zero otherwise.  Regressions are weighted by female 
population*number of teachers.  Constant term is not reported.  
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4.5.2. Impact of Treatment and Education Funding on Schooling  
Table 4.4 reports the results of the model from Equation (4.2) which fully reflects the 
impact of the FPE program on schooling.  The sample is the same as the model used in the 
previous sub-section.  That is, it comprises those females born between 1990 and 1993 (or who 
were 8 to 11 years in 2001) and females born between 1980 and 1985 (who were 16 to 21 years 
in 2001).  The former group is the treatment or FPE cohort while the latter group is the control or 
untreated group.  The dependent variable is years of schooling.  I include the same controls as in 
Table 2.  The effect of treatment and level of education funding is measured by the coefficient on 
the interaction term FPE cohort and FPE Inputs.  This effect is measured by the coefficient φ3 
and it represents the primary coefficient of interest.    
Each column of the table represents a different specification of the regression.  The first 
specification comprises only the covariates while the second specification includes both the 
covariates in the first specification plus district fixed-effects.  The third and final specification 
includes year of birth or birth year fixed-effects to keep constant time-varying unobserved 
factors that might be correlated with the program.  Such factors might include other government 
programs and policies around the same time as the FPE.   
The results in columns 1 to 3 bear out the predictions of the model.  The coefficients on 
the interaction terms are positive and statistically significant throughout all specifications.  Using 
the preferred specification (column 3), the FPE policy resulted in an increase in schooling of 
about 0.85 years.2 Given that the average years of schooling are quite low at 2.87, this represents    
                                                 
2 Using Equation 4.2 and the results from column 3 of Table 4.4, this amount is obtained as follows: The effect of 
treatment (T) on schooling (S) is given by 
  φ  FPE input, where φ  is the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term in Equation 2 and FPE input is the mean log of primary school funding for every 100 teacher (see 
Table 4.2).  By using the average log of primary school funding for every 100 teacher of 1.294, the effect of the 
policy is to increase average schooling of the treated group by φ  FPE input  = 0.654*1.294=0.85 years. 
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Table 4.4: The Impact of Treatment and Exposure on Schooling - OLS Regressions 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent variable: Years of schooling 
FPE Cohort  2.713** 2.607**  
 (1.317) (1.278)  
FPE Input -0.393** 0.004 -0.055 
 (0.190) (0.253) (0.320) 
FPE Cohort * FPE input 0.730*** 0.689*** 0.654*** 
 (0.265) (0.258) (0.234) 
Age  0.959** 0.978*** 1.092 
 (0.367) (0.336) (0.753) 
Age squared -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.043** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.019) 
Employed -0.943*** -0.939*** -0.966*** 
 (0.222) (0.229) (0.216) 
Wealth 0.373*** 0.370*** 0.383*** 
 (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) 
Married -2.487*** -2.558*** -2.537*** 
 (0.267) (0.263) (0.255) 
Radio 0.210 0.203 0.210 
 (0.242) (0.243) (0.217) 
Fridge 1.126** 1.141** 1.170** 
 (0.507) (0.511) (0.465) 
TV 1.483*** 1.468*** 1.343*** 
 (0.269) (0.273) (0.260) 
Christian 1.910*** 1.983*** 1.934*** 
 (0.460) (0.467) (0.458) 
Islam 0.533 0.644 0.577 
 (0.457) (0.432) (0.434) 
Temne -0.191 -0.348 -0.318 
 (0.290) (0.341) (0.339) 
Mende 0.183 0.355 0.344 
 (0.223) (0.236) (0.252) 
Urban 0.973*** 1.159*** 1.093*** 
 (0.236) (0.234) (0.232) 
District fixed-effects No Yes Yes 
Year of birth fixed-effects No No Yes 
Observations 2,667 2,667 2,667 
R-square 0.43 0.43 0.44 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the year*district level.  Statistical levels of significance are: * 
indicates p<0.1, ** indicates p<0.05, *** indicates p<0.01.  The sample comprises the FPE cohort (those born during the 
period 1990 to 1993) and those females born during the period 1980 to 1985. The model also includes a variable for female-
male primary school enrollment ratio in 2004 in the district.  This variable is also interacted with “FPE Cohort” which 
equals one for individuals born 1990-1993 and zero otherwise.  FPE input is calculated as the log of funding allocated for 
primary school education for every 100 teacher in 2004.  The dummy variable “FPE Cohort” which equals one for 
individuals born 1990-1993 is not included in some specifications because the interpretation changes when birth-year fixed-
effects are included in the regressions. Regressions are weighted by female population*number of teachers.  Constant term is not 
reported. 
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a fairly large impact.  This is approximately 30 percent increase in the mean years of schooling 
which is identical to the results in Osili and Long (2008, pg. 73) who investigated the impact of 
schooling using a similar experiment in the case of Nigeria.  Duflo (2001) undertook a similar 
strategy for a more developed country, Indonesia, and found a much smaller impact on schooling.  
It represents about 36 percent of the difference in the mean years of schooling between the 
treated group and control group.  
Other independent variables such as age, whether employed, wealth, marital status, 
household possessions, being a Christian and living in an urban area are significant determinants 
of schooling and carry the expected signs in most cases.     
 
4.5.3. Further Support for the Identification Strategy 
So far in the discussion, I have used as a control group those women who were born 1980 
to 1985 (ages 16 to 21 when the FPE started in 2001).  This was done to avoid the control group 
being “contaminated” with over-aged women who may have benefitted from the program when 
in fact they should not have.   The group of over-aged women who may have benefitted from the 
FPE policy would have likely come from those in the age range 12 to 15 when the policy began.  
For greater comparability, this group would be ideal since the women are closer in ages to the 
treatment group.  If overage enrollment was widespread among these women then using them as 
the control group should result in no significant difference in schooling between them and the 
treatment as a result of the program.  I examine this issue in Table C.1.  The specifications in 
columns (1) to (3) are identical to those in Table 4.4 and the estimates are obtained from the 
same regression model as shown in Equation (4.2).  The results indicate that the coefficient on 
the interaction term is still positive and statistically significant throughout all specifications.  
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This is evidence to suggest that the FPE did not have a significant effect on the control group and 
so it does not appear that overage enrollment at the primary school level was widespread.  
 
4.5.4. Some Robustness Checks 
An important concern in this analysis relates to migration.  As with most African 
countries, Sierra Leone has had a history of population mobility.  Such migration may be 
external or internal (either within or across districts).  The crux of this investigation and 
identification strategy is that an individual’s exposure to the program is determined by district of 
education.  If migration patterns are such that an individual whose current place of residence is 
different to the one where his/her education was received then this could lead to biased estimates 
due to measurement error.  Almost half of the sample has lived at a previous residence.  To 
address this measurement error, I exclude all women who have at one point lived in a different 
residence in the past.  The sample consists of the treatment group (those born 1990 to 1993) and 
the control group of women born between 1980 and 1985. In another specification, I change the 
control group to those women much closer in age to the treatment. Specifically, the control group 
in this case is those born 1986 to 1989.  The respective results are presented in columns 1 and 2 
of Table C.2.  For simplicity, I only show the results of the coefficient on the interaction term.  
Once again, the coefficient estimates on the interaction term carry the expected signs and are 
statistically significant for both specifications.       
There are a couple of considerations arising from these results.  First, although there 
appears to be substantial movement of individuals from their previous place of residence, it is not 
clear whether this migration was across districts or within the same district.  If migration is more 
prevalent in the latter case, then measurement error is not too costly.  Second, migration patterns 
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in Sierra Leone have long tended to be more temporary in that many individuals often leave their 
home to undertake seasonal employment to other areas and then return to their region of birth. 
Recent studies have tried to emphasize the importance of temporary migration as an alternative 
explanation to the “rural-urban” form which pervades the literature (de Haan and Rogary, 2002).  
According to these studies, the extent of rural-urban migration and the high urban population 
growth that is presumed to occur may be exaggerated or not well understood.     
The next robustness check is a falsification exercise.  This is to test whether the results 
may be capturing the effect of some other reform or features of the data which might possibly 
lead to spurious results.  For this, I assume that the reform occurred much earlier than it did. 
Specifically, I use an older group of individuals born between 1968 and 1973 (these were ages 
28 to 33 in 2001 when FPE was introduced) as the treated group while maintaining the same 
control group of individuals born between 1980 and 1985 (ages 16 to 21 in 2001).  If FPE 
exposure had a significant impact on this older cohort, then it raises questions as to whether the 
identification strategy is the appropriate mechanism that links the changes in these outcomes.  
The results of this exercise are shown in column 3 of Table C.2.   The impact of treatment and 
exposure has no significant effect on schooling.     
The results of the above analysis provide additional evidence supporting the 
identification which comes from variation in the treatment and exposure to influence years of 
schooling.  This provides a basis for examining the impact of schooling on preferences. 
 
4.5.5. Impact of Schooling on Preferences: OLS Estimates    
I begin by analyzing the impact of education on preferences using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimation.  These estimates are obtained by running regressions from the model 
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as shown in Equation (4.3).  The primary measure Sijk is Schooling, which stands for the number 
of years of completed schooling.  Table 4.1 provides summary statistics of all the outcome 
variables used in this regression.  As shown in column 2, women in the sample desire roughly 
five children on average, they tend to have their first sexual encounter at the age of 14, 
approximately 24 percent of the women have used modern contraceptives before, while 19 
percent have been tested for the AIDS virus in the past.  Additional outcome variables were used 
to reflect preferences.  The summary statistics reveal that almost 40 percent of women think that 
a husband is justified in hitting or beating his wife if she refuses to have sex; 60 percent of the 
women believe that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband if she is feeling 
tired or not in the mood; over half of the sample think that a wife is justified in refusing to have 
sex with a husband who she knows has a sexually-transmitted disease (STD) while almost 60 
percent thinks that a wife is justified in asking that a condom be used when having sex with a 
husband having an STD.  Summary statistics for these outcome variables are shown for both the 
treated group (FPE cohort) and the control group in columns 3 and 4, respectively, while the 
difference in the means of these two groups is shown in column 5.  
Table 4.5 reports the results of the specification that includes the covariates, district 
fixed-effects and birth year fixed-effects.  Similarly, the sample comprises the same two groups 
of women used in the previous estimation with the exception that all women who have never had 
a previous sexual encounter are excluded from the sample.3  The OLS results in Table 4.5 show 
that schooling has an impact on almost all of the outcomes used in the model.  In column 1, an 
additional year of schooling reduces the number of desired children by 0.06.  Taken at the mean 
desired number of children, this represents a decline of about one percent.  Put another way, a 
                                                 
3 This was done because some questions, such as those pertaining to contraceptive use, are relevant to women who 
have had sexual intercourse at least once.  For consistency purposes, I maintain the same sample throughout.  The 
results do not change in other regressions when women who have never had sex are included in the sample.        
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woman with eight additional years of schooling will on average desire 0.5 fewer children.  These 
results are similar to the lower range of the estimates obtained by Ainsworth et al. (1998) who 
study the fertility impact of education in several sub-Saharan African countries. In column 2, an 
additional year of schooling is associated with a delay in first sexual encounter by about 0.1 
years or approximately one month.  Also, women are more likely to use modern contraceptives 
(column 3) and to have taken a test for the virus that causes AIDS (column 4).  The likelihood of 
choosing modern contraception increases by 1.6 percentage points while the probability of taking 
a test for the AIDS virus increases by 1.7 percentage points.   
Schooling also has an impact on women’s empowerment as revealed in their preferences.  
These preferences are reflected in the answers to questions about women’s opinion on issues 
pertaining to the conditions under which a woman should have sex with her husband and 
whether wife beating is justified if the woman chooses not to have sexual intercourse with the 
husband.  These results are shown in columns 5 to 8.  Women with an additional year of 
schooling are likely to denounce wife beating as justification for not having sex (column 5) and 
they are more likely to believe that a woman is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband 
if she is tired or not in the mood (column 6).   Although women with additional years of 
schooling are likely to think that a woman is justified in refusing to have sex with a husband with 
an STD, this result is not significant (column 7).  However, women with an additional year of 
schooling believe that a wife is justified in asking that a condom be worn when having sex with 
her husband if he has an STD (column 8).   
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4.5.6. Impact of Schooling on Preferences: Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimates 
While the OLS estimates can provide some indication of the association between 
schooling and the outcomes under consideration, proper identification of the effect of education 
on these outcomes is often problematic due to the endogeneity of schooling.  If schooling is 
endogenous then the estimates obtained will be biased and inconsistent.  One solution to address 
this potential problem is to use an instrumental variables strategy.    
This analysis focuses on the use of instrumental variables to identify the causal impact of 
schooling on preferences.  The instrumental variable, in order to be effective, must be correlated 
with schooling and must affect the outcomes only through years of schooling.  Under the 
assumption that the FPE program only affected the amount of schooling received by individuals 
of a certain age, the interactions of birth year and the FPE inputs may be used as instruments for 
education.  Specifically, I use the interaction term FPE cohort*FPE input as an instrument for 
years of schooling. This is the same interaction term used in Equation (4.2).  Summary statistics 
for the FPE input variable are shown in Table 4.2.   
The order of the specifications used and the included control variables are the same as 
those used in the OLS estimation.  Individuals born between 1980 and 1985 comprise the 
reference or control group while the treatment group consists of women who are born between 
1990 and 1993.  Standard errors are clustered at the district and birth year level.   
Table 4.6 presents the IV results after estimating Equation (4.3) assuming that schooling 
is endogenous.  Similar to the OLS results obtained in Table 4.5, the IV estimates show that 
schooling has a significant impact on almost all of the outcomes under consideration.  The F-
statistics from the first–stage regressions confirm that the instruments are not weak (instrument 
validity).  An additional year of schooling leads to a reduction in the number of children desired 
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by 0.37 (column 1).  The IV results are very close to those of Lam and Dureyea (1999) and Osili 
and Long (2008) using data for Brazil and Nigeria, respectively.  Compared to other studies such 
as Leόn (2004), the findings in this chapter are almost identical.  Leόn (2004) finds that an 
additional year of schooling for U.S. women between the ages of 40 and 49 years reduced 
completed fertility by 0.3.   
With one more year of schooling, women delay the start of sexual activity by about 0.2 
years or approximately two months and they are 5 percentage points more likely to have taken a 
test for the AIDS virus in the past.  All of the outcome variables in columns 5 to 8 are significant 
and of the same sign as the results obtained in the OLS regressions.  That is, more educated 
women are less likely to think wife beating is justified when a wife refuses to have sex; 
additional years of schooling will lead women to think a wife is justified in refusing to have sex 
if she is tired or not in the mood.  Similarly, with more education, women are more in favor of a 
wife refusing to have sex with a husband who she knows has an STD; and if she decides to have 
sex with her infected partner then she is justified in requesting that a condom be used during 
sexual intercourse.    
As an additional robust check, I ran the same regression from Equation (4.3), this time 
using the excluded group of women born 1986 to 1989 (or 12 to 15 years old in 2001) as the 
control group.  This group is closer in age to the treatment group who were born 1990 to 1993 
(or where 8 to 11 years in 2001).  They were excluded from the base sample because of possible 
contamination caused by over-age.  That is, some of these women (although older than the 
statutory primary school age) may have been in primary school and directly benefitted from the 
policy.  The IV results are shown in Table C.3.  All specifications are the same as those in Table 
4.6.  The high first-stage F-statistics indicate the instruments remain strong.  The coefficients on      
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Table 4.5: The Impact of Schooling on Preferences – OLS Regressions 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variables 
 Desired 
number of 
children 
Age at 
first 
sexual 
inter-
course 
Use 
modern 
contracep-
tive 
Tested for 
AIDS 
virus 
Wife 
beating 
justified 
in 
refusing 
sex 
Wife 
justified 
in 
refusing 
sex when 
tired 
Wife 
justified 
in 
refusing 
sex with 
STD 
husband 
Wife 
justified 
in asking 
to use a 
condom 
with STD 
husband  
Schooling  -0.064*** 0.108*** 0.016*** 0.017*** -0.015*** 0.011*** 0.004 0.010*** 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Age  0.698 1.193** 0.064 -0.202* 0.132 -0.199 0.052 -0.152 
 (0.619) (0.556) (0.267) (0.119) (0.164) (0.230) (0.161) (0.169) 
Age squared -0.012 -0.021* -0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Employed 0.242** -0.540*** 0.016 0.028 0.052** -0.017 -0.028 -0.012 
 (0.095) (0.135) (0.038) (0.020) (0.024) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035) 
Wealth -0.133** -0.032 0.022** 0.023* -0.026* 0.008 0.005 0.022 
 (0.056) (0.060) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
Married 0.315*** -0.394** -0.120*** 0.090** 0.043 -0.072** -0.106*** -0.074** 
 (0.078) (0.168) (0.032) (0.039) (0.034) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) 
Radio -0.029 0.154 -0.020 -0.003 0.028 0.042* 0.020 -0.016 
 (0.129) (0.168) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) 
Fridge -0.214 0.331 0.064 0.048 -0.009 0.023 0.070 0.110** 
 (0.205) (0.222) (0.061) (0.047) (0.039) (0.060) (0.058) (0.051) 
TV 0.069 0.096 0.098 0.007 -0.069* 0.028 -0.033 -0.031 
 (0.276) (0.104) (0.071) (0.064) (0.040) (0.080) (0.077) (0.047) 
Christian -0.846** -0.196 0.068 0.044 -0.195 -0.034 -0.036 -0.180 
 (0.417) (0.382) (0.062) (0.050) (0.138) (0.097) (0.143) (0.125) 
Islam -0.509 -0.239 0.026 -0.019 -0.157 -0.008 -0.045 -0.220* 
 (0.417) (0.363) (0.056) (0.045) (0.137) (0.092) (0.139) (0.123) 
Temne 0.010 -0.401*** -0.016 -0.034 0.074** -0.017 0.051 -0.025 
 (0.097) (0.134) (0.050) (0.037) (0.032) (0.030) (0.038) (0.031) 
Mende -0.101 0.021 -0.098*** 0.077* -0.028 -0.124** -0.104 -0.022 
 (0.146) (0.191) (0.027) (0.046) (0.036) (0.050) (0.065) (0.042) 
Urban -0.176 -0.019 0.015 0.016 -0.001 -0.043 0.014 -0.020 
 (0.116) (0.165) (0.036) (0.023) (0.038) (0.033) (0.032) (0.039) 
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2,251 2,058 2,251 2,205 2,246 2,216 2,232 2,239 
R-square  0.243 0.238 0.248 0.222 0.137 0.096 0.072 0.106 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the year*district level.  Statistical levels of significance are: * indicates 
p<0.1, ** indicates p<0.05, *** indicates p<0.01.  The sample comprises the FPE cohort (those born during the period 1990 to 
1993) and those females born during the period 1980 to 1985, but only those who have had sex in the past.   The model also 
includes a variable for female-male primary school enrollment ratio in 2004 in the district.  This variable is also interacted with 
“FPE Cohort” which equals one for individuals born 1990-1993 and zero otherwise.  Regressions are weighted by female 
population*number of teachers.   Constant term is not reported. 
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Table 4.6: The Impact of Schooling on Preferences – Instrumental Variables Regression 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variables 
 Desired 
number of 
children 
Age at 
first 
sexual 
inter-
course 
Use 
modern 
contracep-
tive 
Tested for 
AIDS 
virus 
Wife 
beating 
justified in 
refusing 
sex 
Wife 
justified in 
refusing 
sex when 
tired 
Wife 
justified in 
refusing 
sex with 
STD 
husband 
Wife 
justified in 
asking to 
use a 
condom 
with STD 
husband  
Schooling  -0.370*** 0.203* 0.048 0.049** -0.111** 0.090** 0.114** 0.081** 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.041) (0.023) (0.047) (0.039) (0.045) (0.037) 
Age  0.668 1.188** 0.067 -0.211* 0.128 -0.190 0.087 -0.130 
 (0.646) (0.578) (0.239) (0.126) (0.177) (0.251) (0.187) (0.163) 
Age squared -0.018 -0.019 -0.001 0.005 -0.005 0.004 -0.000 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Employed -0.048 -0.457*** 0.046 0.060** -0.043 0.064 0.084 0.058 
 (0.161) (0.165) (0.055) (0.030) (0.049) (0.055) (0.053) (0.051) 
Wealth -0.018 -0.068 0.010 0.009 0.011 -0.022 -0.038* -0.006 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Married -0.423 -0.139 -0.042 0.164*** -0.188 0.124 0.166 0.102 
 (0.308) (0.338) (0.103) (0.061) (0.117) (0.101) (0.121) (0.103) 
Radio 0.069 0.130 -0.031 -0.012 0.061 0.017 -0.017 -0.039 
 (0.145) (0.163) (0.025) (0.033) (0.038) (0.040) (0.047) (0.040) 
Fridge 0.320 0.172 0.008 -0.008 0.165* -0.106 -0.124 -0.018 
 (0.318) (0.334) (0.090) (0.060) (0.099) (0.089) (0.115) (0.095) 
TV 0.559 -0.070 0.046 -0.048 0.083 -0.103 -0.201* -0.143 
 (0.342) (0.222) (0.106) (0.080) (0.098) (0.115) (0.118) (0.090) 
Christian -0.101 -0.419 -0.010 -0.035 0.040 -0.224 -0.302 -0.353** 
 (0.560) (0.487) (0.108) (0.083) (0.175) (0.154) (0.195) (0.154) 
Islam -0.274 -0.313 0.001 -0.043 -0.083 -0.070 -0.131 -0.275** 
 (0.455) (0.376) (0.054) (0.051) (0.143) (0.104) (0.153) (0.123) 
Temne -0.115 -0.344** -0.003 -0.021 0.034 0.016 0.097 0.007 
 (0.155) (0.157) (0.053) (0.034) (0.053) (0.050) (0.060) (0.039) 
Mende 0.019 -0.009 -0.110*** 0.064 0.012 -0.145*** -0.141** -0.045 
 (0.194) (0.195) (0.036) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.061) (0.045) 
Urban 0.107 -0.110 -0.015 -0.011 0.087 -0.117** -0.085 -0.088* 
 (0.194) (0.192) (0.045) (0.028) (0.063) (0.054) (0.069) (0.053) 
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First stage (F-stat.) 15.31 18.92 15.31 14.33 15.22 16.25 15.46 16.16 
Observations 2251 2058 2251 2205 2246 2216 2232 2239 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the year*district level.  Statistical levels of significance are: * indicates p<0.1, ** 
indicates p<0.05, *** indicates p<0.01.  The sample comprises the FPE cohort (those born during the period 1990 to 1993) and those females 
born during the period 1980 to 1985, but only those who have had sex in the past.   The model also includes a variable for female-male 
primary school enrollment ratio in 2004 in the district.  This variable is also interacted with “FPE Cohort” which equals one for individuals 
born 1990-1993 and zero otherwise.  Instrument: interaction of FPE cohort and FPE input, where FPE input is calculated as the log of funding 
allocated for primary school education for every 100 teacher in 2004.  Regressions are weighted by female population*number of teachers.  
Constant term is not reported. 
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the schooling variable for the most part are significant and all coefficients carry the same sign as 
those in Table 4.6.  As expected, the magnitudes of the coefficients are lower when this group of 
women is used as the control group.  This result may be evidence that some of these women may 
have directly benefitted from the FPE policy even though they were over-aged.   
 
4.6. Conclusion 
The benefit of education on private returns is well documented in the empirical literature 
with a range from 6 to 11 percent (Duflo, 2001).  However, the impact of education on market 
outcomes explains only a fraction of the story.  Education provides various social benefits.  One 
of the ways it can do so is to alter preferences among individuals.  By altering preferences, 
education may affect both private and social returns.  If there are positive returns to education 
brought about by changing preferences, then private returns underestimate the value of education 
without accounting for social returns.   
In order to show how schooling alters preferences, one must show that more schooling 
causes changes in preferences.  This is because causality can run in the opposite direction.   More 
future-oriented individuals (that is, those having increased preferences for future benefits) are 
more likely to increase their schooling.  To address this, it requires exogenous variation in 
factors that are highly correlated with schooling.  This study took advantage of the nature of the 
Free Primary Education (FPE) policy in Sierra Leone that led to a differential impact on 
education for children of primary school age due to year of birth and the level of education 
investments.  I began by presenting evidence that this policy did increase the number of years of 
schooling of women receiving treatment by about 0.84 years.  I then use the exogenous variation 
in both an individual’s year of birth and the amount of education funding to identify the impact 
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of schooling on preferences.  This identification strategy works because both year of birth and 
education funding affect individual level of schooling.  Both OLS and IV estimates produce 
similar conclusions about the impact of schooling on preferences.     
I estimate that an additional year of schooling decreases a woman’s desire for children.  
Using the IV results, eight additional years of schooling will lead to women demanding one 
fewer child.  This preference for fewer children can be attributable to women maintaining their 
virginity for longer periods as well as an increase in the use of modern contraceptives.  Through 
education, women have become empowered and this empowerment is revealed in their 
preferences.  These preferences are reflected in women’s beliefs that support the rights of women 
to decide under what conditions to have sexual relations with their husbands. 
Given the consistency of the findings which compare favorably with other studies, I 
conclude that the estimated effects of education are robust to unobserved characteristics of the 
women in the sample or unobserved policies that may have been occurring at the time and that 
affect both preferences and schooling.  Education alters preferences.  To the extent that change in 
preferences may impact both private and social returns to schooling, I argue that private returns 
underestimate the value of education without accounting for the effect on other outcomes. 
These findings are important for economic policy as it pertains to education and women’s 
issues.  The FPE policy achieved its objective of increasing the quantity of schooling.  Policies of 
this type that set out to increase schooling may suffer unintended consequences such as a decline 
in education quality.  This does not appear to be the case because by increasing education, 
women have become empowered as revealed in their preferences.     
Beyond the effectiveness of this policy on these women, there is a possibility that the 
FPE also had large secondary effects on the Sierra Leone economy.  If women are better able to 
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control their fertility by say, increased modern contraceptive use and delaying the start of sexual 
encounters, then with increased education, women are also enhancing their stock of human 
capital.  Consequently, one might expect labor market outcomes for women to improve.  The 
children born to these women also stand to benefit.  Parental education is considered a key factor 
in influencing the outcomes of children (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995).  Therefore, the impact of 
education on the labor market experience of women and the impact of these women’s education 
on their children’s outcomes represent important areas of future research. 
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CHAPTER 5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation is a compendium of essays analyzing the role of public policy in 
affecting such outcomes as fertility, educational attainment and women’s preferences towards 
fertility and sexual activity.   
In the first essay, I present evidence supporting the influence of a federal government-
sponsored state abstinence education (SAE) program.  In an era of heightened awareness of the 
high teen birth rates in the U.S., an intense debate has centered on the effectiveness of various 
policy approaches to reducing early childbearing.  One view among researchers is that policies 
promoting abstinence and improved contraceptive practices can be influential in curtailing teen 
births.  Specifically, I estimate the impact of SAE funding from the federal government Title V, 
Section 510 appropriations on the birth rates for teens 15-17 years in the U.S. over the period 
1991-2005.  Using difference-in-differences methodology, the results suggest that Title V SAE 
has led to a decline in birth rates for the targeted group of female minors.  I further find that the 
SAE program has a consistently significant impact among Whites but not Blacks.  
This next essay examines the impact on fertility outcomes of a policy - the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) - that allows women to proceed on job-protected maternity leave.  
Because the FMLA has clearly-defined eligibility criteria and empirical evidence suggests that it 
may have been associated with an increase in work leave taken, it is possible to identify the 
impact on fertility by comparing the outcome among eligible women with the fertility outcomes 
of those who are not eligible for FMLA.  I find that the implementation of the FMLA has 
resulted in eligible women increasing their probabilities of giving birth to a first and second child.  
The magnitude of the effects appears larger for a first birth.  The results of the analysis also show 
that eligible women are giving birth to children much earlier.  I also consider the impact of the 
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policy across sectors, race and ethnicity, and education level.  These results indicate that the 
FMLA is more effective in non-government sectors.  There is no difference in the responsiveness 
to birth among Blacks and Hispanics.  Meanwhile, among Whites, eligible females have 
significantly higher probabilities of giving a first or second birth.  Eligible women with at least 
some education experience at the college level are more likely to give a first or second birth 
since the FMLA.       
This research offers some insights into family friendly policies in the U.S.  There are a 
number of potential implications arising from such a policy.  First, the FMLA can help to address 
the balance between women’s work and family life.  Second, it can help to address the length of 
delay in childbearing among career oriented women.  Finally, there are also implications for the 
retention of women in the labor force given that educated women may opt out of paid 
employment after having children.    
The final essay takes advantage of the nature of the Free Primary Education (FPE) policy 
in Sierra Leone that led to a differential impact on education for children of primary school age 
due to year of birth and the level of education investments.  I began by presenting evidence that 
this policy did increase the number of years of schooling of women receiving treatment by about 
0.84 years.  I then use the exogenous variation in both an individual’s year of birth and the 
amount of education funding to identify the impact of schooling on preferences.  This 
identification strategy works because both year of birth and education funding affect individual 
level of schooling.  Both OLS and IV estimates produce similar conclusions about the impact of 
schooling on preferences.  
I estimate that an additional year of schooling decreases a woman’s desire for children.  
Using the IV results, eight additional years of schooling will lead to women demanding one 
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fewer child.  This preference for fewer children can be attributable to women maintaining their 
virginity for longer periods as well as an increase in the use of modern contraceptives.  Through 
education, women have become empowered and this empowerment is revealed in their 
preferences.   
The above research has provided a platform for an interesting research agenda.  Moving 
forward, I plan to extend my work in the following areas: 
i) Using individual-level data over some sufficiently long time period, I want to analyze the 
impact of state-abstinence education programs on other outcomes such as abortions.  
Data at this disaggregated level will allow for a detailed analysis of the SAE programs on 
fertility and other related outcomes in places where these programs are specifically 
implemented.  This may include data at the state, city or even school-level. 
ii) In addition to the effectiveness of the FMLA policy in influencing child preferences, by 
allowing eligible women the right to return to their former jobs after giving birth, the 
FMLA has effectively improved the labor outcomes of new parents (Waldfogel, 1999).   
Beyond these, the findings raise the possibility that the policy may have improved other 
outcomes not yet explored.  For instance, the long-term educational attainment and health 
outcomes of children born to FMLA-eligible women represent important areas for future 
research. Using the NLSY, specifically the NLSY79 Children and Young Adults, it is 
possible to link these eligible women directly to their children.  Since 1988, the NLSY 
has collected information on children born to the 1979 women cohort.  These children 
were age 10 and older. There is a variety of outcomes of interests such as information 
such as schooling, health and fertility.  Berger et al. (2005) find that women taking less 
than the maximum allowable leave period under the FMLA have children with worse 
127 
 
health outcomes, attributable in part to the lower levels of breastfeeding and 
immunizations which are short-term outcomes.   
iii) Beyond the effectiveness of the free primary education (FPE) policy on these women, 
there is a possibility that the FPE policy also had large secondary effects on the Sierra 
Leone economy.  If women are better able to control their fertility by say increased 
modern contraceptive use and delaying the start of sexual encounters, then with increased 
education, women are also enhancing their stock of human capital.  Consequently, one 
might expect labor market outcomes for women to improve.  The children born to these 
women also stand to benefit.  Parental education is considered a key factor in influencing 
the outcomes of children (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995).  Therefore, the impact of 
education on the labor market experience of women and the impact of these women’s 
education on their children’s outcomes represent important areas of future research.    
As the availability of data increases, impact evaluation programs have become more 
prominent in research.  I am interested in assessing the impact of various policy interventions on 
a variety of outcomes that seek to improve the lives of people, in particular those in poorer 
developing countries.  I am planning to study the effects of a conditional cash transfer program 
in Jamaica.  Specifically, I want to investigate whether the PATH program in Jamaica had an 
impact on the education of the program’s recipients and if there was an impact did it ultimately 
affect criminal behavior among these vulnerable groups of the population. 
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Table A.2: Difference-in-Differences: Outcomes of Change in Birth Rates: Control 
Group: Birth rates for females 25-29 years 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Blacks Hispanics Whites 
 Dependent Variable: ∆Birth rates 
     
Panel 1: Multi-way clustering approach     
∆SAE Funding *Young -4.349*** -9.719*** 6.033 -4.351** 
 (1.491) (3.459) (6.295) (1.830) 
Observations 1372 1372 1370 1372 
R-square  0.21 0.04 0.21 0.13 
     
Panel 2: SAE Funding variable lagged once     
∆SAE Funding *Young -4.734*** -10.551* 8.601* -4.770*** 
 (1.183) (5.704) (4.772) (1.168) 
∆SAE Funding *Young (lagged once) -3.914*** -7.095 15.570*** -3.936** 
 (1.027) (7.201) (5.725) (1.213) 
Observations 1274 1274 1273 1274 
R-square  0.22 0.04 0.23 0.14 
     
Panel 3: Include once-lagged dependent variable     
∆SAE Funding *Young -4.315*** -6.189 -15.759*** -4.342*** 
 (1.208) (4.575) (5.286) (1.214) 
∆Birth rates (lagged once) -0.011 -0.519*** -0.254*** -0.016 
 (0.068) (0.030) (0.053) (0.048) 
Observations 1274 1274 1272 1274 
R-square  0.21 0.30 0.27 0.13 
State fixed-effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional Covariates? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean of ∆SAE 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
Notes: Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust and adjusted for multi-way clustering at the year and state 
level (Panel 1) and adjusted for clustering at the state level (Panels 2 and 3).   Statistical levels of significance are as 
follows:  * means p<0.1, ** means p<0.05, *** means p<0.01. The real SAE funding variable is deflated by the 
total population to obtain per capita term. Data for Hispanics include all persons of Hispanic origin of any race.   
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Table A.3: Difference-in-Differences: Outcomes of Change in Birth Rates: 
Control Group: Birth rates for females 25-29 years (Sample size modification) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Blacks Hispanics Whites 
 Dependent Variable: ∆Birth rates 
     
Panel 1: Sample excludes years 1996, 1997 and 2002     
∆SAE Funding *Young -4.688*** -9.427 0.783 -4.617*** 
 (1.270) (6.034) (4.888) (1.253) 
Observations 1078 1078 1076 1078 
R-square  0.21 0.05 0.11 0.13 
     
Panel 2: California included in sample     
∆SAE Funding *Young -4.360*** -9.740 6.027 -4.348*** 
 (1.237) (5.845) (4.775) (1.220) 
Observations 1400 1400 1398 1400 
R-square  0.21 0.04 0.21 0.13 
  
Panel 3: Sample excludes the state with the highest and lowest real State Abstinence 
Education (SAE) funding per capita  
∆SAE Funding *Young -4.189** -9.379 4.980 -4.465** 
 (1.337) (6.365) (4.908) (1.329) 
Observations 1316 1316 1316 1316 
R-square  0.21 0.04 0.22 0.12 
     
Panel 4: Sample period from 1995 to 2000     
∆SAE Funding *Young -2.616* -8.617 16.417*** -2.695** 
 (1.314) (6.998) (5.533) (1.213) 
Observations 588 588 588 588 
R-square  0.34 0.05 0.31 0.31 
State fixed-effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional Covariates? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust and adjusted for clustering at the state level.   Statistical levels 
of significance are as follows:  * means p<0.1, ** means p<0.05, *** means p<0.01. The real SAE funding variable 
is deflated by the total population to obtain per capita term. Data for Hispanics include all persons of Hispanic 
origin of any race.   
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Table B.1:Description of Variables  
Variables Variable Definition 
Outcome variables  
First birth Equals one if first child is born on or after 1989 and zero otherwise 
Second birth Equals one if second child is born on or after 1989 and zero otherwise 
  
Dummy explanatory variables 
FMLA Equals in a year the FMLA is in effect, zero otherwise 
Eligible Equals one if individual satisfies the eligibility criteria for obtaining benefits 
under the FMLA, zero otherwise 
Married Equals one if married, zero otherwise 
Black Equals one if Black, zero otherwise 
Hispanic Equals one if Hispanic, zero otherwise 
Union Equals one if part of a union in primary job, zero otherwise 
Urban Equals one if current residence is urban, zero otherwise 
Gender role1 Equals one if respondent thinks a woman’s place is in the home, zero 
otherwise 
Gender role2 Equals one if respondent thinks men should share housework, zero otherwise 
Gender role3 Equals one if respondent thinks women should perform traditional roles, zero 
otherwise 
  
Continuous explanatory variables 
Age Age in years 
Education  Years of schooling (Highest grade completed) 
Family income  Total net family income in thousands of dollars 
Parity Number of children ever born 
AFQT score Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) score in percentile 
Job tenure  Total tenure (in weeks) with employer at primary job 
  
Other variables  
High school dropout Equals one if highest grade completed is less than 12, zero otherwise 
High school graduate Equals one if highest grade completed is 12, zero otherwise 
Some college Equals one if highest grade completed ranges from 13 and 15, zero otherwise 
College graduate Equals one if highest grade completed is at least 16, zero otherwise 
Employed Equals one if respondent is currently employed, zero otherwise 
Government sector Equals one if employed with the state or federal government, zero otherwise 
Private sector Equals one if employed with a private-owned organization, zero otherwise 
MLS states Equals one if state is had a job-protected Maternity Leave statute (MLS) 
prior to the FMLA, zero otherwise 
Employees Number of employees at respondent’s current job location 
Hours work Number of hours worked in the past calendar year 
Number of children desired Number of children desired 
Maternity leave Equals one if employer offers job-protected maternity leave, zero otherwise 
Covered Equals one if individuals works in a covered institution, zero otherwise 
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Table B.2: Some Calculations 
 
Panel A: Predicted Probabilities of a birth (Eligible Women) 
 (1) (2) (3)=(1)+(2) (4)=(2)/(1)*100 
 Eligible Women 
 
Before FMLA 
 (Baseline) 
Marginal effect After FMLA  % increase 
First birth 25.96 5.97 31.87 23.05 
Second birth 28.00 4.18 32.18 14.93 
Simple Average 26.98 5.08 32.03 18.99 
 Notes: Probabilities were calculated using the coefficients presented in column 2 of Table 3 (first birth) and column 2 
of Table 5 (second birth).  The sample period is from 1989 to 2006.  Average age of the eligible women at the 
baseline probability is about 30 years.  All evaluations are done at the sample means.   
 
 
Panel B: Implied Probabilities of any birth for all working women using estimates from Averett 
and Whittington (2001)        
 (1) (2) (3)=(1)+(2) (4)=(2)/(1)*100 
 Working women 
 
No maternity leave 
 (Baseline) 
Marginal effect Maternity Leave % increase 
A child 36.9 3.25 40.15 8.81 
Notes: The study by Averett and Whittington examines the impact of maternity leave on the probability of having a child during 
the sample period 1985 to 1992 using the NLSY79.  Average age of women at baseline is 27 years.  The baseline probability is 
obtained by dividing the number of births over the sample period divided by the number of women in the sample.  That is, 
1325/3590=0.369 or 36.9 percent.  The marginal effect is the average of the marginal effects in models 1 and 2 of Table 3.   
 
 
 
Table B.3: Predicted response time (years) before getting a birth (Eligible Women) 
 (1) (2) (3)=(1)+(2) 
 Eligible Women 
 
Before FMLA 
 (Baseline) 
Marginal effect 
Units (%) 
After FMLA  
First birth 2.32 -0.88 (-37.8%) 1.44 
Second birth 2.37 -0.50 (-21.1%) 1.87 
Simple Average 2.35 -0.69 1.65 
 Notes: Probabilities were calculated using the coefficients presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 for a first birth 
and second birth, respectively.  All evaluations are done at the sample means.   
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Table C.1: The Impact of Treatment and Exposure on Schooling - OLS Regressions 
(Different Control Group: Individuals born 1986-1989 or 12-15 years in 2001) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent variable: Years of schooling 
FPE Cohort  1.520 1.480  
 (0.990) (1.003)  
FPE Input -0.704*** -0.352* -0.429 
 (0.185) (0.195) (0.273) 
FPE Cohort * FPE input 0.792*** 0.731*** 0.734*** 
 (0.208) (0.183) (0.221) 
Age  1.355 1.371 2.635 
 (1.016) (1.022) (2.828) 
Age squared -0.032 -0.032 -0.089 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.083) 
Employed -1.435*** -1.419*** -1.418*** 
 (0.149) (0.150) (0.145) 
Wealth 0.237** 0.235** 0.234** 
 (0.113) (0.119) (0.116) 
Married -3.779*** -3.801*** -3.807*** 
 (0.533) (0.535) (0.545) 
Radio 0.113 0.076 0.088 
 (0.133) (0.133) (0.152) 
Fridge 0.336 0.352 0.438 
 (0.459) (0.467) (0.425) 
TV 1.067** 1.074** 0.976** 
 (0.459) (0.461) (0.413) 
Christian 2.072* 1.989* 1.966* 
 (1.098) (1.083) (1.076) 
Islam 1.571 1.532 1.490 
 (0.996) (0.968) (0.954) 
Temne 0.044 -0.105 0.004 
 (0.252) (0.297) (0.286) 
Mende -0.217 -0.209 -0.207 
 (0.201) (0.224) (0.257) 
Urban 1.128*** 1.229*** 1.132*** 
 (0.272) (0.286) (0.283) 
District fixed-effects No Yes Yes 
Year of birth fixed-effects No No Yes 
Observations 1,974 1,974 1,974 
R-square 0.46 0.46 0.47 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the year*district level.  Statistical levels of significance are: * 
indicates p<0.1, ** indicates p<0.05, *** indicates p<0.01.  The sample comprises the FPE cohort (those born during the 
period 1990 to 1993) and those females born during the period 1986 to 1989.  The model also includes a variable for female-
male primary school enrollment ratio in 2004 in the district.  This variable is also interacted with “FPE Cohort” which 
equals one for individuals born 1990-1993 and zero otherwise.  FPE input is calculated as the log of funding allocated for 
primary school education for every 100 teacher in 2004.  The dummy variable “FPE Cohort” which equals one for 
individuals born 1990-1993 is not included in some specifications because the interpretation changes when birth-year fixed-
effects are included in the regressions. Regressions are weighted by female population*number of teachers.  Constant term is not 
reported. 
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Table C.2: The Impact of Treatment and Exposure on Schooling – OLS Regressions 
(Robustness Check) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent variable: Years of schooling 
 Sample of non-
movers 
(Base sample) 
Sample of non-
movers 
(Alternate sample) 
False treatment 
FPE Cohort*FPE input 0.676** 1.179*** -0.177 
 (0.318) (0.267) (0.159) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
District fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Birth year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,207 915 3,107 
R-square 0.53 0.55 0.39 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the year*district level.  Statistical levels of significance are: ** indicates 
p<0.05, *** indicates p<0.01.  The sample in column (1) comprises the FPE cohort (those born during the period 1990 to 1993) 
and those females born during the period 1980 to 1985, but only those who have never moved residence at the time they were 
interviewed.  The sample in column (2) comprises the FPE cohort (those born during the period 1990 to 1993) and those 
females born during the period 1986 to 1989, but only those who have never moved residence at the time they were 
interviewed.  The sample in column (3) comprises the “False treatment” (those females born during the period 1968 to 1973) 
and those females born during the period 1980 to 1985, but only those who have never moved residence at the time they were 
interviewed.  The model also includes a variable for female-male primary school enrollment ratio in 2004 in the district.  This 
variable is also interacted with “FPE Cohort” which equals one for individuals born 1990-1993 and zero otherwise.  FPE input 
is calculated as the log of funding allocated for primary school education for every 100 teacher in 2004. Column 1 and 2 
regressions are weighted by female population*number of teachers.  Constant term is not reported. 
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Table C.3: The Impact of Schooling on Preferences – Instrumental Variables Regression 
(Different Control Group: Individuals born 1986-1989 or 12-15 years in 2001) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variables 
 Desired 
number of 
children 
Age at 
first 
sexual 
inter-
course 
Use 
modern 
contracep
-tive 
Tested for 
AIDS 
virus 
Wife 
beating 
justified 
in 
refusing 
sex 
Wife 
justified 
in 
refusing 
sex when 
tired 
Wife 
justified 
in 
refusing 
sex with 
STD 
husband 
Wife 
justified 
in asking 
to use a 
condom 
with STD 
husband  
Schooling  -0.295*** 0.109 0.029 0.065*** -0.003 0.038 0.080** 0.108*** 
 (0.111) (0.112) (0.036) (0.024) (0.036) (0.033) (0.039) (0.040) 
Age  1.305 1.746 -0.080 -0.390 0.345 -0.473 -0.498 -0.629 
 (1.813) (1.252) (0.434) (0.397) (0.363) (0.431) (0.526) (0.412) 
Age squared -0.038 -0.039 0.001 0.011 -0.009 0.011 0.015 0.018 
 (0.050) (0.034) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) 
Employed -0.132 -0.287 0.083 0.147** 0.037 0.066 0.125* 0.160** 
 (0.190) (0.220) (0.068) (0.058) (0.065) (0.066) (0.076) (0.072) 
Wealth -0.095 -0.114 0.002 0.017 -0.005 0.020 0.023 0.004 
 (0.073) (0.091) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.021) 
Married -0.400 -0.154 -0.045 0.324*** 0.139 0.061 0.228 0.258 
 (0.487) (0.476) (0.135) (0.112) (0.138) (0.122) (0.155) (0.162) 
Radio -0.102 0.146 0.036 -0.056** -0.036 0.108*** 0.020 0.002 
 (0.174) (0.157) (0.029) (0.028) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Fridge 0.174 0.448*** 0.063* 0.068 0.002 -0.078* 0.118* 0.147* 
 (0.195) (0.141) (0.035) (0.049) (0.046) (0.046) (0.066) (0.080) 
TV 0.042 -0.190 0.150** -0.199*** -0.130** 0.090 -0.117 -0.157* 
 (0.281) (0.178) (0.071) (0.062) (0.061) (0.058) (0.104) (0.092) 
Christian -0.266 0.221 -0.101 -0.187 -0.045 0.227* -0.012 -0.042 
 (0.828) (0.459) (0.167) (0.180) (0.140) (0.135) (0.148) (0.139) 
Islam -0.015 0.314 -0.160 -0.220 -0.052 0.197 0.051 0.000 
 (0.775) (0.426) (0.160) (0.181) (0.136) (0.122) (0.134) (0.139) 
Temne 0.081 -0.354* -0.062 0.050* 0.081** 0.041 0.058 0.082* 
 (0.184) (0.211) (0.052) (0.027) (0.041) (0.036) (0.053) (0.047) 
Mende -0.182 -0.029 -0.006 0.020 -0.025 0.040 -0.034 0.138** 
 (0.150) (0.258) (0.069) (0.065) (0.044) (0.089) (0.105) (0.065) 
Urban 0.068 0.411* 0.012 -0.003 -0.132** -0.123** -0.122** -0.144** 
 (0.217) (0.220) (0.039) (0.036) (0.061) (0.050) (0.062) (0.063) 
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First stage (F-stat.) 25.80 22.51 25.80 25.56 25.76 24.68 26.64 25.41 
Observations 1489 1398 1489 1455 1488 1473 1477 1486 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the year*district level.  Statistical levels of significance are: * indicates p<0.1, 
** indicates p<0.05, *** indicates p<0.01.  The sample comprises the FPE cohort (those born during the period 1990 to 1993) and 
those females born during the period 1986 to 1989, but only those who have had sex in the past.   The model also includes a variable 
for female share of primary school enrollment in 2004 in the district.  Instrument: interaction of FPE cohort and FPE input, where FPE 
input is calculated as the log of funding allocated for primary school education for every 100 teacher in 2004.  Regressions are weighted 
by female population*number of teachers.  Constant term is not reported. 
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Comparison of results with other studies 
Although I show the results to be quite robust, a potential source of contention relates to 
the magnitude of the estimated impact of the SAE program.  Recall that the findings indicate that 
for an average state, an expenditure of $50,000 can help to avoid approximately four births to 
teenagers.  To my knowledge, there are no other state-level based studies to which the results can 
be compared.   
However, a comparison with the implied outcomes of a county-based abstinence study does shed 
some light on the credibility of the results.  Specifically, Doniger et al. (2001) looked at the 
impact of an abstinence education campaign (Not Me Not Now) on several outcomes, including 
pregnancy rates amongst Monroe County (New York) females in the age range 15-17 years.  
Using a cross-sectional time series study on an average of 1,611 children from middle schools 
over the period 1993-1996 and after controlling for other pregnancy-causing factors, their results 
showed that the pregnancy rates declined by 13.9 per 1,000 among the 15-17 year old females 
who were treated by the campaign.  During the same time period the largest decline in pregnancy 
rates in a comparable county was 6.3, while the decline was by 5.9 in the state of New York.  
Therefore, the implied net decline in pregnancy rates in Monroe County was 7.6 to 8 (i.e. 
7.6=13.9-6.3 and 8=13.9-5.9) over a three year period, suggesting an annual decline of about 2.6 
pregnancies  per 1,000 15-17 year old females. With an average annual sample size of 1,611, this 
in turn implies that the program may have been associated with avoiding approximately four 
pregnancies per year (=2.6/1000*1,611).  Funding for the Not Me Not Now program was 
$300,000 over the four years 1993-1996.  This meant that on average, $75,000 was spent per 
annum on the campaign.  Assuming a constant rate of return, if annual expenditure was $50,000, 
then approximately 2 pregnancies to 15-17 year-olds will be avoided.  
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Discrete-Time Hazard Analysis and Data Construction Process 
Hazard (Event History) Analysis  
To investigate the impact of the FMLA policy on fertility behavior, I apply hazard or 
event history models.  These models go by different names with the most commonly used in 
economics being discrete or continuous time hazard models.  In these models, the objective is to 
model the hazard of an event that has happened to a sample of individuals and the possible 
causes of this event overtime.  Some of these causes (explanatory variables) may either be 
constant or they may vary with time.  Although similar, there is a major difference in panel data 
models and hazard models:  panel models tend to model an outcome with different values over 
some time period while hazard models model the one-time occurrence of an event.   
I define a hazard as the probability that an individual who is at risk of experiencing an 
event does experience the event at a specified time conditional on the individual “surviving” up 
to that time.  In my framework, the hazard might be the probability that a woman eligible for 
maternity leave under the FMLA does experience a birth during some period.  Compactly, this 
may be written as: 
!"  #$%∆"'( )*", " , ∆"|."∆"  
Alternatively, this can be written as 
!"  #$%∆"'( )" / 0 1  2 , ∆"|0 3 "∆"  
where h(t) is the hazard or hazard rate;  )*", " , ∆" is the probability that the event occurs 
during the time interval [t, t+∆t).  The duration of the event is T ≥ t, S(t) suggests the individual 
survives to (past) time t; t is a particular value of T; and ∆t is some small period of time.   
156 
 
 Upon closer examination, the hazard rate, h(t) is calculated as follows: 
!"  45%678 9: $4;$<$;5=#> ?!9 7@A78$74B7 "!7 7<74""  45%678 9: $4;$<$;5=#> 7@A9>7; $4 "!7 $4"78<=# 
where the denominator is a measure of person-time-units of exposure.  The idea is that a separate 
observation is recorded for each unit of time an individual is exposed (or at risk) to an event.  For 
instance, a woman who experiences a first birth after say one year will have contributed to one 
person-year while someone who gives a first birth after five years will have contributed five 
person-years.  In hazard models, the outcome is the hazard rate.  The models may be estimated 
using continuous time or discrete time.  Typically, if the time intervals are very small units such 
as days, minutes, seconds, etc, then continuous time is preferred to discrete time hazard models.  
Models in discrete time are better utilized where there are larger time intervals such as months 
and years.  In some instances, the decision to use the continuous or the discrete-time method is 
not always clear.  In any event, the discrete method converges to the continuous time or 
(proportional hazard) model as the interval gets progressively smaller.    
 
Data Construction for Discrete Time Hazard Analysis 
I use discrete-time hazard approach to model the effect of the FMLA on the outcome 
variables.  There are several advantages to using the discrete-time approach relative to the 
continuous method.  First, as I mentioned earlier, the sample time period is in years which may 
best be utilized with the discrete time method.  Second, it is very practical to use the discrete-
time approach in non-proportional hazards with time-varying covariates.  Third, discrete-time 
hazard models work much in the same was as logit regression models which are very common in 
the social science literature.  As far as disadvantages in using the discrete-time approach, these 
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models require additional manipulation of the data and this tends to increase the size of the 
dataset. With most computer software being equipped to deal with this issue, the potential for 
long computational time is minimized.  On the other hand, the additional manipulation required 
in discrete-time models turns out to be an advantage in that there is greater transparency in 
estimation relative to continuous-time models where most of the estimation procedures are 
already programmed within the software and concealed from the user.   
Consequently, the first step in undertaking a discrete-time hazard analysis is to expand 
the dataset in the following manner.  Let yi represent the time the event (or the censoring) occurs 
for individual i, ci is a censoring binary indicator and the response variable is Yit.  Therefore, we 
have: 
C$"  D(, " 1 E$(, F  E$, B$  GG, F  E$, B$  (
H 
As an example of how to interpret the above, if a person experiences an event during the second 
time interval then the discrete response will be (Yi1,,Yi2 )=(0,1), while a person who is censored in 
the third period will have the discrete response (Yi1,,Yi2, Yi3)=(0,0,0) , and so forth.  The 
restructured dataset is called a person-period (person-year) file.  If the “event” is a first birth, for 
each year that a woman does not experience an event conditional on being at risk (eligible for 
FMLA), a separate observation (person-year) is created.  A woman gives a first birth is 
subsequently removed from the sample and adds no additional person-years to the sample.  For 
instance, beginning 1989 (the first year of the sample), a woman who experiences a first birth in 
this year, contributes one person-year.  If she does not give a first birth until say 1995, then she 
contributes seven person-years.  Censored women – those who did not experience a birth during 
the sample period – will have contributed a total of 18 person-years.  This data restructuring will 
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typically result in the number of person-years being greater than the actual number of women in 
the sample.   
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Preference questions as appearing in the SLDHS 
1. If you could go back to the time you did not have children and could choose exactly the 
number of children to have in your whole life, how many would that be?  Or for those with 
no living children, the following question was asked: If you could choose exactly the 
number of children to have in your whole life, how many would that be? 
2. How old were you when you had sexual intercourse for the very first time? 
3. Is a wife justified in refusing to have sex with her husband when she is tired or not in the 
mood? 
4. Have you ever used any (any of the contraceptive methods)?  
5. I don’t want to know the results, but have you ever been tested to see if you have the AIDS 
virus? 
6. Husband and wives do not always agree in everything.  If a wife knows her husband has a 
disease that she can get during sexual intercourse, is she justified in refusing to have sex 
with him? 
7. If a wife knows her husband has a disease that she can get during sexual intercourse, is she 
justified in asking that they use a condom when they have sex? 
8. Sometimes a husband is annoyed or angered by the things that his wife does.  In your 
opinion, is a husband justified in hitting or beating his wife in the following situations: if 
she refuses to have sex with him? (Other situations were given to the respondent as well)   
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